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Language is what makes us human, yet languages are also what 
differentiate us.
The linguistic condition of our species is perhaps no better illustrated 
than in the Himalaya. As depicted in Edward Lear’s timeless painting 
of Kanchenjunga that graces the cover of this volume, the snow-
capped mountains seem like formidable barriers and the foothills an 
impenetrable jungle to human — and hence language — contact. Yet 
the mountain range that forms the Himalayan chain is majestic, the 
foothills and valleys lush, and the high-altitude plateaus expansive — a 
seeming invitation to human interaction and linguistic exchange. 
While the geographical determination of linguistic commonality and 
difference is acute in the Himalayan region, most of the barriers and 
overtures to language contact are political, particularly with the advent 
of colonialism, modernity and globalization.
This original and timely collection brings together case studies from 
salient areas of the Himalayan region — Tibet (China), Assam (India) 
and Nepal — focused on the politics of language contact. Promoting 
a historically grounded and theoretically informed perspective, The 
Politics of Language Contact in the Himalaya offers nuanced insights 
into language and its relation to power in this geopolitically complex 
region. As editors, we are confident that it will be essential reading 
for researchers in the fields of language policy and planning, applied 
linguistics, and language and literary education. The detailed 
introduction and concluding commentary make the collection 
accessible to all social scientists concerned with questions of language, 
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and we anticipate that the book as a whole will be of interest to scholars 
in anthropology, sociolinguistics, political science and Asian studies.
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Introduction: Language Politics 
and Language Contact
Selma K. Sonntag
Language politics has always been inherently interdisciplinary, as 
highlighted by the range of disciplines contributing to and represented 
in the field — and linguistics and political science are not always the 
primary ones. The scope of the field is further enlarged by the two 
different ways that the phrase ‘language politics’ can be parsed: the 
language of politics versus the politics of language. The language of politics 
traces its contemporary roots to George Orwell’s celebrated and still 
relevant novel, 1984. The study of the manipulation of politics and 
political attitudes through language, i.e., through choice of words, 
labels and metaphors as well as grammatical and syntactical structures 
(e.g., passive versus active voice), gained momentum beginning in the 
1980s — appropriate timing given its Orwellian roots — when the linguist 
George Lakoff promoted the notion of ‘framing.’ How political issues 
are ‘framed’ often determines the parameters of political debate in the 
public sphere. Dalits throughout South Asia, including the Himalaya, 
raised their voice in the public sphere by rejecting Mahatma Gandhi’s 
paternalistic framing of them as Harijan and the more pejorative label 
of ‘Untouchables’ in favor of the agonistic term, ‘oppressed’ (dalit). The 
framing of local activity against big commercial logging in the Garhwal 
Himalaya in the 1970s as an environmental movement — the Chipko 
andolan — spread the now renowned ‘tree-hugging’ trope far beyond 
the western mountains of the Himalaya (Rangan 2000; DeLoach, Bruner 
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and Gossett 2002). In effect, Lakoff ignited the study of the language 
of politics in a number of disciplines, including enthusiasm for Critical 
Discourse Analysis (CDA) in linguistics. Political science was a laggard 
in embracing the linguistic turn, despite political communication 
having a long pedigree in the discipline dating back to Harold Laswell, 
most famous for defining politics as ‘who gets what, when and how’ in 
the 1930s.
Political science has also lagged behind other disciplines in the study 
of the politics of language, a field which has come to be populated primarily 
by applied linguists and sociolinguists under the rubric of Language 
Policy and Planning (LPP). Thomas Ricento’s (2016) four-volume 
anthology of LPP, published in the series Critical Concepts in Linguistics, 
attests to the growing prominence of the field. The origins of LPP can 
be traced back to the post-World-War-II decolonization period with the 
emergence of newly independent, dubbed ‘developing’, countries. The 
seminal LPP volume Language Problems of Developing Nations, edited 
by Joshua Fishman, Charles Ferguson and Jyotirindra Das Gupta, 
appeared in 1968. The choice of language(s) to use in education and 
administration, among other sectors, in these new nations was typically 
perceived as a problem needing to be solved by rational planning using 
‘technical tools for choosing among several alternatives’ (Rubin and 
Jernudd 1971: xiv). Linguists were enlisted for corpus development; 
they were often joined by other social scientists for the more politically 
fraught status development in the language planning process. The few 
political scientists who ventured into the field (see Sonntag 1996 for 
a list) tended to recommend monolingual language policies or a dual 
language policy which retained the former colonial language along with 
a dominant ‘native’ language. These language policy recommendations 
were for the most part informed by modernization theory, the mantra 
of which was that modern nations functioned more efficiently and 
engendered national loyalty when they adopted policies that promoted 
societal and individual monolingualism.
The growing critique of modernization theory in the 1970s affected 
the LPP field, with critical sociolinguistics taking the lead over the more 
traditional disciplines (Ricento 2000). Critical sociolinguists undertook 
and published in-depth, nuanced case studies of the politics surrounding 
language policy choices (see, e.g., Phillipson, Skutnabb-Kangas and 
 3Introduction
Africa 1986; Tollefson 1986). Many of these were descriptive rather than 
theoretically-driven, for there was no common theoretical approach in 
the LPP field to replace modernization theory, despite some dabbling 
in post-structuralism (Clayton 1999). Recently, the study of the politics 
of language has been invigorated by political theory, in particular by 
normative theorists who focus on multiculturalism. In 2003, in the 
Annual Review of Applied Linguistics, Will Kymlicka and Alan Patten 
announced that ‘political theorists in the last few years have started 
to take an interest in issues of language policy’ (Kymlicka and Patten 
2003a: 3). That same year, they published an edited volume, Language 
Rights and Political Theory (2003b), launching a prominent intervention 
into the LPP field by a subfield of political science that heretofore had 
been absent. Political scientists other than normative theorists have 
also recently been developing theoretical frameworks for analyzing 
language politics (see, e.g., Sonntag and Cardinal 2015) that resonate 
with efforts by LPP scholars (see, e.g., Tollefson 1991). 
The present volume reflects and contributes to this burgeoning, 
interdisciplinary discussion of both theoretical approaches and nuanced 
case studies in the study of language politics. While the contributors 
come from an array of traditional disciplines — linguistics, political 
science, anthropology, geography — all work, and some were trained, 
in disciplinary interstices. Most are emerging scholars, embarking on 
research careers that will continue to bridge disciplines. The book is 
also grounded in the multidisciplinary nature of area studies, focusing 
on the Himalaya, a transborder region offering a rich bounty of case 
studies. The contributors all presented, or had planned to present, 
papers at the 5th Himalayan Studies Conference in Boulder, Colorado, 
1–4 September 2017. In their Himalayan case studies, the locations of 
which are depicted on the map in Figure 0.1, the contributors focus 
on the second parsing of language politics, the politics of language, but 
they also draw upon the language of politics, or more precisely how 
language politics is framed by different agents.
A distinctive feature of this book is that all of the contributions 
address the politics of language contact. This welcome feature brings 
to the scholarly discussion on language politics a more nuanced 
understanding of language(s) and their relation to power than is often 
found in traditional social science analyses. For example, in recent 




























































econometric analyses of the politics of language, political scientists and 
economists (e.g., Ginsburg and Weber 2011; Laitin and Ramachandran 
2016) have latched onto ‘language distance,’ originally proposed by the 
linguist Joseph Greenberg (1956), as an independent variable with little 
understanding of the concept’s limitations in multilingual environments. 
In contrast, the focus on language contact in this volume allows for the 
rich, contextual analyses that area studies afford. In the context of South 
Asia, the concept of language contact is attuned to Murray Emeneau’s 
(1956) ground-breaking article on India as a linguistic area, published 
in the same issue of the journal, Language, as Greenberg’s language-
distance article. The insights that interdisciplinary, area-studies scholars 
can bring to the study of the language politics are significant, as this 
volume clearly demonstrates. 
In the formulation adopted in this book, language contact is a 
historical constant. However, the multilingualism that language contact 
generates — whether individual or societal multilingualism — is always 
contingent (see also Heugh and Stroud 2018). This contingency is primarily 
dependent on the power dynamics among those in contact. Hence the 
notion of language contact neither compels a rigid categorization of 
languages as objects, as they are treated in many social science analyses 
of language politics (e.g., Liu 2015), nor does it dissolve the category of 
language as is common among postmodernist renditions (e.g., Makoni 
and Pennycook 2005; Wee 2011). The first contribution to this volume, 
‘Language Contact and the Politics of Recognition Amongst Tibetans 
in China: The rTa’u-Speaking “Horpa” of Khams’ by Tunzhi (Sonam 
Lhundrop), Hiroyuki Suzuki and Gerald Roche, begins by developing the 
notion of language contact along two dimensions: a horizontal dimension 
(associated more with linguistics) and a vertical dimension (which brings 
into focus power dynamics). The authors argue that both dimensions in 
concert make up the politics of language contact. They then proceed to 
demonstrate how a rigid categorization of the rTa’u language spoken 
in the eastern stretches of Tibet can impede a politics of recognition as 
expatiated by political theorists who expound on multiculturalism. 
They also warn against the postmodern inclination of dismissing rTa’u 
as a language, concluding that this would equally impede the politics 
of recognition for its speakers. According to their analysis, recognition 
entails not only the politics of language but the language of politics, that 
is, how rTa’u is labeled in public and academic discourse.
6 The Politics of Language Contact in the Himalaya
While the authors of this first contribution draw on political theory in 
their case study of the politics of language contact in the Himalaya, I take 
a historical-institutionalist approach developed in comparative politics 
in my chapter, the second in this collection, entitled ‘What Happened to 
the Ahom Language? Language Politics in Assam.’ In this contribution 
I analyze the language shift from a Tai-Kadai language to Indo-Aryan 
Assamese in the precolonial Ahom kingdom in Northeastern India. 
While the power dynamics of language shift, a well-established concept 
in the LPP field (see, e.g., Fishman 1964), usually entails speakers of 
a subordinate language abandoning their language for the dominant 
language (see the other chapters in this volume), in the Ahom case those 
in power abandoned their language in preference of another language 
in the kingdom’s multilingual environment. I employ the concepts 
of state tradition and language regime to analyze how and why, in 
the Ahom kingdom, language shift defied the expected trajectory of 
power dynamics, in which those in power impose their language on 
their subordinates. Like the first chapter in this book, my contribution 
problematizes a rigid, genealogical classification of languages. By 
analyzing the politics of language contact in a historical context, I 
also expose the implicit assumptions about power and language that 
tend to adhere to studies of language politics bound to the nation-
state model. Throughout the collection, the contributors’ focus on the 
constant of language contact confirms the contingency of the nation-
state’s monolingual model. This shifts our understanding of the politics 
of language away from positing monolingualism as the norm, toward 
multilingualism as both the individual and societal default — what 
Kathleen Heugh and Christopher Stroud (2018: 1) call a ‘southern lens 
[…] for understanding multilingualism.’
In the book’s third chapter, entitled ‘Transforming Language to 
Script: Constructing Linguistic Authority through Language Contact 
in Schools in Nepal,’ Uma Pradhan examines the power dynamics —
which she conceptualizes as ‘linguistic authority‘ drawing on Pierre 
Bourdieu’s theoretical framework — of language contact in education 
in contemporary Nepal. Nepal’s new policy of MultiLingual Education 
(MLE) is generating new sites and types of language contact, as Pradhan 
outlines in her description of the adoption of multilingual textbooks in 
a school in the southern Tarai region. In the following chapter, entitled 
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‘The Significance of Place in Ethnolinguistic Vitality: Spatial Variations 
Across the Kaike-Speaking Diaspora of Nepal,’ Maya Daurio discusses 
another prominent feature of the politics of language contact in Nepal: 
mobility and internal migration. Daurio’s case study focuses on the 
rural-urban dynamics of Kaike speakers in and from the Dolpa region 
in western Nepal. In addition to a spatial dynamic, Daurio employs a 
temporal one, showing how the politics of language contact has changed 
for Kaike speakers over the decades since Jim Fisher’s (1986) original 
anthropological work in the same area.
In their contribution, ‘Speaking Chone, Speaking “Shallow”: Dual 
Linguistic Hegemonies in China’s Tibetan Frontier,’ Bendi Tso and 
Mark Turin use prolonged language contact between Chone Tibetan and 
other Tibetan languages, as well as Chinese, as a backdrop to introduce 
other key concepts in the politics of language. They problematize the 
concept of ‘linguistic hegemony’ to demonstrate that the usual binary of 
dominant versus subordinate/minority language common in research on 
language politics and particularly in the Language Policy and Planning 
(LPP) field (see, e.g., Wright 2004) is more complicated in the context 
of language contact. They develop the notion of ‘dual hegemonies’ 
to capture the complex hierarchy of languages in the border region 
where Tibet interfaces with non-Tibetan populations, particularly with 
Han Chinese. The language hierarchies they expose are hegemonic 
in that they are established through coercion and consent — through 
language policies and ideologies. Their focus on language policy 
as well as language ideology provides for a more robust analysis 
than Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) studies (see Blommaert and 
Bulcaen 2000) which tend to be limited to ideological representations in 
documents and other public discourse. Conceiving of language policy 
as the institutionalization, and not only the representation, of language 
ideology (Sonntag and Cardinal 2015: 8) enables the authors to analyze 
the role of language practices stemming from language policies, such 
as adult literacy programs, in the hegemonic establishment of language 
hierarchy. The authors of the first chapter of this volume make a similar 
point about language hierarchies: relying only on a critical analysis 
of their ideological construction often misses how speakers of the 
subordinate language(s) consent to and actively seek recognition rather 
than reject hegemony. These two contributions — the first and the last of 
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the book, and both on the politics of language contact in Tibet — suggest 
that the counter-hegemonic agency that critical sociolinguists (e.g., 
Canagarajah 1999; Pennycook 1995) tend to impute to non-dominant 
language speakers can be quite ephemeral.
The endurance of established language hierarchies is a theme 
addressed throughout the volume. Uma Pradhan’s analysis in her 
chapter suggests that an upheaval or reversal of the historically prevailing 
language hierarchy in Nepal is unlikely, despite the opening — what I 
would call a ‘critical juncture’ — provided by Nepal’s new MLE policy. 
Only when established language hierarchies are disrupted because 
of a significant change in the power dynamics — which, according 
to Uma Pradhan and others (e.g., Turin 2006), hasn’t yet happened in 
Nepal, notwithstanding its new political regime — is it likely that a 
new language hierarchy will emerge. In the case study that I present 
of the Ahom kingdom’s shift from a Tai-Kadai language to Indo-Aryan 
Assamese, the critical juncture marked the expansion of the ranks of 
the elite hierarchy to include Assamese speakers, causing Assamese 
to be valued over the Ahom language. Focusing on the local level in 
her case study in a relatively isolated rural area in Nepal, Maya Daurio 
demonstrates that power dynamics can change and evolve to alter a 
local language hierarchy. Uma Pradhan’s analysis also indicates that 
there is space at the local level for negotiating linguistic authority, albeit 
within the context of the prevailing linguistic hierarchy implicit in 
Nepal’s national framework for education.
While the focus of Maya Daurio’s study is the linguistic vitality of 
Kaike — much improved in recent decades from what Jim Fisher (1986) 
worried was a dying language — all of the contributions in this book 
at least touch upon the theme of language vitality and language loss. 
Perhaps the most dramatic case of language loss among those covered in 
this volume is that of the Ahom language in upper Assam, providing a 
fitting title for my case study: ‘What Happened to the Ahom Language?’ 
Unlike the other cases of language loss discussed in this book, Ahom 
was not a subordinate or bottom-of-the-hierarchy language. I explain 
the loss in terms of, in effect, the erosion of state traditions that had 
fostered a non-territorially-demarcated multilingual environment with 
a very high degree of language contact. Incorporation in territorially-
defined modern ‘nation-states’ with their ‘monoglot nationalism’ — as 
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Tunzhi (Sonam Lhundrop), Hiroyuki Suzuki and Gerald Roche put it 
in their contribution to this collection — has been the bane of linguistic 
diversity. This is amply demonstrated by the two contributions on 
Tibet in this volume which highlight the impending language loss 
of rTa’u and Chone Tibetan. As the authors of the first chapter note, 
Tibet is ‘typically viewed as linguistically homogeneous,’ leading to 
a somewhat simplistic view of language politics in Tibet as that of a 
Tibetan language endangered by Chinese linguistic hegemony. Such 
a narrow reading belittles, albeit most likely unintentionally, a serious 
concern over the loss of internal Tibetan linguistic diversity.
In Nepal, where the nation-state was ‘imagined’ fairly early (in 
the eighteenth century), language loss — although not language 
contact — was somewhat impeded by the relative lack of infrastructure 
in a predominantly rural environment, at least until the era of 
bikas (modernity/development), which started in the 1950s. More 
recently, fitting Nepal’s linguistic diversity into discrete, identifiable 
‘languages’ that can be preserved and even revitalized has been a 
formidable undertaking in the Nepalese nation-state’s transition from 
a monolingual to at least a nominally multilingual language regime 
(see Sonntag 1995). The hope is that this new regime will stem language 
loss, but as Uma Pradhan points out, in Nepal’s new MLE, identifying 
the languages to be saved involves ‘transform[ing] language to script,’ 
as the title of her contribution to this book indicates. In the context of 
Nepali linguistic hegemony, she demonstrates that this transformation 
results in a heavy dose of Nepali inserted into the local Tharu language 
to make the newly written Tharu in the textbooks rāmro (good). 
According to Pradhan, what connotes ‘good’ language in this case is 
the visual impact of language contact between dominant (e.g., Nepali) 
and subordinate (e.g., Tharu) written languages.
The complex relation between the spoken and written forms of 
language contact is an important element in language politics, as is well 
demonstrated in this volume. One aspect of the relationship on which 
several contributions expound is linguistic purity. Tunzhi (Sonam 
Lhundrop), Hiroyuki Suzuki and Gerald Roche observe that written 
Tibetan serves as the benchmark of purity and authenticity for Tibetans, 
hence the source of loanwords in the hierarchically subordinate rTa’u 
language whose speakers seek recognition as Tibetan. But such borrowing 
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also marks the rTa’u as not an authentic Tibetan language, further 
impeding its speakers’ claims to be Tibetan. In their chapter, Bendi Tso 
and Mark Turin explain that Chone Tibetan speakers attribute what they 
perceive as their language’s ‘shallowness’ to the high number of Chinese 
loan words. In contrast, Amdo Tibetan, standardized in written form by 
the Chinese government for use in schools and administration, is perceived 
to be more authentically Tibetan. Both of the chapters on the politics of 
language contact in Tibet in this book demonstrate how linguistic purity 
reinforces and reflects linguistic hierarchy. Uma Pradhan’s research 
suggests that incorporating loan words from the dominant language can 
help elevate the status of the subordinate language. In this case, Nepali 
loan words help ‘sanitize’ Tharu.
The power of the written standard language over spoken language 
is a common theme in this book, as the above examples suggest. As 
Uma Pradhan observes in her chapter, ‘‘‘Writing” […] became a way 
to prevent a language from being labelled as a dialect of another 
language.’ In my contribution, I note that an important aspect of the 
critical juncture marking the shift from Tai-Kadai Ahom to Indo-Aryan 
Assamese was when court chronicles started to be written in Assamese 
by new entrants into the ruling hierarchy who were literate in Assamese. 
Yet the relationship between written and spoken language(s) is often 
muddled or overlooked by scholars of language politics. Political 
scientists tend to conflate the written and spoken language (e.g., Laitin 
and Ramachandran 2016) and LPP scholars tend to wall off their 
discipline from literary studies where written language is the focus. 
The chapters in this volume help overcome these deficits in the study of 
language politics by, as Pradhan puts it, ‘drawing attention to the often-
overlooked dynamics of written language contact’ and contributing to 
a further broadening of the field of language politics through a more 
interdisciplinary lens.
This book also addresses the relationship between language and 
ethnicity, a topic which tends to be overdetermined in scholarship 
on language politics (May 2008: 8). The contributions demonstrate 
that this relationship, like the multilingualism generated by language 
contact, is temporally and spatially contingent. Maya Daurio’s chapter 
illustrates the spatial contingency of ethnolinguistic identity: diasporic 
Kaike speakers tend to identify their language as a marker of their 
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ethnicity more so than those who remain in the Tichurong Valley in 
Dolpa. Furthermore, both diasporic and valley-dwelling Kaike speakers 
identify Kaike as their language and not their ethnicity. Instead they 
identify ethnically as Tarali — which Daurio points out can also cover 
non-Kaike-speaking Tichurong residents. Identification with their larger 
ethnic group, the Magars of Nepal, is even less common, particularly 
for Tichurong residents. When Kaike speakers do identify as Magar, 
it is primarily for instrumental reasons. The temporal contingency of 
the relation between language and ethnic identity is highlighted in the 
first two chapters of the volume. Tunzhi (Sonam Lhundrop), Hiroyuki 
Suzuki and Gerald Roche analyze the exonyms used for rTa’u speakers 
which historically identify them as non-Tibetan. Yet rTa’u speakers self-
identify as Tibetans. This self-identification, argue the authors, should 
be recognized and respected, no matter that rTa’u can be linguistically 
classified as a non-Tibetan language. As Mark Turin (2018: 265) has 
contended, ‘There is no reason that communities should be expected 
to define or categorize themselves based upon externally imposed 
linguistic criteria that have a lot to say about grammar but nothing to 
say about belonging.’ In my chapter, I argue that the Ahom were not an 
ethnic group, and linguistic identity was not a meaningful identifier of 
belonging in precolonial Assam, despite the intensity of ethnolinguistic 
identity in Assam today. The ‘essentializing link between language and 
identity,’ as Tunzhi (Sonam Lhundrop), Hiroyuki Suzuki and Gerald 
Roche put it in their contribution, is a colonial and modern nation-state 
construct. Most states engaged in nation-building have attempted to link 
national identity to a single language, resulting in language policies that 
promoted monolingualism. This clearly was the case in Nepal, as Uma 
Pradhan demonstrates in her contribution. Only recently has the Nepali 
state entertained demands for mother-tongue education, legalizing 
multilingual education practices of the type that Pradhan details in 
her chapter. Her analysis indicates that the process of transforming the 
mother tongue of Tharus into a Tharu language to be used in schools 
belies a simple equation between language and ethnicity. 
The scholarly enterprise of mapping ethnicities onto languages or 
languages onto ethnicities is not the straightforward, objective activity 
that is often assumed in studies of ethnolinguistic politics, particularly 
those that negatively correlate ethnolinguistic diversity within a nation 
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with poor national economic performance (e.g., Easterly and Levine 
1997; Liu 2015). Situating their case study in a key transborder region, 
Bendi Tso and Mark Turin demonstrate the limitations of confining 
analyses of the relationship between language and ethnicity to the 
national context. According to their research, Chone Tibetans tend to 
evaluate their language in terms of both the Tibetan ethnolinguistic 
context and the Chinese national context. Both contexts devalue Chone 
Tibetan, a politics of language that can best be understood by focusing 
on language contact, as exemplified throughout this volume. This 
lack of isomorphism between language and ethnicity — so apparent 
in the Himalaya — should be the starting point, the basic assumption, 
of scholarly analyses of language politics. As Mark Turin (2018: 264) 
argues, scholarly ‘thinking that fuses ethnicity together with language’ 
is not only sloppy but potentially ‘dangerous’ to adducing the politics 
of language by neglecting the role of language contact in group identity 
(see also Wee 2018). Recent work on language politics elsewhere (see, 
e.g., Albaugh and de Luna 2018 on Africa) similarly challenges the 
assumption of the universality of a one-to-one correspondence between 
language and ethnicity — an assumption that emanates from the 
historical experience of the West/North. In this regard, this volume, 
based in interdisciplinary area studies, makes an important contribution 
to the study of language politics beyond the Himalaya. To quote Turin 
(2018: 263) again, ‘the collapsing of ethnicity and language into one 
category [is] a “political act”.’ 
The themes of language contact, language and ethnicity, written and 
spoken forms of language, purity and authenticity, linguistic hegemony 
and hierarchy, and language vitality and language loss that are 
addressed in the contributions to this book in the context of Himalayan 
area studies are crucial to advancing our understanding of language 
politics. The interdisciplinary nature of the volume is a vital ingredient 
to this advancement, in both the Himalaya and beyond.
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1. Language Contact and the Politics 
of Recognition amongst Tibetans in 
the People’s Republic of China
The rTa’u-Speaking ‘Horpa’ of Khams
Tunzhi (Sonam Lhundrop), Hiroyuki Suzuki, 
and Gerald Roche
Vertical and Horizontal Politics  
of Language Contact in Tibet
Language contact has both horizontal and vertical dimensions. The 
horizontal dimension refers to the exchange of linguistic features that 
takes place during language contact. This includes the flows of lexicon, 
phonemes, syntactic structures, and so on, that occur via practices of 
borrowing, code-switching, and the intergenerational transmission 
of languages acquired in adulthood. Over time, such horizontal 
exchanges lead to linguistic convergence, the emergence of creoles and 
pidgins, and the formation of language areas. The vertical dimension 
of language contact, meanwhile, refers to the ordering of populations 
into hierarchies according to their language practices, through various 
processes of domination and subordination (Grillo 1989). Whilst the 
horizontal dimension of language contact is primarily associated 
with convergence, the vertical dimension is associated with linguistic 
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differentiation (Gal 2016) and language shift — the replacement of one 
language by another (Pauwels 2016). 
Both horizontal and vertical dimensions of language contact 
influence one another, and both are inherently political. Regarding 
the horizontal dimension, we often see, for example, the existence of 
purist ideologies (Thomas 1991) underlying resistance to loanwords in 
accordance with the position of language varieties and their speakers 
in a vertical hierarchy; purism typically targets terms from threatening 
dominant languages, but is indifferent to borrowing from subordinate 
languages. The features that are exchanged in horizontal contact are 
also coded as indexing various types of vertically arranged categories 
of languages (beautiful/ugly, expressive/restrictive, etc.) and people 
(good/bad, superior/inferior, competent/incompetent, etc.) (Alim, 
Rickford, and Ball 2016; Piller 2016). The various interactions between 
the vertical and horizontal dimensions of language contact produce the 
multitude of language ecologies present today — the rich diversity of 
how multiple language forms are differentiated and organized in social 
and physical space (Haugen 2001). 
In this chapter we focus on the vertical dimension of the politics of 
language contact, with a discussion of ‘recognition’ as a key process 
through which vertical sorting takes place in language contact situations. 
From within the vast literature on the politics of recognition, we focus on 
key sources in order to introduce how this concept can be used to think 
about the vertical dimension of language contact. Cillian McBride (2013) 
distinguishes two subtly distinct varieties of ‘recognition’, which we 
will gloss as ‘individual recognition’, and ‘collective recognition’ — we 
focus on the latter. Both concepts draw on Hegel’s foundational work 
on the intersubjective nature of identity (Cudd 2006) — the way that 
individual and collective identities are formed through relationships 
with others, rather than arising from the inherent qualities of the 
individual or collective self. In this view, recognition by others is a key 
component of the development of self-identity. For theorists of collective 
recognition such as Charles Taylor and Nancy Fraser, the recognition 
of a person’s belonging to a larger group is foundational to healthy 
identity formation. Injustice arises when such identities are denied 
(non-recognition) or are denied equal respect to mainstream identities 
(mis-recognition). Both non- and mis-recognition lead to various harms, 
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including social exclusion, economic marginalization, interpersonal 
discrimination against members of non- and mis-recognized groups, 
and a distorted sense of self and self-worth. We argue that in the context 
of language contact and the creation of language hierarchies, language 
shift can also be viewed as a harm resulting from mis-recognition. 
We examine recognition and the formation of language hierarchies 
in the Tibetan context. Although typically viewed as linguistically 
homogenous, with diversity existing only between dialects of a single 
Tibetan language, Tibet is actually home to significant linguistic 
diversity (Roche 2014, 2017). The region’s language ecology is now 
dominated by the national language of the People’s Republic of China 
(PRC), Putonghua, whilst an imagined, standard Tibetan language, 
represented by the written language, acts as a regionally dominant, but 
nationally minoritized, language. Meanwhile, this standard Tibetan 
language is positioned in a vertical hierarchy above the region’s spoken 
Tibetic varieties (Tournadre 2014) and its minority (i.e., non-Tibetic) 
languages (Roche and Suzuki 2018). An important factor conditioning 
the prestige and vitality of these minority languages is their lack of 
official recognition by the Chinese state, which renders them invisible 
to formal language policy and planning initiatives (Roche and Yudru 
Tsomu 2018). However, in this article we do not discuss state policies 
and practices, but instead draw attention to another way in which Tibet’s 
minority languages are subordinated in a language hierarchy — their 
mis-recognition by the ‘mainstream’ Tibetan population. 
We examine the mis-recognition of Tibet’s minority languages 
through an exploration of the case of the rTa’u language. rTa’u is spoken 
by approximately 45,000 people in western Sichuan Province, primarily 
in dKar mdzes (Ganzi) Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture. All its speakers 
are classified as Tibetans within the state’s ethnic classification system, 
and also consider themselves as such. rTa’u has a long history of contact 
with Tibetan, as evidenced by the numerous Tibetan loanwords it 
contains (Wang 1970–71). However, this contact has intensified in the 
past three decades in the context of rapid, state-led development and 
increasing human mobility. A recent investigation into the vitality of 
rTa’u found it to be ‘clearly endangered’ (Tunzhi 2017), with widespread 
language shift towards Tibetan underway. rTa’u is widely known in 
the linguistic literature as Horpa, and Tunzhi (2017) has argued that 
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the use of this exonym by linguists potentially contributes to rTa’u 
speakers’ negative attitudes towards their language and thus also 
contributes to undermining the language’s vitality. In this chapter, we 
extend this argument in two parts. First, we examine how debates about 
the origin of rTa’u speakers and the ‘notorious ambivalence’ (Wang 
1970–71) of the term Hor both contribute to mis-recognition, insofar 
as they bring into question the rTa’u speaker’s deeply-felt Tibetan 
identity. Secondly, we look at how this mis-recognition articulates with 
the broader position of rTa’u speakers in the context of contemporary 
debates and social movements amongst Tibetans in the PRC. We argue 
that this mis-recognition in two social domains — the academic and 
the everyday — contributes to the overall subordination of the rTa’u 
language within the Tibetan hierarchy of languages, which in turn is 
driving language shift. 
In the conclusion, we examine the implications of these arguments 
for understanding language contact in Tibet and the Himalaya more 
broadly, addressing our conclusions to both analytical and normative 
concerns. Analytically, we argue that the concept of recognition, 
despite having been critiqued by both anthropologists and linguists, is 
nonetheless useful in understanding the politics of language contact. 
Secondly, our normative conclusions examine how a more nuanced 
consideration of the dynamics of recognition can be used to formulate 
ameliorative projects that could help foster linguistic diversity in the 
region, and reverse the widespread language shift currently underway 
throughout Tibet and the Himalaya; we contrast this perspective with 
current local approaches to language politics in Tibet, which are, as we 
show below, based in essentializing and purist discourses that are likely 
to be contributing to, rather than resisting, language loss. 
The rTa’u-speaking ‘Horpa’:  
Ambiguous Origins and Shifting Polysemy 
A great deal of scholarly attention in the PRC has been focused on 
placing rTa’u speakers within the broader Tibetan community. Within 
these debates, the fact that rTa’u speakers are Tibetans, but speak a non-
Tibetic language, is viewed as a ‘problem’ that requires solving, often 
through historical investigations seeking a single baptismal origin for 
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the population, which would supposedly resolve the issue of their 
contemporary identity. This search for a single origin is complicated 
by the polysemy of the term Hor that is applied to rTa’u speakers in 
literary Tibetan, and which is also used in Chinese and English texts 
to refer to their language. We argue that the search for origins, and 
the polysemy of Hor, are part of a broad regime of mis-recognition 
that does not take into account rTa’u speakers’ professed identity as 
unproblematically Tibetan, despite their linguistic distinctiveness. 
Following, we briefly examine the main competing theories of the 
origins of the Horpa people before discussing the polysemy of the 
term Hor. 
Numerous scholars trace the origin of rTa’u speakers to the Mongols, 
typically Eastern or Khalkha Mongols (Zeng 2006; Ren 1981; Gele 1988; 
Ganzi Xianzhi 1999; Daofu Xianzhi 1997). The Mongol invasion of what 
is now dKar mdzes Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture is an unequivocal 
historical fact. Proponents of the theory that rTa’u-speakers originate 
with Mongols trace the term Horpa directly to the legacy of having 
been invaded, and then ruled over, by Mongols, known as Hor, from 
the Yuan Dynasty (1271–1368) to the early Qing Dynasty (1644–1912) 
(Tunzhi 2017). Although no linguist today considers rTa’u to be a 
Mongolic language, there has nonetheless been speculation that rTa’u is 
related to Mongolian, such as in Zeng (2007: 186): 
We departed from Dajianlu (Kangding), setting out to explore the Hor 
region. As we passed through Songlinkou, we discovered that the 
Horpa people are different from Khams-Tibetans. Our interpreter, who 
was from Kangding told us […] that the language spoken by Horpa 
people is a mixture of Mongolian and Tibetan called Dijiaohua, which is 
incomprehensible to neighboring Tibetans. 
Zeng (2007) further cites reference to local toponyms in identifying 
Mongolian influence.1 
A second theory that seeks to explain rTa’u origins is what we call 
the nativist theory. This theory has received little attention — only a few 
scholars from dKar mdzes Prefecture have written on the topic, though 
it is widely discussed in local intellectual circles. A key proponent of 
1  For instance, the township located about ten kilometers east of Luhuo County town 
called Srib mo (Simu) is said to be a Mongolian term, as is the village name Shwa ba 
thang (Xialatuo), which is said to mean ‘Yellow Plain’.
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this view is Ran (2004), who, in addition to his published work, has 
also given several oral presentations on the theory, and has written a 
number of unpublished manuscripts on the topic. The nativist theory 
argues that place names in the Tibetan-speaking area to the west of the 
rTa’u-speaking region provide good evidence that the rTa’u language 
predates the arrival of the Tibetan language. Ran (2004: 27) provides a 
list of mountain and place names which he argues are rTa’u in origin, 
e.g., that use the prefix /ʐæ/, meaning mountain in rTa’u, but having 
no meaning in Tibetan. This is significant given that rTa’u language 
is today no longer spoken in this area. Ran (2004: 26–37) thus argues 
that rTa’u speakers or the rTa’u language are native to the area,2 and 
prominent local Tibetan scholar Thubtan Phuntshog (Thub bstan Phun 
tshogs, p.c.) concurs with Ran’s argument. 
Although situating rTa’u speakers as indigenous might be viewed 
as an attempt to raise their status within local language hierarchies, 
like the theory of Mongol origins, it still constitutes a form of mis-
recognition in treating Tibet’s minority language speakers as a problem 
that needs to be solved — an aberrance from an assumed mainstream 
population — and in not taking seriously speakers’ professed identities. 
Such debates about the origin of rTa’u speakers can be understood in 
the broader situation of the numerous ways in which the term Hor is 
used in Tibetan contexts. An exploration of how the meaning of this 
term has changed over time, and shifts according to context, will show 
that the mis-recognition found in the search for Horpa origins is also 
perpetuated by the use of this polysemous label. 
The word Hor appears in both written and spoken varieties of 
Tibetan. For instance, Powers and Templeman (2012: 299) define Horpa 
as: ‘a term used by Tibetans to refer to Uyghurs, and sometimes to 
Mongols. It generally refers to Turkic or Mongolian people living near 
Tibetan populations in northern Tibet and modern Qinghai.’ Edgar 
(1932: 71) states in a description regarding the people called Hor in 
the dKar mdzes area that, ‘the “Yugurs” and the “Hor” are the same 
people.’ In the following discussion of the term Hor, we first examine 
and compare definitions in several modern Tibetan dictionaries, and 
then, with reference to Moriyasu (1977), explore the shifting meaning 
2  Ran (2004: 26–37) dates the antiquity of this settlement to approximately the fifth 
and sixth centuries AD. 
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of Hor over time. Finally, we survey the different meanings of Hor in a 
variety of local contexts throughout the eastern Tibetosphere.
Amongst modern Tibetan dictionaries, Jäschke (1881: 598) defines 
Hor according to two historical periods: formerly, it designated a Mongol, 
whilst at the time of writing it referred to Tibetans living near Lake Nam 
(gNam mtsho) in Central Tibet, or to Turkic peoples in Western Tibet. 
Les Missionnaires Catholiques du Thibet (1899: 1066) first defines Hor as 
a term for both regions and people, namely, in the western Tibetan area 
it refers to Turkestani people, whereas in central Tibet it denotes various 
pastoral tribes in the North Plains (Byang thang) region. Additionally, 
Hor is also claimed to designate Le thang [sic],3 ’Ba’ thang, and sDe dge, 
as well as a large region referred to as the Hor zar Khag lnga [sic]4 or Hor 
po Khag lnga [sic].5 Das (1902: 1329, 1330) defines Hor as ‘a Tatar’, and 
Hor pa as ‘a Dzungarian; also a Tibetan from the northern provinces, a 
herdsman of North Tibet.’ Zhang (1985: 3071–72), meanwhile, defines 
Hor as describing various ethnic groups in different periods, i.e., Yugur 
(Uyghur) before the Yuan; Mongol in the Yuan; ’A zha and Tuyuhun 
in the Yuan-Ming transition; and at present, pastoralists in the Byang 
thang, and members of the Tu nationality (minzu) of Qinghai. Zhang 
also provides two additional meanings: a po hor, for pastoralists living 
in northern Tibet, and people of the Khams Tre Hor region, although 
the Chinese description in the dictionary is ‘Mongolians living in five 
regions: Daofu, Luhuo, Zhuwo, Ganzi, and Donggu’.6 Goldstein (2001: 
1175) provides two meanings: firstly, referring to either Mongolia or 
Mongols or, secondly, to the pastoralists living in Northern Tibet. 
We see both variation and overlap in these definitions. Whereas 
Goldstein (2001: 1175) does not distinguish Mongols and pastoralists 
in Northern Tibet, Jäschke (1881: 598) clearly mentions the temporal 
distinction between these two; however, as a modern synchronic 
description, Hor in the sense of Mongol also appears in compounds 
3  Li thang in Literary Tibetan. However, local Tibetans in Li thang consider the 
toponym as Le thang which has the same sense as Li thang ‘grassland as a bronze 
mirror’. The local pronunciation follows the spelling Le thang, not Li thang. 
4  Hor sras khag lnga ‘five districts ruled by the Hor prince’ in Literary Tibetan. 
5  Hor dpon khag lnga ‘five Hor chieftain’s states’ in Literary Tibetan. There are also 
other Literary forms, such as hor khog khag lnga and hor khag sde lnga.
6  Each of them in Literary Tibetan is rTa’u, Brag ’go, Tre hor, dKar mdzes, and sTong 
skor. However, the components of ‘five regions’ are not consistent in literature and 
narratives.
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such as Hor glu ‘Mongol song’, Hor gos ‘Mongol clothing’, and Hor zla 
‘Mongol calender’. Jäschke (1881: 598), Les Missionnaires Catholiques 
du Thibet (1899: 1066), and Zhang (1985: 3072) point out that the 
meaning of Hor differs according to region, denoting pastoralists of 
northern U-Tsang, Turkic people in Western Tibet,7 and people in five 
Hor districts in Khams. Therefore, Hor is a polysemic word when 
viewed synchronically. Finally, as Goldstein (2001: 1175) makes clear, 
the meaning also varies depending on whether a text is in Classical or 
Modern Tibetan.
Moriyasu (1977) provides a diachronic perspective on the polysemy 
of the term Hor through a detailed analysis of the Dunhuang document,8 
Pelliot Tibétain 1283,9 together with other primary sources in Chinese, 
Old Uyghur, and Literary Tibetan. He argues that Hor originally 
denoted non-Tibetan groups living on the northern Tibetan plateau, 
regardless of their specific ethnicity, but excluding the Han of the Tang 
and Qing Dynasties, and the Uyghur (1977: 43–44). He divides changes 
in the object denoted by Hor into five periods (see Table 1.1):
Table 1.1.  Changes in the meaning of Hor over time.
Era Meaning of Hor
7th c. to mid 8th c.  
(until early 9th c.)
ethnic groups in northern Tibet, between Tibet 
and Tang
late 8th c. to 9th c. equivalent to Dru gu (Turkic or Uyghur)
13th c. to 15th c. Mongol
(16th to) 17th c.  
(until 18th c.)
ethnic groups of Qinghai and Turkic and Mughal 
people in Western Tibet
19th c. to 20th c. ethnic groups of Northern Tibet (Byang thang) 
and Eastern Tibet (sDe dge)
Source: Moriyasu 1977
7  Not giving a detailed description on the usage of hor in the western Tibetosphere 
within the article, we note here that in the present Ladakh, Tibetic-speakers employ 
hor to designate Turkic groups, especially Uyghur and Uzbek as well as hor pa for 
these people (Nicolas Tournadre, p.c.). 
8  This collection of documents, found in the Mogao caves in contemporary 
Dunhuang, Gansu Province, in the People’s Republic of China, includes some of 
the earliest known Tibetan texts. 
9  The transliteration of this document is available at http://otdo.aa.tufs.ac.jp/archives.
cgi?p=Pt_1283. 
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He concludes by defining Hor as ‘ethnic groups except for the Han 
living on the northern Tibetan plateau, as well as those living in contact 
with the border of Tibet’ (Moriyasu 1977: 45). Moriyasu thus claims that 
for Tibetans, Hor denotes non-Tibetan ethnic groups on the northern 
Tibetan plateau, which is why it excludes Han, who are the counterpart 
to the east of Tibet. Based on this conclusion, we can understand that 
the polysemy of the word Hor is partially due to an accumulation of 
various meanings, and the meaning denoted by the word depends on 
the era and region. 
If we turn to contemporary usages of the term, we find significant 
differences from this historical situation. Moreover, there are 
differences between Hor as an autonym and an exonym. We will 
examine how Hor is used in the regions of U-Tsang, Amdo and 
Khams, following an introduction to Hodgson’s (1853) distinction 
between Hor and Sog.10 Hodgson (1853: 122–23) describes Hórsók 
as a compound of two Literary Tibetan words hor and sog; however, 
no modern Tibetan dictionary we consulted includes this compound 
(Jäschke 1881; Les Missionnaires Catholiques du Thibet 1899; Zhang 
ed. 1985; Goldstein 2001). Oidtmann (2014) also discusses Hor Sog 
as a copular expression appearing in the title of a text11 by Welmang 
Pandita Konchok Gyaltsen,12 and analyses Hor Sog as ‘Hor and Sog’, 
referring to the Yuan and then later Mongol khanates, especially 
that of Gushri Khan (2014: 306). Both Ahmad (1970: 110) and Tucci 
(1999: 256n128) make a similar distinction between Hor and Sog as 
representing distinct Mongol populations. 
In the context of the U-Tsang, Hor primarily denotes Tibetan people 
living in the Nag chu region, and is used as both an exonym and 
autonym; people in Nag chu call themselves Hor pa, whilst outsiders 
call them a pho hor,13 an appellation that typically carries a derogatory 
connotation. Nag chu Tibetans nonetheless express strong attachment 
10  In the earlier period, sog denoted countries and states to the west of Tibet, mainly 
the present Iran as sog po stag gzi, and at present Turkey, sog po du ru ka: (Zhang ed. 
1985: 2961). 
11  rGya bod hor sog gyi lo rgyus nyung brjod pa byis pa ’jug pa’i ’bab stegs.
12  dBal mang paN Di ta dKon mchog rGyal mtshan (1764–1863). Although 
Oidtmann (2014) transcribes the first name as Belmang, we provide the local 
pronunciation — Welmang.
13  Zhang (1985: 3072, 3121) provides a spelling a po hor, which might follow the 
pronunciation of Central Tibet.
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to their identity as Hor, and in particular to their place within the thirty-
nine Hor tribes, Hor tsho So dgu (Karmay 2005; Shi and lHa mo thar 
2012). Linguistically, the Nag chu Hor language is considered a member 
of the Khams pastoralists’ dialect group by previous works such as Qu 
(1996) and sKal bzang ’Gyur med and sKal bzang dByangs can (2002), 
and as a member of the southeastern section together with many Khams 
Tibetan subgroups (Tournadre 2014).14
In Amdo, the northeastern part of the Tibetosphere, Roche (2011) 
mentions that Turkic-, Sinitic-, and Mongolic-speaking peoples of Amdo 
are often construed as and referred to as Hor, and he documents how 
Tibetans in Xing’er Township (Minhe County) refer to local Mangghuer 
people as Hor. Nowadays, many Amdo Tibetan speakers primarily 
understand Hor as a term designating the people of Tu nationality (hor 
rigs). However, in referring to the Tu as Hor, the term Hor pa is not used 
in Amdo. 
In Khams, especially within the present dKar mdzes Prefecture of 
Sichuan Province, we find Hor as an appellation of ethnic groups as 
well as toponyms. According to Moriyasu (1977), Tibetans in Central 
Tibet began, in the nineteenth century, to use Hor to refer to inhabitants 
of the ‘five Hor regions’: rTa’u, Brag ’go, Tre hor, dKar mdzes, and 
sTong skor in today’s dKar mdzes (cf. Zhang 1985: 3071); inhabitants 
of this region are referred to as Hor pa, and toponyms containing 
Hor are widespread. However, it is crucial to note that Hor in this 
context is an exonym. Although some contemporary Tibetans of the 
‘five Hor regions’ now refer to themselves as Horpa, the term appears 
to have originated as an exonym approximately 200–300 years ago, in 
the Yongzheng period of the Qing Dynasty, i.e., the early eighteenth 
century (Li 2015: 120–21). 
The extent of the Hor khog Khag lnga is limited to the northern 
part of the contemporary dKar mdzes Prefecture, from dKar mdzes 
County in the north to rTa’u County in the south. However, we can find 
toponyms containing Hor even in southern Khams, up to the present 
gTor ma rong valley in bDe chen Prefecture, where we find a hamlet 
called Hor gzung,15 which locals interpret to mean ‘the place grasped 
14  This group was previously named Kham-Hor in Tournadre (2005). 
15  Huorong. Here and following, the Chinese pinyin for Tibetan place names are 
provide in the footnotes. 
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(controlled) by Hor’. Tibetans living in this hamlet consider Hor to 
mean ‘Mongol’, referring to Mongols who came to the area during the 
Yuan Dynasty. Li thang and Nyag chu kha counties also have several 
toponyms such as Hor lung (township),16 Hor chu (river),17 and Hor 
rnying a.k.a. Hor ra rnying ba (township).18 Locals also interpret these 
names to be connected to Mongols of the Yuan Dynasty. 
Throughout Khams, the term Hor (for Mongols) is typically 
conflated with Sog. In interviews with local Tibetans residing in or near 
hamlets containing Hor, the term Sog was consistently used to refer to 
Mongols, not Hor. No one was able to explicitly distinguish Hor from 
Sog. Some outsiders suggest that Hor in Li thang and Nyag chu kha can 
be interpreted as Hor in Hor khog Khag lnga; however, except for the 
mention of Les Missionnaires Catholiques du Thibet (1899: 1066) that 
Hor also designates Le thang [sic], ’Ba’ thang, and sDe dge, nowhere 
else is it recorded that Li thang and Nyag chu kha were part of Hor 
khog Khag lnga. Furthermore, we can note that in some toponyms in 
dKar mdzes Prefecture, Sog often refers to ‘Mongol’, even in relation 
to the Yuan Dynasty, such as Sog pho (township) of Rong mi Brag ’go 
(a.k.a. Rong brag) County. Local Tibetans trace their origins to Mongol 
soldiers who did not complete the journey to Yunnan. Contemporary 
residents are Khams Tibetan speakers, and are generally unfamiliar with 
the term Hor. Lastly, we refer to Giraudeau and Goré’s (1956) French-
Tibetan dictionary, which primarily reflects spoken varieties from the 
southern Khams area. They give a single Tibetan word for ‘Mongolian’: 
sog po, followed by an example Sog po gong ma, denoting ‘Mongolian 
or Manchurian emperor’ (1956: 185). This means that they understand 
Sog po both as Mongolian and Manchurian in the historical context, 
whereas it only means Mongolian in the contemporary context. This 
view, except for the sense of Manchurian, is widely shared by Tibetans 
in southern Khams today. The word Hor as a designation of Mongol 
does not appear in this dictionary.
To summarize, then, local Tibetans in Khams often understand both 
Hor and Sog to mean Mongol, but use Sog for Mongols in the modern 
age, and Hor in a historical context related to the Yuan Dynasty. As 
16  Honglong. 
17  Huoqu. 
18  Heni or Heranniba. 
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Moriyasu (1977) points out, Mongolians in the Yuan Dynasty were 
called Hor by Tibetans; however, Tibetans in the contemporary era 
hardly recognize the historical difference between the two lexemes, and 
thus understand them as synonyms. 
Taken together, the debates around the origins of rTa’u speakers, 
and the polysemy of the term Hor suggest the same thing — that 
rTa’u speakers are somehow less than Tibetan; that their identity is a 
problem that needs to be solved, since they are distinct from a perceived 
Tibetan norm. Both the search for origins and the exonym Hor suggest 
that somewhere there is an unproblematic, standard Tibetan to whom 
rTa’u speakers are being compared. The polysemy of the term Hor is 
particularly telling in this regard, since the only point at which all possible 
meanings of the term converge is around the concept of a ‘non-Tibetan’ 
inhabitant of Tibet. Meanwhile, the debates around the origin of rTa’u 
speakers enact mis-recognition in a more subtle way, in that, even when 
finding rTa’u speakers to be indigenous, they serve the ‘metacultural’ 
function (Urban 2001) of validating a link between historical origins 
and contemporary identity, and thus overriding the views and beliefs 
of contemporary rTa’u speakers, whilst also perpetuating the status of 
rTa’u speakers as a problematic population that necessitates special 
explanation for their distinctiveness. These academic infatuations with 
the supposedly problematic nature of rTa’u speakers and the Hor stand 
in stark contrast to rTa’u speakers’ self-perception as unproblematically 
Tibetan, despite their linguistic distinctiveness. Even though most rTa’u 
speakers are unaware of these debates — only two college graduate 
interviewees out of a total of thirty had even heard the term Hor19 — we 
nonetheless argue that these debates are significant in that they form 
part of a larger regime of mis-recognition when viewed in the broader 
context of contemporary discussions around Tibetan identity and 
language in the PRC.
19  The following section is based on two periods of fieldwork, in 2014 and 2017. Data 
were collected mainly through qualitative, semi-structured interviews, with a 
sample of twenty in the former and ten in the latter, by way of cluster sampling.
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rTa’u-speakers and Contemporary  
Tibetan Language Politics 
Within contemporary discussion around language and identity amongst 
Tibetans, minority languages such as rTa’u are faced with a pervasive 
climate of mis-recognition. This primarily manifests as the assertion of 
monoglot nationalism (Dorian 1998; Heinrich 2012), a standard language 
ideology (Lippi-Green 1997) that portrays all Tibetans as speaking a 
single language. This singularity is often explained in terms of common 
origins and descent, with all the languages of Tibet typically viewed as 
rooted in the written form. In this view, non-standard languages are 
thought to be corrupted, degraded forms of the written language, as 
expressed in the following quote from the Tibetan historian Tsepon WD 
Shakabpa (2009: 13).
The spoken and written forms of Tibetan are closely related, although 
there are modest corruptions in the spoken form in widespread areas: 
Lhodruk, Sikkim, Ladakh, Monpa, Sherpa, Tamang, and so forth […] 
although there is one original language for the three provinces of Tibet, 
regional accents have evolved. Because of these corruptions, if one does 
not listen carefully, it is difficult to understand.
Such a view portrays rTa’u and other minority languages of Tibet 
as corrupted forms of written Tibetan, thus placing them beneath 
the written language in a prestige hierarchy organized around the 
principle of purity. This view of non-standard languages as degraded 
forms of the written language can be gleaned from Teichman’s 
(1922: 65, emphasis added) description of rTa’u, which most likely 
reproduces the views of local interlocutors: ‘The language spoken at 
Dawu (perhaps akin to that used in the Gyarong States further east) is 
a very corrupt form of Tibetan, if indeed it is a Tibetan dialect at all.’20 
Similarly, Rockhill’s (2004 [1891]: 263) description of rTa’u language 
as ‘a wonderful mixture of Tibetan and Chinese’ is most likely derived 
from his local informants, and represents the Tibetan standard 
language ideology that diversion from an ancestral language comes 
about via ‘corruption’ from other languages. 
20  Teichman then goes on to discuss the ‘curious racial mixture’ of local Tibetans, 
suggesting that he viewed linguistic and biological types as related. 
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When not tied to the written language by a process of temporal 
degradation, minority languages such as rTa’u may be connected to 
written Tibetan by an imagined process of fossilization; divergence 
as stasis rather than change. A number of online commentaries21 have 
attempted to establish some sort of relationship between Old Tibetan 
and contemporary rTa’u, in support of the theory that rTa’u is a ‘living 
fossil’ of Old Tibetan. One online article22 by a rTa’u-speaker suggests 
that rTa’u speakers are the descendants of soldiers sent by Tibetan kings 
to safeguard the eastern entrance to the Tibetan plateau. According to 
the author, this explains the supposed character traits of contemporary 
rTa’u speakers: negotiation skills and a tendency to fight. The author 
even suggests that the language itself was developed as a secret code 
for spying purposes. This article, from a native perspective, if nothing 
else, emphasizes the desire of rTa’u people to be identified as Tibetans. 
Alongside such attempts to identify rTa’u with Old Tibetan, local 
discourses also draw attention to the language’s radical difference from 
spoken Tibetan. When referring to the language, non-rTa’u speakers 
typically refer to it not as Horpa (as in Literary Tibetan) or rTa’u (as 
speakers refer to it), but as logs skad — a widespread Tibetan term used to 
refer to non-standard languages in the eastern Tibetosphere. This term has 
been defined as referring to a ‘kind of speech not understood by others in 
a certain region, line of work, etc.’23 And although this definition appears 
merely descriptive and non-pejorative, rTa’u speakers consider logs skad 
to have definite negative connotations; it is not a term they themselves 
use.24 Another term applied by other Tibetans to the rTa’u language, but 
not used by rTa’u speakers themselves, is ’dre skad, which literally means 
‘ghost speech/language.’25 As with logs skad, this term carries negative 
21  A speech on Mdo Kham rTa’u area by ‘gyaur Med Tshering, 26 April 2014: 
http://ti.zangdiyg.com/Article/detail/id/2620.html; a brief talk on Mdo Kham 
rTa’u language by Orgyan rDorje, 12 March 2015: http://www.tibetcm.com/
contemporary/critical/2015-03-12/7472.html 
22  A short take on the relationship between rTa’u language and written Tibetan 
by rTa’u rGyal Mtshan, 25 June 2016: http://www.gltadra.com/kb/ndbw.
asp?id=1321&Zhg=001&NdRak_ID=ZamqowLc#ndbwNdCam 
23  The Tibetan & Himalayan Library, Tibetan text archive, English definition of logs 
skad, http://dictionary.thlib.org/internal_definitions/public_term/123461 
24  Suzuki and Sonam Wangmo (2016) discuss the term logs skad. 
25  In addition to ‘ghost’, other suggested translations for ‘dre include ‘demon’, ‘imp’, 
‘goblin’, and ‘devil’, all strongly suggestive of the term’s negative connotations (see 
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connotations. Furthermore, these derogatory terms for the rTa’u language 
are generally associated with broadly negative stereotypes regarding 
its speakers: that rTa’u speakers are shrewd business people (and are 
therefore by implication greedy and dishonest), have a tendency to fight, 
and have no appreciation for (mainstream) Tibetan culture. 
These portrayals of Tibetan as a prestige ur-language, and rTa’u 
as either a degraded or fossilized (but always radically different) 
derivative, take on heightened significance in the contemporary context 
of widespread social mobilization in defense of the Tibetan language. 
Although the vitality of Tibetan is certainly greater in comparison to the 
region’s minority languages, concern for, and mobilization in defense 
of, the Tibetan language has intensified in the twenty-first century 
(Robin 2014; Roche 2017). Such concerns have emerged, in particular, 
in responses to changes in schooling, which have increasingly seen the 
promotion of what is called the ‘type two educational model,’26 which 
has basically instituted Chinese-medium education and relegated 
Tibetan to a subject, rather than a medium of education (Henry 2016). In 
response to this, and other pressures on the Tibetan language, two major 
programs have emerged as part of a broader language movement: one 
promoting the use of ‘pure father-tongue’, (pha skad gtsang ma) and the 
other advocating grassroots literacy. 
The ‘pure father-tongue’ movement is a form of ‘verbal hygiene’ 
(Cameron 1996) aimed primarily at avoiding loanwords in spoken 
and written Tibetan, and promoting Tibetan neologisms (Thurston 
2015, 2018). The underlying logic of the movement is that the Tibetan 
language is threatened by an increasing number of loanwords from 
Chinese, particularly as the language expands into new domains. Rather 
than a discrete, organized social movement with a clear organizational 
structure and program of activities, the pure-father-tongue movement is 
a diffuse, decentralized, grassroots movement (Roche and Lugyal Bum 
2018). It is promoted through social media and in essays, poems, memes, 
and songs, as well as by word of mouth. The following examination of 
pure-father-tongue discourses is suggestive of the ways in which they 
http://dictionary.thlib.org/internal_definitions/public_term/11031). Interestingly, 
Thurston (2018: 205) provides another possible interpretation for ’dre skad as 
‘blended language’; the word ’dre is also a verb stem denoting ‘mix, blend.’ 
26  For further discussion of this system, see Chapter 5 of this volume, by Bendi Tso 
and Mark Turin.
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constitute a form of mis-recognition for speakers of rTa’u and other 
minority languages, in positing an essentializing link between language 
and identity that elides the existence of Tibetan minority languages and 
speakers. 
One can easily find many poems dedicated to the pure father-tongue, 
as in the following sample by Tibetan poet Pedma Trashi (Pad ma bkra 
shis).27 In this poem, the Tibetan language is considered a cornerstone 
of Tibetan identity, along with other important elements such as being 
compassionate and abstaining from alcohol. Such poems are recited at 
school ceremonies and other social events. A common theme in all such 
poetry is that language is the keeper of culture, and that without culture 
one group of people is no different from any other, and therefore the key to 








Oh, people of the Snowland
Oh, people of compassion
Oh, you forbid alcohol
Women’s personality is softer than wool
Men honor dignity the highest of all. Oh!
Wear authentic Tibetan clothes, good sons and daughters,
Speak pure Tibetan language, people of good lineage.29 
27  See the poem online here, http://www.inalco.fr/sites/default/files/asset/document/
jpo_chants_pema_tashi_final_final_0.pdf 
28  Here and elsewhere, the Tibetan texts have been transcribed faithfully according to 
the original, even when they include ‘errors’.
29  Translation by Sonam Lhundrop. 
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The most popular way that such ideas reach the general population is 
undoubtedly through song. Many songs in recent years have highlighted 
the importance of speaking pure Tibetan.30 In 2015, a song titled ‘Father-
tongue (Pha skad)’ was the main theme at the New Year Gala of Khampa 
TV, which featured the young Tibetan singer Gergyal Pedma (dGe rgyal 








Nourished in the wealth of history,
The melodious sound,
Created by the unvanishing spirits of ancestors,
Embodiment of the long-lasting tales of our ancestors,
Father-tongue — our father-tongue,
Sweeter than sweet tsampa,
Father-tongue, father-tongue — our father-tongue.32
Another clear example of such promotion is the song ‘Manifestation of 
the Father-tongue (Pha skad kyi Rang mdangs)’ by the well-known singer 
Shertan (Sher bstan):33
30  In addition to the two songs described below, another extremely popular song on 
this theme is Three Lamas are Seated Up There (sTod gan na bla ma rnam gsum 
bzhugs) by Rigdzin Drolma (Rig ’dzin sgrol ma), which can be accessed at: https://
www.youtube.com/watch?v=wDQdwn3fCOw
31  You can view Gergyal Pedma performing the song here: https://www.youtube.
com/watch?v=pmz_ojUfYzs
32  Translation by Sonam Lhundrop.
33  See the song performed here: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PFD4M5ffZHI 





In my heavenly land of snow
High above shine the sun, moon and stars
Within, blessings rain down — 





In the palace of monastic universities
Great teachings pile up like a great mountain
Within, a great ocean of wisdom swirls — 





To the benevolence of the great minister Thunmi
The Tibetan letters shine with glory
Within, the flowers of great civilization blossom — 
The fortunate blessings of the Tibetan people





My father-tongue is as pure as gold
My writing system is as pure as fresh milk
Within us, unity is pure as a white silk strip — 





Pure language is Tibetans’ treasure
The letters of the alphabet are Tibetans’ adornments
Within, the cultural manifestation reflects who we are — 
Do not lose that which the sky has protected34
Some have even seen it as a marketing strategy to include such songs in 
albums so that they reach even larger audiences. In the music industry, 
a new term has been invented in light of this, phake chedruk (pha skad ched 
bsgrigs) ‘pure-father-tongue album’, meaning that such albums include 
only Tibetan language songs. 
Although informal groups sometimes form to encourage people 
to speak ‘pure’ Tibetan, it is more often promoted by individuals, 
particularly those with some level of formal education. One impact of 
the movement has been to establish a value hierarchy that promotes 
‘pure’ language as both prestigious and morally valuable, and hence 
a source of pride, and denigrates ‘mixed’ language as non-prestigious, 
immoral, and shameful. This is significant for minority languages such 
34  Translation by Sonam Lhundrop.
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as rTa’u in that, as we have seen above, they are typically viewed as 
mixed languages. Television has been a popular medium for propagating 
such purist language ideologies: an example will suffice to demonstrate. 
In one well-known clip, a pastoralist goes to a city to purchase goods 
for the upcoming Tibetan New Year. He enters a shop and starts 
speaking a ‘mixed’ language, assuming that the shopkeeper must be 
Han Chinese. To his surprise, the shopkeeper is a Tibetan. Nonetheless, 
instead of speaking Tibetan to the shopkeeper he continues in ‘mixed’ 
language, now thinking to impress her and show his superiority. To 
his disappointment and embarrassment, the shopkeeper reprimands 
him and lectures him on the importance of speaking ‘pure’ language 
(Thurston 2015 discusses the role of comedy in propagating language 
ideologies in the Tibetan context). 
In addition to this focus on verbal hygiene, the contemporary Tibetan 
language movement has also focused on adult literacy. People from 
different backgrounds, such as college students, monks, and business 
people, have been organizing village-level programs to teach written 
Tibetan to illiterate pastoralists and farmers. These programs have 
also appeared in the rTa’u area amongst rTa’u speakers, including in 
Tunzhi’s village. His mother is sixty-five years old at the time of writing, 
and has never been to school, but has participated in a village-level 
illiteracy eradication program since 2014 (each household is expected 
by the monastery to send at least one member to attend these classes). 
She is now able to read several common Buddhist scriptures and chant 
them while following a recording on audiocassette. Cases such as hers 
are now common in the rTa’u area. And although we acknowledge that 
such programs are very much welcomed by local communities, we argue 
that they contribute to the mis-recognition of rTa’u speakers insofar as 
they reaffirm the essentializing, monoglot link between language and 
identity, whilst also undermining the perceived value of the spoken 
language and precluding efforts to develop a writing system for it.
Also known as the ‘eradicating illiteracy’ (yig rmongs sel) program, 
the adult literacy program aims to teach adults basic Tibetan literacy so 
that they can independently read Buddhist scriptures. Each monastery 
oversees a specific district, and conducts such programs in communities 
within its district. Often the monastery develops the textbooks. Classes 
are continued until participants are able to recite a designated scripture. 
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No comprehension lessons are offered; the pedagogical content 
simply includes how to pronounce the letters, how to combine them 
into syllables, and some provide chances to practice reciting simple 
texts. A typical program lasts about 15–20 days and is carried out 
annually prior to the New Year, a time when all residents are back in 
the community from their seasonal work at construction sites far away. 
In the case of the first author’s community, the local monastery sends 
a head teacher who teaches the advanced classes, while local college 
students who are back in the community during the winter holiday 
teach the beginners. Students are divided into different classes based 
on their reading proficiency. During class, students repeat letters and 
portions of text after the teacher. There are simple tests at the end of 
each program, in which students recite a given text. However, there 
are reports and pictures on the social media platform, WeChat, of other 
communities with more advanced and long-term classes, and videos 
circulated on WeChat show adults memorizing long Buddhist texts and 
demonstrating their mastery of the content through debate. In many 
cases, college students and local monks collaborate on such programs. 
Pressure to learn written Tibetan and to speak Tibetan in a manner 
that conforms to the written standard is increased by the language’s 
association with Tibetan Buddhism and religious figures. Many rTa’u 
speakers describe feeling anxious when lamas are present, especially 
when they are invited to perform rituals in family homes, because such 
figures sometimes scold locals who speak Tibetan with an accent, or 
even simply for speaking rTa’u in their presence. For rTa’u-speakers, 
their identity and sense of belonging to a community are strongly 
linked with their religious affiliation, and therefore such pressures 
from religious figures, combined with Buddhist institutional support 
for purism and literacy, are felt as a heavy burden. For many rTa’u 
speakers, such pressures are viewed as a choice between their language, 
on the one hand, and their religion and identity on the other. 
In this context, literacy in Tibetan becomes a nexus for maintaining 
ethnic boundaries through purist practices, promoting alternative 
visions of modern Tibetan identity through literacy, and accessing the 
sacred. It is perhaps not surprising, then, that when asked if there is 
any value in maintaining the rTa’u language, most interviewees directly 
compare its value with the maintenance and development of the Tibetan 
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language. They claim that maintaining rTa’u is valuable only insofar as 
it contributes to the maintenance of the Tibetan language. Otherwise, 
the maintenance of the language for its own sake is seen as meaningless. 
One particular interviewee, the head of a school for orphans in the 
rTa’u area (and therefore the bearer of significant responsibility for the 
transmission of the language) stated that one language is enough for 
Tibet, and all effort should be directed towards the development and 
promotion of a single Tibetan language, even at the expense of the rTa’u 
language. This is demonstrative of the hegemonic position of monoglot 
language ideologies in relation to contemporary visions of Tibetanness. 
This unwillingness to maintain rTa’u manifests in resistance to 
efforts to develop the language, for instance, by creating a writing 
system for it. This contributes to a vicious cycle where the language 
is seen as useless and therefore not worth maintaining, but cannot be 
made useful without such initiatives. This can be seen particularly in 
the educational context. Although most rTa’u speakers are unwilling 
to develop a writing system for their language, the lack of a writing 
system can be seen as one of the factors that deprives rTa’u of social 
and cultural prestige, and places pressure on speakers to abandon 
their language for Tibetan. Children are encouraged to speak Tibetan 
at school (even when the majority of students are rTa’u speakers), and 
only use rTa’u at home. 
However, even this last bastion of the language is now under 
pressure, as it is commonly thought that speaking rTa’u hinders one’s 
capacity to learn Tibetan well, as rTa’u is seen as a corrupting influence 
on pure Tibetan. However, the challenges faced by rTa’u speakers in 
learning Tibetan can more accurately be explained by the failure of the 
educational system to account for the fact that they are learning a second 
language, not ‘their own’ first language. Nonetheless, prevailing views 
amongst rTa’u speakers blame the children themselves for being poor 
students, and also blame the rTa’u language for ‘corrupting’ the Tibetan 
language. Such views have convinced rTa’u-speaking parents that 
speaking Tibetan at home with their children is in their best interests. 
One interviewee in particular shared a story that reflects the motives 
that lead rTa’u speakers to experience persistent linguistic anxieties in 
relation to their spoken Tibetan. She is from a community where all 
households but hers speak rTa’u, so she has become fluent in both her 
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home language, pastoralist Tibetan (’brog skad), and rTa’u since an early 
age. However, she said that since she moved to the city of Chengdu a 
few years ago due to health issues, ‘Other Tibetans say I speak Tibetan 
with an accent… this made me very embarrassed.’ For the vast majority 
of rTa’u speakers, such moments of mis-recognition based on their 
accent are incidents of great embarrassment and shame; rather than 
being recognized and esteemed as multilingual Tibetans, rTa’u speakers 
are thus mis-recognized as aberrant, and disesteemed. 
Conclusion
Above, we have discussed how mis-recognition of rTa’u speakers 
functions in two distinct arenas: the academic and the quotidian. Within 
the academic field, knowledge production focuses on attempting to 
clarify the origins of the ‘Horpa.’ The ‘notorious ambivalence’ (Wang 
1970–71) of this term, both diachronically and synchronically, suggests 
that its only stable function has been to imbue various populations 
with contrastive alterity, as Others to the Tibetan Self. Meanwhile, the 
everyday lived reality of rTa’u speakers is increasingly characterized 
by mis-recognition within the context of an essentializing language 
movement that seeks to tie Tibetan identity to a single, ‘pure’ language. 
In both cases, rTa’u speakers are denied recognition by significant social 
others — Tibetan academics, clergy, and laymen. The claims of rTa’u 
speakers to be Tibetan whilst speaking a non-Tibetan language are at 
best problematized, and at worst outright rejected, resulting in various 
harms for rTa’u speakers, including linguistic anxiety and insecurity, 
ultimately leading to language endangerment and shift. 
We believe that the preceding discussion demonstrates the analytical 
value of applying the concept of recognition to examinations of how 
hierarchies emerge in language contact situations. However, we 
acknowledge that not everyone shares our enthusiasm for the analytical 
usefulness of the concept. Scholars such as Coulthard (2008, 2014), 
Povinelli (2002), and Vincent (2017), for example, have argued that 
although a focus on recognition helps reveal the existence of diffuse 
and often concealed symbolic value hierarchies, it nonetheless leaves 
power hierarchies in place. These authors claim that since recognition 
is usually given by dominant groups to the subordinated, it continues 
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the disempowerment of minoritized groups and thus both perpetuates 
and conceals existing power structures, rather than eradicating them. 
Simpson (2014) has offered the concept of refusal as an alternative to 
the asymmetrical and disempowering notion of recognition; to refuse 
is to reject the power structures inherent in recognition, and to assert 
Indigenous identities and practices on the basis of continuing sovereignty, 
rather than intersubjective processes that entangle the Indigenous subject 
with practices of settler dominance. In reply to such criticisms, we note 
that these analyses were all developed in Western, settler-colonial, liberal-
democratic, multicultural societies, where those offering recognition (and 
perpetuating mis-recognition) are viewed by subaltern populations as 
dominating, oppressive Others. In the present case, however, we have 
been examining a situation in which a linguistic minority is facing mis-
recognition from a dominant, mainstream group with which it identifies, 
and which it does not wish to refuse. As such, appropriate recognition is 
likely to be deemed by them not only apt, but, given the important role 
that religion plays in setting the boundaries of the desired collective 
belonging, also morally good. This therefore opens up the possibility that 
structures of recognition and mis-recognition, whilst always implying 
power asymmetries, do not necessarily imply oppression. 
A second line of argument that should be considered here relates 
specifically to recognition and languages. Although typically not 
discussed explicitly in terms of recognition, or with reference to authors 
such as Taylor and Fraser, there has been ongoing debate amongst 
linguists for at least the past twenty-five years regarding the value of 
‘differentiating’ languages as bounded, stable ‘objects.’ We regard this 
conversation to be, in important ways, about recognition, and not only 
the differentiation of linguistic types and the creation and reinforcement 
of symbolic hierarchies. Criticism of the politics of recognition as it relates 
to language include: that such practices can impose inappropriate, etic 
standards for what constitutes a language (Mülhäusler 2006); that it 
may lead to the commodification of and competition between languages 
(Dobrin, Austin, and Nathan 2007); and that it often reproduces standard 
language ideologies and essentialist theories of language and identity 
that underlie much language endangerment (Heller and Duchêne 2007). 
Such views are also bolstered by broader poststructuralist critiques that 
view language as a fundamentally dynamic, fluid, fuzzy set of resources 
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(Makoni and Pennycook 2005), rather than as a preexisting structure to 
which individuals belong; in this view, the assertion of stable identity 
categories, rather than their organization into hierarchies, is the source 
of injustice. In response to these criticisms, we note that the existence of 
distinct linguistic types is not in question in the context we are examining; 
rTa’u speakers recognize the distinctiveness of their language from that 
of mainstream Tibetans, who, in turn, recognize the distinctiveness of 
rTa’u. To refute these salient local categories would thus be to engage 
in both ‘epistemic violence’ (the rejection of the subaltern subject’s 
capacity to know, see Spivak 2010), as well as ‘ontological violence’ 
(violence against the conceptual order and lifeworld constructed by 
subaltern subjects). In contexts where discrete, bounded languages are 
already part of local views, we therefore see discussions of recognition 
as analytically appropriate. 
Beyond the analytical value of engagement with the concept of 
recognition in understanding the construction of language hierarchies, 
and in nuancing our understanding of recognition in different contexts, 
we also argue that the concept has a normative role to play in efforts 
to support individual languages and maintain linguistic diversity. We 
argue that greater recognition for the rTa’u language by the mainstream 
Tibetan community would help in its maintenance, and we therefore 
make the following recommendations. Firstly, academics in the PRC and 
elsewhere who speculate about the identity of rTa’u speakers should take 
seriously the expressed opinions of rTa’u speakers. Secondly, given that 
the polysemy of the term Hor reduces its discursive role to something like 
‘un-Tibetan’, scholars would be well advised to avoid this term. Thirdly, 
proponents of adult literacy and the ‘pure-father-tongue’ movements 
could give greater recognition and esteem to minority languages such 
as rTa’u in relation to the ‘standard’ Tibetan that they promote. Finally, 
the Tibetan community at large, including local religious figures, could 
contribute to this increased recognition for the language by avoiding 
negative terms such as logs skad and ’dre skad, and by valorizing, rather 
than dis-esteeming, minority languages such as rTa’u; and by tolerating 
‘accents’ in people who speak Tibetan as a second language, and even 
esteeming such individuals for their multilingual repertoires, rather 
than viewing such capacities as barriers to Tibetanness. These changes 
would go a long way to improving an ideological environment which is, 
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to say the least, currently unsupportive of the maintenance of the rTa’u 
language. 
Finally, it is worth noting that many of Tibet’s minority languages, all 
of which are endangered to some degree, are in a similar predicament to 
rTa’u, facing a double bind between maintaining a language but having 
their Tibetanness questioned, or abandoning their language in order to 
claim a Tibetan identity. State structures that deny recognition to Tibet’s 
minority languages are unlikely to change, and thus the exclusion of 
these languages from major social institutions is likely to persist. Any 
attempts to reverse language shift in those domains is therefore unlikely 
to succeed. However, it is possible that a change in attitudes towards 
these languages by other Tibetans, and greater recognition of their 
social and cultural value, would help support these languages into the 
future, and thus help reverse the broader decline in linguistic diversity 
currently apparent in Tibet and the Himalaya. 
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2. What Happened to the Ahom 
Language? 
The Politics of Language Contact in Assam
Selma K. Sonntag
The modern nation-state, emanating from post-Westphalia Europe, 
is frequently characterized by linguistic homogeneity, if not always 
empirically then at least ideologically. A common language is 
ideologized as the glue of the nation, the emotional tie needed to 
foment a sense of national identity rising above parochial proclivities. 
Furthermore, the modern state has an interest in impelling linguistic 
homogeneity: ‘linguistic rationalization’ (Laitin 1988) allegedly 
promotes administrative and economic efficiency and, some argue 
(e.g., Patten 2001), democratic participation. Even multilingual states, 
such as India, engage in these processes: in the Indian federal system, 
states, including Assam, are the site of linguistic rationalization (Laitin 
1989) and cultivation of the affective ties that fuel linguistic nationalism 
(Mitchell 2009; Sonntag 2014). 
The association of a common language with the nation-state, both as 
a marker of identity and a vehicle of communication, has been avowed 
by such acclaimed scholars as Benedict Anderson (1991), Ernst Gellner 
(1983) and Eric Hobsbawm (1990). They attribute the association to 
print capitalism, industrialization, and nationalism, respectively. These 
attributions impart a sense of inevitability to linguistic homogenization 
in the modern nation-state, as if linguistic homogenization is the 
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only outcome of modernization and nation-building. They also shift 
focus away from the state as the purposeful perpetrator of linguistic 
rationalization to forces beyond the state’s control. But we know that, 
despite state attempts at linguistic rationalization, most modern states 
are not monolingual and that, despite Anderson’s claim that historically 
as well as currently ‘the bulk of mankind is monoglot’ (1991: 38), a 
majority of the global population remain polyglots (Meyerhoff and 
Stanford 2015: 3). Moreover, despite its Herderian origins, the modern 
nation-state fixes its territorial boundaries, which do not always 
correspond to more fluid linguistic boundaries. Thongchai Winichakul 
(1996: 67) has chastised Anderson, Gellner and Hobsbawm and their 
followers for failing to ‘pa[y] attention to the most obvious constitutive 
element of a nation-state, namely its territory, as if it were merely a non-
effective container of […] essential elements [of the nation].’ Refocusing 
on the agency of the state, i.e., ‘bringing the state back in’ (Evans et al. 
1985) to our analyses of language politics, exposes the historical and 
geographical contingency of the Western European nation-state model 
of linguistic homogeneity and debunks its accompanying ideology of 
linguistic nationalism. 
A historical-institutionalist approach to the study of language politics, 
as developed by Sonntag and Cardinal (2015), lends itself to analyzing 
language politics in a variety of geographically and temporally dispersed 
and diverse states, rather than being limited to the modern nation-state. 
Central to our theoretical framework are the analytical concepts of state 
tradition and language regime. We posit that state traditions inform 
language regimes. State traditions are representational sedimentations 
of how a state governs. They are reflected in historical patterns of 
institutionalized practices of governance. For example, federalism 
represents a state tradition of territorial governance that informs the 
language regime in India, Canada and the erstwhile Soviet Union. In the 
United States, liberalism, rather than federalism, has been the dominant 
tradition informing language policy choices (Sonntag 2019). Language 
policies compatible with state traditions are institutionalized, comprising 
a language regime. Language regimes are, then, the institutionalized 
practices of language governance. Because state traditions inform these 
institutionalized practices, a language regime has a representational or 
ideological component as well. As such, language regimes tend to be 
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hegemonic and therefore relatively stable. Although specific language 
policies within the regime may be tinkered with around the edges, 
the range of policy options is circumscribed by state tradition. In the 
terminology of historical institutionalism, language policies are said to 
be path dependent. Only at critical junctures is a wider range of policy 
choices considered. Critical junctures can, but do not always, disrupt 
state traditions, leading to new policy regimes. More often, state 
traditions endure even though the policy path may shift. 
Using this historical institutionalist framework of state traditions 
and language regimes, my chapter is a case study of Assamese language 
politics. I cover three different polities or states — the Ahom kingdom, 
British India, and independent India — and their associated language 
regimes, all located in the same complex linguistic environment marked 
by language contact and diversity. My primary focus, however, will be 
on the Ahom kingdom. As a precolonial state in the Himalayan border 
region between what we categorize today as South Asia and Southeast 
Asia, the Ahom kingdom’s state traditions, and by extension its 
language regime, were decidedly different from either the colonial state 
or independent India. What makes the study of the Ahom kingdom 
intriguing is that, at the height of its power during the seventeenth 
century, prior to British colonization, the Ahom kingdom shifted from 
using the Tai-Kadai Ahom language to using the Indo-Aryan Assamese 
language, suggesting a rupture in the language regime. This shift 
appears to have been subsequently reified under the colonial language 
regime, setting the stage for postcolonial linguistic nationalism in 
Assam. Hence the framing of this chapter’s theme as ‘What happened 
to the Ahom language?’ 
I will proceed on the assumption that the Ahom kingdom was similar 
to other ‘mandala states’1 in Southeast Asia. The key traditions of the 
mandala states that I discuss below are their non-territoriality and elite 
hierarchy. I then sketch out a probable linguistic environment of the 
Ahom kingdom, speculating on its language regime given its mandala-
state traditions. I attempt to identify the critical juncture at which the 
language shift from Tai Ahom to Assamese occurred. I argue that this 
1  The metaphor of the mandala invokes a cosmic universe depicted as a circle 
radiating outward, the center of which is the most spiritually enlightened or, in the 
case of states, the most politically powerful. 
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critical juncture indexed a change in the language regime informed by 
incipient changes in the Ahom kingdom’s traditions of non-territoriality 
and elite hierarchy. I will then discuss how this shift was consolidated 
under the colonial state and its attendant linguistic ideology. Finally, 
I will address language politics in post-independence Assam, starting 
with nationalist representations of the Ahom kingdom and its language 
regime. My research is based on secondary sources, most of them 
historiographical and using scant or sketchy records, hence my use 
above of less-than-analytical terms, such as ‘assumption’, ‘sketch’, 
‘attempt’ and ‘speculate’. 
The Mandala State
Given the dominance of the Western nation-state model, scholars have 
grappled with identifying and defining ‘Asian forms of the nation’ 
(Tønnesson and Antlöv 1996). Historians of Southeast Asia have reached 
a consensus to some extent on the precolonial state, after sifting through 
the historiography of the region: 
historians have found the state-as-mandala productive in their thinking 
for two reasons. First, it is an ‘indigenous’ model and therefore ‘protects’ 
early Southeast Asia from Eurocentric concepts. Actually, of course, 
it is not indigenous; it is Indic. Second, it is a cultural concept, and its 
very resistance to pat definition as a model of state formation gives it 
interpretative power (Reynolds 1995: 427). 
James Scott (2009) defines the classical mandala or padi state in 
opposition to Zomia, the anarchic, swidden-agricultural swathe of 
highlands across Southeast Asia and Northeast India. Largely missing 
from his analysis is the flip-side of his dichotomy between the mandala 
state and Zomia: the mandala state in interaction with a transregional 
Sanskrit cosmopolis, to use Sheldon Pollock’s (1998a) terms. Both Scott’s 
and Pollock’s analyses are useful in reconstructing the dynamics of the 
politics of language contact in Assam.
One of the most significant characteristics of the mandala state is 
its non-territoriality. In mandala states, ‘[t]he political sphere could 
be mapped only by power relationships, not by territorial integrity’ 
(Thongchai 1994: 79). Yet scholars of language politics (e.g., Laponce 
1987) often identify territoriality as essential to the vitality of a 
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language. Pollock labels the transition from Sanskrit’s transregional 
cosmopolitanism to vernacularization as ‘literary territorialization’ 
(Pollock, 1998b: 49), when ‘new notions of geocultural frameworks 
[were developed] for […] literary narrative representations […] in which 
[…] texts would circulate’ (Pollock 1998a: 28). The lack of territoriality 
as a political concept in the mandala states — what we can call a state 
tradition of non-territoriality — suggests a different type of language 
politics and language regime from that of the modern nation-state.
Instead of sovereignty being defined territorially in precolonial 
Southeast Asia, power radiated out of the center, hence the mandala 
trope. Shifting and overlapping alliances, and multiple, shared 
sovereignty were the norms (Thongchai 1994: chap. 4). There were no 
fixed territorial boundaries where one mandala state started and another 
stopped. And they differed in the range or scope of their mandala. The 
‘unit of political order’ (Scott 2009: 430) that indexed the state tradition of 
non-territoriality was muang, a Tai/Thai term that Thongchai Winichakul 
(1994: 81) glosses as ‘governed area’ and Charles Keyes (2003: 184) 
translates as ‘principality’. A muang could be within the mandala of one 
or more powerful states, often called muang themselves (Keyes 2003: 179), 
and could have subordinate muang within its mandala orbit. A muang 
could shift territorially from, for example, one side of the Mekong River 
to the other but remain the same muang (Miles 2014: chap. 6). Muang 
could divide and separate, and, less frequently, coalesce and combine. 
Moreover, ‘a subject of a local authority could be at the same time a 
subject of another authority’ (Thongchai 1994: 73). At least in northern 
Thailand, spoken languages were referred to as Kammüang, or language 
of the muang (Keyes 2003: 184). Because of the shifting nature of muang 
and their populations, people also ‘shift[ed] their language practices’ 
(Scott 2009: 39). Languages were no more delineated or objectified than 
territory was. Language contact, diversity and multilingualism were 
constants. As Oliver Wolters (1999: 159), the historian usually credited 
for the mandala trope, puts it: ‘There are probably few more influential 
cultural features in earlier Southeast Asia than multilingualism.’
At the center of the mandala states was the king or deva-raj. Kings 
were considered to be reincarnated divinities legitimizing their 
centrality and rule in what Victor Lieberman (2011) refers to as river-
valley civilizations. The ‘Indianization’ of Southeast Asian kingdoms 
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(Coedès 1967) provided legitimation of hierarchical rule centered 
around the king. As Coedès (1967: 15–16) defines it: 
Indianization must be understood essentially as the expansion of an 
organized culture that was founded upon the Indian conception of 
royalty, was characterized by Hinduist or Buddhist cults, the mythology 
of the Purāṇas, and the observance of the Dharmaśāstras, and expressed 
itself in the Sanskrit language. It is for this reason that we sometimes 
speak of ‘Sanskritization’ instead of ‘Indianization’.
Sanskritization in this context refers to the adoption of Sanskrit as the 
aesthetic, political-cultural, and literary language of the court and 
the legitimation this provided, and not necessarily to emulation by 
those lower in the sociopolitical hierarchy, as the term implies today 
throughout South Asia. Sanskrit was never used as an ‘everyday medium 
of communication […] [n]or even functioned as a chancery language for 
bureaucratic or administrative purposes’ in the mandala states (Pollock 
1998a: 12). However, its use introduced writing to the mandala states; 
literacy, or in Pollock’s terms ‘literariness’, provided the trappings of 
hierarchical rule. According to Pollock (1998a), inscriptions from this 
period would usually begin with accolades to the king in Sanskrit, then 
revert to details in the local language(s), written in Sanskritic script. 
Sanskrit functioned as the expressive, aesthetic language, whereas local 
languages were for enumerative, constative uses (Pollack 1998a: 12). We 
can identify Sanskritization or Indianization as the source of the mandala-
state tradition of socio-political hierarchy. Along with the state tradition 
of non-territoriality, it informed a cosmopolitan Sanskritic language 
regime. With the ‘spread of political Sanskrit’, Southeast Asia became 
part of what Pollock (1998a: 12) refers to as the ‘Sanskrit cosmopolis’.
This Sanskrit cosmopolis was ecumenical according to Pollock (1998a, 
1998b) — religion per se was not the driver of the spread of Sanskrit; 
instead Pollock attributes its spread to the aesthetic, universalistic 
traits of Sanskrit’s hyperglossia and accompanying cultural-political 
practices. And yet it seems that this hyperglossia began to break 
down with the spread of Theravada Buddhism from Sri Lanka and its 
attendant Sanskritized Pali liturgy in the early centuries of the second 
millennium CE. Nevertheless, consistent with Pollock’s analysis, 
Steven Collins (2003) suggests that the adoption of Pali Buddhism in 
mandala states was not necessarily or primarily for religious purposes. 
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According to Collins (2003: 681), Pali Buddhism ‘began to be imported 
by kings as part of their state-building enterprises […] [Its] ideology 
operated among the elite, primarily as an element in a nexus of power, 
as local power-holders were organized by a king into a maṇḍala.’ Pali or 
Theravada Buddhism ‘[i]n its sociopolitical aspect […] had to do with 
naturalizing inequality in social hierarchies’ (Collins 2003: 681), i.e., it 
was instrumental in reinforcing the hierarchical state tradition at a time 
when mandala kingdoms, particularly newer ones in Siam and Burma, 
were coming into their own. 
It also appears that the importation of Pali Buddhism and its liturgy 
spurred the development of local writing systems, albeit derived from 
Pali’s Sanskritic script (Collins 2003: 683). Hence, with the adoption 
of Buddhism by the Siamese king in the thirteenth century, royal 
inscriptions began to appear in what was to become the Thai script 
(Keyes 2003: 183; Collins 2003: 684). The Burmese script dates about a 
century earlier, while other orthographic systems in what is now Burma, 
such as Mon and Arakanese scripts, appeared even earlier, predating 
Pali Buddhism to some extent (Collins 2003: 683–84). The change in the 
literary language regime of the Siamese and Burmese mandala states 
corresponds to Pollock’s vernacularization, that is, a shift from Sanskrit 
being the ascetic language of royal accolades and poetry to vernaculars 
playing this role. The language regimes of the mandala states became 
more parochial and local — in effect, remaining multilingual and 
multiscriptal but without the Sanskrit hyperglossia.
Although the development of local scripts appears to signal a 
language regime change, there was not necessarily a corresponding 
political change: mandala states tended to endure up until colonial 
conquest. In particular, state traditions endured. As suggested 
above, the state tradition of hierarchy was actually reinforced by the 
introduction of Pali Buddhism. Thongchai Winichakul (1994) argues 
that what I am calling the mandala-state tradition of non-territoriality 
was not disrupted in Siam until colonial powers began to vie for power 
in Southeast Asia, at which time the Siamese kingdom managed to 
escape colonization by quickly adopting the technology of mapping 
and territorial-administrative control. Yet Pollock’s vernacularization 
rests on an assumption of new ‘geocultural frameworks’ enabling 
‘literary territorialization’ (Pollock 1998b: 49). So what were the 
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new geocultural conceptions that marked the change in language 
regime? Culturally, Theravada Buddhism percolated down the social 
hierarchy (Collins 2003; Keyes 2003), which hadn’t happened with the 
Brahmanical Hinduism of the Sanskrit cosmopolis (Coedès 1967: 369). 
Geographically, the spread of Tai peoples south and west from Yunnan 
had reinforced the muang concept as the primary ‘unit of political order’ 
(Scott 2009: 430). These cultural and geographical shifts framed the ‘turn 
[…] to the use of local languages for literary expression in preference to 
the translocal language[s]’ of Sanskrit and Pali (Pollock 1998a: 6). The 
‘local’ was not defined territorially but rather according to its place in 
the mandala of state power. The shift to the vernacular was a conscious 
choice, according to Pollock (1998a: 7) — it was a policy option that had 
opened up at a critical juncture. 
The state traditions of hierarchy and non-territorialization endured 
at this juncture, during the shift in the literary language regime from 
Sanskrit hyperglossia to vernacularization. Nevertheless, the new 
regime enabled ‘literary territorialization’ (Pollock 1998b: 49) which was 
not equivalent to political territorialization but undoubtedly impacted, 
and gradually transformed, political-cultural concepts of space. 
Institutionally, this transformation took the form of ‘a more uniform 
and efficient tax regime and administration, and […] kingdomwide 
economic integration and militarization’ (Scott 2009: 253) in the 
increasingly centralized mandala states on the eve of colonialism. In 
turn, ‘[t]he process of valley homogenization’ along the Chao Phraya, 
Salween and Irrawaddy ‘was much advanced by increasing state 
centralization between 1600 and 1840’, with ‘the valley states […] busy 
fabricating more uniform Burmese, Siamese […] and Shan’ (Scott 2009: 
253, referencing Lieberman). Zomia remained outside of the mandala 
states’ hierarchy in Scott’s rendition, not least because of the mandala 
states’ lack of territorial sovereignty and integrity. 
However, the mandala states were dependent on Zomia for their 
agricultural and military manpower needs, which they would obtain 
by periodically raiding Zomia, often for slaves (Scott 2009; Wolters 
1999: 164). The mandala states also battled each other, albeit for control 
of manpower rather than territory (Wolters 1999: 164). Given the lack 
of fixity of the states and their subjects (including slaves), there was a 
great deal of fluidity in identity. Although we need not accept Scott’s 
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emphasis on Zomians-versus-the-state as the most relevant distinction, 
there is a general consensus that neither language nor ethnicity were 
salient identity markers in the mandala state. As Scott (2009: 253) 
puts it, ‘[a] certain plasticity of identity was built into precolonial 
power relations.’ While the elite literary component of the language 
regimes of mandala states was initially characterized by Sanskrit 
hyperglossia, followed by literary vernacularization, the ‘constant 
movement back and forth between the valleys and the hills’ (Scott 
2009: 27) meant that quotidian language practices were undoubtedly 
multilingual and involved constant language contact, often between 
unrelated languages. Despite valley homogenization — particularly in 
terms of governmentality — on the eve of colonialism, most scholars 
concur that it is indeed difficult to say that there was any concept of 
ethnolinguistic identity, as we now conceive of it, in the mandala state 
(Scott 2009: 253).2
The Ahom Kingdom
Hence the difficulty of identifying the Ahom. Yasmin Saikia (2004: 252) 
insists that the Ahom are not an ethnic group, despite an ethnolinguistic 
dimension to their current-day efforts at mobilization. More probably, 
they initially were identifiable as warriors migrating with a Tai king 
from the east, and constituted the military-bureaucratic class once the 
Ahom kingdom was established in the upper Brahmaputra Valley in the 
thirteenth century (Saikia 2004: chap. 3). This ‘class’ of ‘nobles’ (Saikia 
2004: 20, 126, 252) shared power with the king, or swargadeo, as ‘Ahoms’ 
(Guha 1983: 19–20). According to Saikia (2004: 133), these initial Ahoms, 
i.e., the royalty and the warrior-administrators, were all men and 
‘espoused local women’. Amalendu Guha (1983: 39), who more easily 
uses Ahom as an identitarian category, claims that the initial Ahoms 
separated from a mung or muang in upper Burma. Guha (1983: 12, 32) 
glosses mung as ‘political society’; accordingly ‘the Ahom polity started 
as a loose confederacy of several mungs around a dominant one of the 
Tai model.’ 
2  Sudipta Kaviraj (2010: 141–43) argues that likewise in Bengal prior to colonialism, 
there was ‘no linguistic identity’. He points to the ‘fuzziness’ of space and time in 
pre-colonial India, distinct from the enumeration and mapping of the colonial world.
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It appears, then, that the establishment of the Ahom kingdom in the 
early thirteenth century was based on mandala-state traditions. The 
muang geocultural framework and a sociopolitical hierarchy with a 
noble class were its foundation. Moreover, it was founded in a complex, 
multilingual environment, which was neither ‘politically void’ (Guha 
1983: 12) nor literately void (Gohain 1999: 101), at the critical juncture 
when mandala states were vernacularizing. As I argue below, this put 
the Ahom language regime on a different policy path, setting the stage 
for the replacement of the Tai-Kadai Ahom language with Indo-Aryan 
Assamese at another critical juncture: when the kingdom’s traditions 
of non-territoriality and elite hierarchy were changing, although not 
completely disrupted. I will first reconstruct the Ahom language regime 
by elucidating how the Ahom kingdom’s mandala-state traditions 
informed it, then analyze its shift to Assamese.
Like other mandala states, the Ahom kingdom was not dependent 
on territorial control, but rather control of manpower for wet-rice-
agricultural as well as military purposes (Guha 1983: 34; Saikia 2004: 
128–29). Accordingly, there was no land tax imposed in the kingdom, 
only a labor, and at times military, service requirement (Bhattacharya 
2005: 21; see also Gurung 2018: 199, n14; Parwez 2018: 133). Indeed, the 
institutionalization of manpower in ‘the Ahom peasant-militia’ system 
of corvée labor was deemed ‘the most important component of the Ahom 
political system’ by Edward Gait, a colonial authority on the Ahom 
(quoted in Saikia 2008: 154). The nobility was responsible for acquiring 
the manpower, usually by absorbing and/or enslaving the diverse 
population, often through military ventures. These populations could 
be Zomians: Guha’s (1983) account has been characterized by Nayanjot 
Lahiri (1984: 60) as ‘the absorption of stateless shifting cultivators into 
[the padi Ahom] polity’ (see also Saikia 2004: 155). Manpower could also 
be secured from other muang — usually militarily although without 
necessarily absorbing the muang themselves, as was typical of mandala 
states. Some of the earliest secured, if not absorbed, were the Tibeto-
Burman-speaking Barahis and Morans (Guha 1983: 15; Saikia 2004: 
2), whose women the initial Ahom espoused (Saikia 2004: 32). The 
acquired manpower was organized at its base into paik, which consisted 
of three to four individual laborers (or militiamen) who then shared 
rotation in labor units known as khel (Saikia 2004: 126–27; Guha 1983: 
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8–9; Terweil 1983: 58). Khel were further aggregated into faid or ‘service 
groups’ (Saikia 2004: 126). Neither khel nor faid had any territorial base. 
Nor did they necessarily contain paik from the same locale or speaking 
the same language: ‘To inhibit khel solidarity, paiks were constantly 
moved from place to place and between khels’ (Saikia 2004: 127). This 
system undoubtedly both reflected and reinforced an extremely diverse 
multilingual environment. 
Khel were under the control of the Ahom nobility. The structure of the 
nobility was hierarchical, with the rungs expanding and growing more 
numerous over time. At the apex initially were two great gohain (Terweil 
1983: 21), followed by lesser gohain in the hierarchical ranking. The gohain 
‘control of the labor force […] made these nobles very powerful, often 
more powerful than the [royal] princes’ (Saikia 2004: 126). Their relation 
with the Ahom royalty cohered to mandala-state traditions: according 
to Barend Terweil (1983: 54), gohain is the Assamese term for Ahom 
nobility; in Ahom Tai, the titles of these high-ranking gohain contained 
the word mung, the Ahom cognate of the Thai muang — reflecting the 
Tai model of political society as a loose confederation, as identified by 
Guha (1983) quoted above. Also quite powerful, and more numerous, 
were the phukan and barua, nobles who were responsible for large khel 
which served in both wet-rice agriculture production and military 
ventures (Saikia 2004: 126; Guha 1983: 8). Lower ranks, such as the 
saikia, also constituted the Ahom, or nobility class. Beyond the initial 
warrior migrants, the Ahom were drawn from earlier populations and 
autochthonous groups, and possibly from earlier as well as more recent 
Tai migrations from upper Burma (Guha 1983; Gohain 1999: 102; Saikia 
2004: 27). Saikia (2004: 286) cites a source claiming that the third great 
gohain, created in the late fifteenth century, was initially filled by a Naga 
(see also Baruah 1999: 32). In Scott’s (2009) terminology, Nagas would 
be considered Zomians; that they could be enlisted as both paik and 
the highest-ranking Ahom demonstrates the political-cultural, and by 
extension linguistic, fluidity of the Ahom kingdom. 
Just as fluid was the literary environment of the Ahom kingdom. The 
Ahom mandala state most probably was part of, or at least influenced 
by, the Sanskrit cosmopolis (see Saikia 2004: 118). At a minimum, the 
kingdom was sandwiched by it — between Southeast Asia and ancient 
Kamarupa in the lower Brahmaputra Valley, where the spoken and 
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written linguistic heritage was Indo-Aryan (Saikia 2008: 160–64), dating 
from the fifth century onward (Gohain 1999: 101). According to Guha 
(1983: 12), the ‘political heritage of ancient Kamarupa had not left upper 
Assam totally untouched.’ Other lower Brahmaputra kingdoms, such 
as the Kachari, Koch and Jaintia, had developed writing systems as 
well (Saikia 2004: 123). Pollock dates Assamese vernacularization from 
the mid-fourteenth century when the Ramayana was first composed in 
Assamese ‘at the request of the Barāhi king’. Although the Barahi king 
to whom Pollock attributes vernacular Assamese patronage appeared 
to be further down the valley than the Tibeto-Burman-speaking Barahi 
with whom the Ahom initially interacted (see above), Pollock’s dating 
suggests that not long after their arrival in upper Assam from Southeast 
Asia, the Ahom came into contact with vernacularizing trends 
originating in the South Asian, as opposed to the Southeast Asian, 
Sanskrit cosmopolis.3 
It appears that the Ahom brought a writing system with them in the 
early thirteenth century, possibly pre-dating the emergence of the Thai 
script in Siam, but post-dating vernacularization in the mandala states 
in Burma. B. K. Gohain (1999: 101), referencing scholars such as Terweil, 
claims that the script of the Ahom kingdom was ‘specific only to Ahom’ 
and that it was ‘derived from old Mon as it was written in the first 
centuries of the second millennium A.D.’ — the Mon kingdom being one 
of the first vernacularizing mandala states among the Southeast Asian 
mandala states, as noted above.4 Other scholars, such as Guha (1983), 
3  In a personal conversation (29 October 2018, Dibrughar University, Assam) I had 
with Jahnabi Gogoi Nath, a historian of the Ahom kingdom (see, e.g., Gogoi Nath 
2002), she expressed doubt whether the king whom Pollock references was Barahi. 
Given my argument that ethnonyms had little or no identitarian significance, or 
that kingdoms were not territorially defined and marked by a specific language 
before vernacularization, whether the royal patron of the first Assamese Ramayana 
was Barahi or not is less significant than that he was Hindu and probably a Tibeto-
Burman speaker. 
4  This assessment that the Ahom script was similar to the Mon script was also 
expressed by Girin Phukon, Director of the Institute of Tai Studies and Research in 
Moranhat, Assam during my visit there on 30 October 2018. However, in an article 
in the Institute’s journal, Phukon (2018: 212) speculates that the Ahom ‘acquired 
the script from the Pyu in Upper Burma’. Phukon’s assessments are not necessarily 
inconsistent, given that the Pyu (Tibeto-Burman speakers) could have themselves 
adopted the script in which Mon, an Austro-Asiatic language, was written. But they 
do indicate the high degree of both written and spoken language contact that was 
prevalent throughout the region historically.
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refer to the Ahom writing system as ‘Tai script’. Ahom literariness took 
shape in the buranji, which were primarily court chronicles celebrating 
and delineating the genealogy and exploits of the kingdom’s rulers. 
The buranji were under the keep of the deodhai, or priests, of the 
Ahom kingdom. But there is little, if any, historical evidence that the 
deodhai were Buddhists (or Hindus). The critical juncture in literary 
vernacularization marked by the introduction of Pali Buddhism in 
other mandala states, as discussed above, was apparently absent in the 
Ahom case. Or at least the religious component was absent, but perhaps 
not the literary marker: Gait, the British colonial ‘expert’ on the Ahom 
kingdom, claimed that the Ahom language was ‘written in a character 
derived from Pali’ (quoted in Saikia 2004: 285). If indeed the Ahom script 
was based on the Mon script, which, as discussed above, pre-dated full-
scale adoption of Pali Buddhism, then this dates the establishment of the 
Ahom kingdom on the cusp of literary vernacularization in Southeast 
Asia spurred on by Pali Buddhism.
At least initially, then, the written language regime of the Ahom 
kingdom was neither the cosmopolitan Sanskrit language regime nor a 
fully vernacularized one in terms of literary territorialization, but rather 
a very fluid, multiscriptal language regime. While Sarharuddin Ahmed 
(2008: 22) claims that ‘[t]he inscriptions of the Mediaeval Assam (Āhom 
period) are written partly in Sanskrit and partly in local Tai language’,5 
indicative of the language regime of the Sanskrit cosmopolis, the Ahom 
buranji, which are more literary and included origin myths as well as 
royal chronologies and military exploits, ‘were never written in Sanskrit 
but rather in Assamese, and occasionally in a Tai language that is 
sometimes referred to as Ahom’ (Saikia 2004: 123). The Ahom language 
regime was also likely characterized by fluid multilingualism. With 
literacy limited to the very few, primarily the priestly and royal/nobility 
classes in mandala states, ‘there was no pressure to impose linguistic 
uniformity on the peoples’ of these ‘premodern’ mandala polities (Keyes 
2003: 186). We can assume that the spoken means of communication 
in the Ahom kingdom comprised a variety of languages, including 
pidgins (Baruah 1999: 31). As Terweil (1983: 44) has put it, ‘[t]he Ahom 
developed sophisticated communication systems and organizational 
hierarchies […] Generally they succeeded in keeping a tight hold over a 
5  Ahmed (2008), unfortunately, does not specify to which inscriptions he is referring.
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large populace of great diversity.’ Linguistic contact between Tai-Kadai, 
Indo-Aryan, Tibeto-Burman and Austro-Asiatic ‘language families’ 
must have been constant in speech interactions among and between 
the different ‘classes’ and muang in the Ahom kingdom. The language 
regime of the Ahom kingdom, at least up until the seventeenth century, 
is therefore probably best characterized as institutionalized multilingual 
and multiscript/multiliterate contact.
In the early sixteenth century, the sphere of the Ahom mandala state 
began expanding through military ventures to include the older Chutia 
kingdom to the northeast. The recently Hinduized Chutia, who may 
have been either Tibeto-Burman or Tai-Kadai speakers or both, had 
supposedly developed ‘a Tai script’ (Saikia 2004: 6) — another example 
of the very complex environment of language contact throughout upper 
Assam. Guha (1983: 27) emphasizes the resulting influence of Hinduism 
on the Ahom kingdom from not only the Chutia but also from further 
Ahom expansion westward: ‘By 1539, the Ahom territory became at 
least twice as big as what it was in size around 1407. More important, its 
Assamese-speaking Hindu subjects were now more numerous than the 
Ahoms themselves.’ Soon thereafter, in 1562, according to Guha (1983), 
the Koch invaded from the west, having already absorbed Assamese-
speaking Hindu Kamarupa, only to have the Ahom reverse their 
fortunes by the mid-seventeenth century. Also by the mid-seventeenth 
century, the Ahom had finally managed to stave off repeated Mughal 
military incursions. Hence, ‘[a]t its peak in the seventeenth century the 
Ahom kingdom stretched from Sadiya [the earlier Chutia capital] in the 
east to Guwahati in the west’ (Saikia 2004: 8). As Jahnabi Gogoi Nath 
(2002: 30) phrases it, the ‘small [Ahom] state formed in the extreme 
south-east corner of the Brahmaputra valley in the early part of the 13th 
century became the single largest state of Assam covering almost the 
entire region of the valley by the last part of the 17th century.’
Evidence of territory becoming a political category in the wake of 
successful Ahom military expansion can be gleaned by comparing the 
Ahom kingdom’s early 1500s census with census categories of the mid-
seventeenth century. The early sixteenth century census focused on 
manpower, i.e., counting the adult male population, with no territorial 
component, according to Guha (1983: 34). In comparison, the mid-
seventeenth-century census was much more complex, although still 
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oriented toward addressing manpower needs. Its purpose was ‘to 
facilitate the swargadeo’s [king’s] mission to become the most powerful 
king of the region’ by expanding and rationalizing the administrative 
nobility’s functions through new regulations on land division for wet-
rice agriculture (Saikia 2004: 127–28). Guha (1983: 34, 32) also notes 
that there was a ‘total absence of any land survey and measurement 
in the Ahom Kingdom until the end of the 16th century’ and that ‘land 
surveyors’ (as well as scribes) were brought into the kingdom from the 
Mughal empire in the early seventeenth century. By 1681, the Ahom 
had ‘started [a] countrywide detailed land survey’ (Parwez 2018: 133). 
The mid-seventeenth century can be taken as the critical juncture 
for the Ahom kingdom, with its military victories, particularly over the 
Mughals, and its ensuing expansion up and down the Brahmaputra 
Valley disrupting the mandala-state tradition of non-territoriality. 
It was also a period of substantial political and economic reform 
(Guha 1983). Terweil (1983: 43–44) claims that with the defeat of the 
Mughals, ‘a new, invigorated Ahom rule was established, ready to 
try new methods of administration.’ A significant example of these 
new administrative methods was the adoption of the Mughal system 
of territorial-administrative control — the pargana system of collecting 
land revenue — at least in the newly acquired Ahom territories in lower 
Assam (Goswami 1986: 16–18; Parwez 2018: 132; Gogoi Nath 2002: 
46–47). Not only did new administrative policy options and pathways 
open up at this critical juncture, the language regime also shifted. Terweil 
(1983: 44) continues: ‘From this time onward the Ahom were firmly set 
on the path towards full assimilation of Assamese Hindu culture, and 
the Ahom tongue became obsolete. Assamese script took over from the 
old Ahom characters.’
Guha (1983) also dates the culmination of the switch from the Tai 
Ahom language to Assamese to the mid-seventeenth century. As Guha 
(1983: 10) puts it: ‘the literate Ahoms retained the Tai language and 
script well until the end of the 17th century […] In this century, this 
[Tai Ahom] language first co-existed with and then was progressively 
replaced by Assamese at and outside the [Ahom] court.’ Saikia (2004: 
120) points to the seventeenth century as well, when ‘several Brahmin 
families were invited to take high positions in the swargadeo’s [Ahom 
king’s] administration’, testifying to what Guha (1983: 25–30) claims 
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as nearly a century of increasing Brahmanical influence. The literary 
impact of this evolving state tradition of expanding the ranks of the 
Ahom nobility can be ascertained from Saikia’s (2004: 121) assertion 
that ‘[a] close reading of the [Ahom kingdom’s] chronicles to evaluate 
their prose style, orthography and language, narrative structure, and 
stories indicates that buranji writing developed and took off in the late 
seventeenth century’ — and that these buranji were written in Assamese 
(Saikia 2004: 123).
It was not only through the expansion of the elite that Assamese 
was replacing the Ahom language. Neo-Vaishnavism with its bhakti 
and anti-Brahmanical practices was spreading rapidly eastward, up the 
valley, bringing with it poetry and prose in Assamese to both the literate 
and illiterate (Guha 1983: 30–31, 44). Although Pollock (1998a: 29) 
argues that bhakti was not a primary ‘dynamic in the history of South 
Asian vernacularization’, its spread corresponds to what appears to be 
political and cultural changes in the Ahom kingdom, and to parallel 
the role of Pali Buddhism in the vernacularization of Southeast Asian 
mandala states. The Ahom kingdom had converted to Hinduism by 
the mid-seventeenth century, but it wasn’t until the late seventeenth 
century that neo-Vaishnavism received official Ahom royal patronage 
(Guha 1983: 30–32). This patronage — presumably, in linguistic terms, 
of ‘vernacularizing’ Assamese — may have been more significant than 
neo-Vaishnavism itself (Pollock 1998a: 31).6 
Equally important as linguistic patronage was the political-economic 
patronage given to the neo-Vaishnavites. The Ahom kings gave land 
grants to the neo-Vaishnavite leaders, which dramatically increased 
from the mid-seventeenth century (Gogoi Nath 2002: 38) — mostly 
on the huge riverine island of Majuli in the Brahmaputra. These land 
grants were not subject to the new land taxation system that the Ahom 
state had adopted from the Mughals. Along with these land grants, paik 
were allocated to the neo-Vaishnavite satra (monastaries) (Gurung 2018: 
101). The satra may have also provided a ‘zone of refuge’, in Scott’s (2009: 
22–26) sense of the term, for the paik: according to Tejimala Gurung (2018: 
113) a ‘large number of paiks […] escape[d] from periodic paik duty and 
6  For comparison’s sake, according to Carmen Brandt (2015), in the early eighteenth 
century, the Meitei king converted to Vaishnavism and, legend has it, destroyed the 
Meitei (Tibeto-Burman) script in the process of switching to a Devanagari-based 
script.
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settle[d] down at satra lands.’ Another option to those seeking to escape 
paik service was also emerging: ‘in the Ahom territories the relatively 
affluent paiks wanted, frequently, to commute their service obligation 
into cash or kind payments’ (Parwez 2018: 133). By the early eighteenth 
century, ‘commutation of paik services for money was encouraged by the 
Ahom state which needed money for payment of wages to the soldiers’ 
of the increasingly mercenary Ahom army (Gurung 2018: 124, n77). 
Edward Gait (2015: 184, n1) cites figures for the number dead in a battle 
in which the Ahom defeated the Jaintia kingdom at the beginning of the 
eighteenth century: of the 2336 men lost on the Ahom side, approximately 
60% were from lower Assam, and hence presumably Assamese speakers, 
compared to only 40% from upper Assam. Although Gait does not 
provide information on this, we can speculate that the foot-soldiers from 
upper Assam were more likely paik rendering military service than those 
from lower Assam, where territorial-administrative control through land 
taxation had been adopted.
In the end, the Ahom kingdom was brought down by what Guha 
(1983: 38) calls ‘peasant revolts under a [neo-Vaishnavism] religious 
garb’, which ‘became endemic’ after 1770 (see also Purkayastha 2008: 
193). The revolts were at least partly in response to ‘[t]he Ahom state 
[…] increasing the duration of service a paik had to render’ to offset the 
reduction of manpower resources that had resulted from the increasing 
demand for commutation of paik services (Gurung 2018: 101). Also, 
the ‘grant of large numbers of paiks [in the mid-eighteenth century to 
religious institutions such as satras] ultimately drained the state treasury 
in the form of loss of man-power-revenue’ (Gogoi Nath 2002: 40). This 
was a period of dramatic riverine changes as well (Cederlöf 2014: 23), 
undoubtedly contributing to the revolts and the kingdom’s manpower 
crisis. The implication in analyses of the decline of the Ahom kingdom 
is that, while a more territorial notion of political control was emerging, 
control over manpower remained a significant resource for exercising 
political authority. The Burmese invaded the weakened Ahom kingdom 
in the early nineteenth century, after the British attempted to help the 
Ahom king to get the rebellions under control (Cederlöf 2014: 4). In the 
subsequent Anglo-Burmese war of 1825, the British took control of the 
Ahom kingdom, first establishing indirect rule, then direct rule in 1838 
(Saikia 2004: 97, 101).
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Assuming that the above narrative is more or less accurate, what 
kind of conclusions can we draw? Using the framework of state 
traditions and language regimes introduced above, we can postulate 
that the Ahom kingdom’s mandala-state traditions most likely informed 
a heavily multilingual and multiscriptal language regime. The critical 
juncture, crowning language regime change, appears to have been 
when the Ahom kingdom reached its height in the mid-seventeenth 
century, after nearly a century of expansion that increasingly took 
on a territorial dimension and accelerated a ‘liberal policy of offering 
respectable official positions to new entrants’ (Purkayastha 2008: 180). 
These newest entrants were in effect ‘a new social class related to state 
power’ (Purkayastha 2008: 180). They legitimized their new status by 
having their own buranji written in Assamese (Purkayastha 2008: 180; 
Saikia 2004: 121, 140). This Assamese buranji writing had an expanded 
‘circle of authors and readers’, given the increased extent of the Ahom 
kingdom (Purkayastha 2008: 180). Adding in the increasing political and 
linguistic influence of neo-Vaishnavism, it seems, then, at the height of 
state power, the language of literature, and probably spoken language as 
well, shifted. The new language regime was informed by state traditions 
that were morphing into more of a territorial notion of the kingdom 
and a flatter hierarchy through expansion of the elite. Although these 
emerging state traditions seem closer to those of the modern state, the 
language regime they informed remained different. Despite the shift to 
Assamese, the path dependency of multilingualism through language 
contact most likely remained.7 
The Colonial State
By all accounts, the Ahom kingdom’s shift from a Tai-Kadai language 
to Indo-Aryan Assamese predates colonialism. While new ‘geocultural’ 
concepts may well have underlain the ‘literary territorialization’ of 
Assamese (Pollack 1998b: 49), and the Ahom kingdom’s mandala-state 
tradition of non-territoriality appeared to be changing, the political 
concepts of fixed borders and territorial sovereignty were a colonial 
7  The linguistic effects of language contact is apparent today, according to Chelliah 
and Lester (2016: 305): ‘Assamese developed a classifier system unusual to Indo-
Aryan on the basis of contact with Tai-Ahom.’
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introduction. ‘Valley homogenization’, including some degree of 
linguistic homogenization, probably also preceded colonial conquest 
(Scott 2009: 253). However, the linguistic ideology of a ‘language’ being 
a discrete, identifiable object ‘belonging’ to a particular people in a fixed 
territory was a colonial imposition. There was a fundamental congruence 
between ‘colonial geography’ (Baruah 1999: chap. 2) and the colonial 
language regime. Colonial geography spawned a ‘new property regime’ 
informed by the ‘Orientalist view that […] emphasized the discreteness 
of each village’ (Baruah 1999: 48), just as the colonial language regime 
was based on the ‘dogma that those who speak a particular language 
form a unique, definable unit and that this unit had a particular culture 
and a particular history’ (Scott 2009: 239, quoting Leach 1954: 48). British 
colonial rule ‘provide[d] a radically new representation of the relation of 
the speaker to his speech (one language, one name, one identity)’ (Montaut 
2005: 81). Under colonial rule, the recognition and status of Assamese 
as the language of the erstwhile Ahom kingdom was consolidated, and 
extended to the colonial political-geographical construct of Assam and 
ethnolinguistic construct of the Assamese people.
Integral to this consolidation and extension was the colonial 
patronage of written texts (Mitchell 2009). Colonial patronage 
differed from the previous royal patronage of what Pollock (1998a) 
would call aesthetic texts, such as poetry or royal accolades. Because 
the new colonial rulers assumed that texts were examples of spoken 
language (Errington 2008: 58), they patronized the production of 
grammars and dictionaries of Indian vernaculars, often undertaken 
by missionaries, spurring standardization. Saikia (2004: 6) notes that 
‘the written language of Assamese was […] standardized’ by the 
American Baptist Mission printing a translation of the bible in 1835, 
‘merg[ing] into one’ the various scripts used at the time. Written 
standardization of Assamese in effect reduced, if not eliminated, the 
multiscriptal characteristic of the previous Ahom language regime. It 
also undoubtedly accelerated homogenization of spoken Assamese, 
a process that began, according to Guha (1983: 44), with the ‘neo-
Vaishnavite missionaries’. Standardization reflected and reinforced 
the colonial linguistic ideology that ascribes a discrete, identifiable 
language as the marker of a discrete, identifiable people or ethnicity. 
It is the key component of linguistic rationalization (Laitin 1988). The 
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colonial state’s language regime was founded on the enumeration and 
delineation, and then standardization, of indigenous languages. 
Philology furnished the ‘scientific’ vindication of the colonial 
linguistic ideology (Errington 2008: chap. 4). Through the comparison 
of the ‘languages’ in written texts, relations — both spatial and 
temporal — between languages could be established, according to 
the philological approach. Since languages mapped onto ethnicities/
peoples in the colonial language regime, philology provided the 
groundwork for establishing historical relations between peoples 
and ethnicities (including races). Those relations were perceived 
to be hierarchical. Although philologically Sanskrit was related to 
Greek, Latin and Persian, as Sir William Jones ‘discovered’, and 
had spawned ‘daughter’ or descendent languages such as Assamese 
(albeit several nodes down the language family tree), the spatial and 
temporal distance between Sanskrit and its European sisters indicated 
to colonialists that Sanskrit and by extension India had fallen into 
decay (Errington 2008: 56 ff). It was a relatively short step from Jones’ 
‘discovery’ in 1786 to Macaulay’s declaration in 1835 that ‘a single 
shelf of a good European library was worth the whole native literature 
of India’. Although the Orientalists, such as Jones, and the Anglicists, 
such as Macaulay, disagreed over language policy choices for Britain’s 
colonial possession (Sonntag 2011), the colonial state’s hierarchical and 
racist tradition reinforced by colonial linguistic ideology informed the 
language regime of the colonial state. 
The ‘history’ of the Tai Ahom language and the Ahom kingdom’s 
shift to Assamese challenged some of the tenets of colonial linguistic 
ideology. The language shift seemed to indicate that the Ahom 
‘conquerors’ did not impose their language on their subjects. This did 
not quite fit with the biologically-based racist ideology of the inherent 
superiority of conquerors over the conquered that informed colonial 
language regimes (Errington 2008: 65, 87). As mentioned above, one of 
the earliest and best known colonial officials to study Assam, and hence 
the Ahom kingdom, was Edward Gait in the late nineteenth century. 
According to Arupjyoti Saikia (2008: 152), 
Gait proclaimed that philology could not be a ‘real test of race’ […] 
[because of] numerous examples where one language had supplanted 
another, or where conquerors adopted the language of the vanquished. 
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Here he provided the example of the Ahom, who abandoned their ‘tribal 
dialect’ in favor of Assamese.
Gait’s ‘texts’ for his history of Assam were primarily buranji which, as noted 
above, were written mainly in Assamese. Buranji were somewhat unusual 
in that, unlike vernacular texts in many other parts of India, they could be 
‘read’ not only philologically but also as historical texts according to the 
colonial regime of history (Chatterjee 2008: 14). These local circumstances 
of Gait’s inquiry may have led him to discount philology as providing 
the ‘scientific’ evidence of racial inferiority in the case of the Ahom and, 
by extension, the Assamese. But for Gait, Assamese was undoubtedly a 
more developed language, with its Sanskrit derivation, than the ‘tribal 
dialect’ of the Ahom. Hence linguistic superiority — a strong ideological 
tenet of the colonial language regime — was nevertheless reinforced in 
the Assamese case albeit not linked to race. The colonial language regime 
rendered the Ahom language as ‘dead’ (Saikia 2004: 80), fitting in with 
philology’s biological metaphors (Errington 2008). The demoting of the 
Ahom language vis-à-vis Assamese in the colonial regime facilitated 
the demotion of Ahoms and, by extension, the Assamese as a race in the 
colonial mentality, despite Gait’s reservations.
Further reinforcement of the colonial mapping of racial and ethnic 
hierarchy was accomplished through a new colonial territorial-
administrative ‘hard boundary’ between hill peoples and supposedly 
more ‘advanced’ valley peoples (Baruah 1999: 29; Saikia 2004: 57–58). 
This new colonial territorial regime disrupted the constant exchange 
between river valley padi states and Zomia that had been a defining 
feature of mandala kingdoms, including the Ahom kingdom (Scott 2009). 
This disruption facilitated the dismantling of precolonial economic 
relations and the introduction of a tea plantation economy. For example, 
slave-hunting was prohibited by the British in the 1830s, for the alleged 
protection of hill tribes/Zomians, and then slavery itself was abolished in 
1860 (Guha 1977: 3, 10). According to Guha (1977: 10–11), ‘[t]he abolition 
of slavery almost crippled the old Ahom aristocracy.’ The British took 
over the sale of opium, which had become an important product for 
trade and consumption during the decline of the Ahom kingdom. Poppy 
cultivation was banned at the behest of tea plantation owners in order to 
coerce the Assamese peasantry into laboring on the plantations (Guha 
1977: 6, 9–10, 19). A new land tenure system favored the tea plantations 
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and agriculturally marginalized the peasantry (Baruah 2005: chap. 4). 
The tea plantations and the colonial administration in Assam tended to 
employ Bengalis, rather than Assamese, in managerial positions (Saikia 
2004: 102). In this new colonial hierarchy, the Ahom, now defined as 
Assamese — and concomitantly the Assamese language — were ranked 
below the Bengalis and the Bengali language (although above the tribals 
in the highlands, i.e., Scott’s Zomia). The colonial language regime, 
informed by Western European state traditions, set the stage for the 
demotic politics of the modern state, which in Assam have taken the 
form of intense linguistic nationalism.
The Modern State 
Language politics have featured prominently in independent India. A 
significant component of India’s postcolonial language regime has been 
linguistic federalism, institutionalized by the 1956 States Reorganization 
Act: major Indian languages, including Assamese, form the basis of most 
states in India’s federal union. The vitality of India’s major regional 
languages seems assured with this linguistic territorialization, while 
minority languages within the linguistic states remain for the most 
part unprotected. Linguistic rationalization, i.e., the institutionalized 
linguistic homogenization of the nation-state model, happens within 
India’s linguistic states (Laitin 1989) — in effect, ‘[l]inguistic federalism 
has shifted the politicization of language downward, to the state level’ 
(Sonntag 2014: 96). Major Indian languages are also enhanced through 
another component of the language regime: the Eighth Schedule of 
the Indian constitution confers the status of national language on an 
original fourteen languages (including Assamese), now twenty-two 
(Sarangi 2015). These two components of modern India’s language 
regime provide it with the ‘pan-Indian cultural grammar of the nation-
province’, to use Baruah’s (1999: 113) terminology. Language politics 
play out primarily in the linguistic nation-provinces or states within 
India. Linguistic nationalism is the ideological fuel for language 
politics within the Indian states; multiple ‘subnationalisms’ (Baruah’s 
terminology again) make up India writ large. Hence, despite state-level 
linguistic rationalization and nationalism, India can be described as 
having a multilingual, and multiscriptal, language regime.
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The intensity of language politics in various states of India 
since independence has been attributed to colonialism: ‘[l]inguistic 
consciousness […] seemed to have stemmed from the classificatory 
passion of the colonial agenda […] providing the grounds for a 
distinctive language consciousness later on to develop into language 
claims and conflicts’ (Montaut 2005: 87–88). The raising of a distinctive 
language consciousness in Assam began soon after the British annexed 
Assam in 1826. The British had made Bengali the official language in 
1837 as they were transitioning to direct rule. According to Uddipan 
Dutta (2016: 68), ‘[w]hile this was an administrative decision, it created 
a situation where Assamese was regarded as a dialect of Bengali.’8 
The colonialists also ruled, or administered, Assam from Bengal, 
not constituting it as a separate colonial province until 1874 (Baruah 
1999: 24), a year after they partially restored Assamese for official use 
(Saikia 2004: 60; Guha 1977: 22). This colonial rendering of Assam as 
a territorial and linguistic appendage of Bengal sparked Assamese 
intellectuals, many of them residing in Calcutta and familiar with the 
Bengal renaissance, to ‘make the case that they [the Assamese] were 
a distinct people with a distinct language and culture’ (Baruah 1999: 
71). Their case against the British colonial language policy in Assam 
was paradoxically based on the colonial — and modern — linguistic 
ideology of discrete peoples having their own discrete language, and 
their demands therefore resonated with the language regime (Sonntag 
and Cardinal 2015: 8). It was consequently unsurprising when they allied 
with missionaries complicit with the colonial regime who promoted the 
Assamese language as the distinctive feature of Assam, for the purpose 
of disseminating Christian scriptures to the local population in their 
own language (Baruah 1999: 71; Saikia 2004: 60). Ironically, the tea 
industrialists helped cultivate Assam’s territorial distinctiveness from 
8  The view that Assamese is a dialect of Bengali still finds expression in such 
prominent places as the Oxford Dictionary. The 2010 edition’s definition of 
Assamese as ‘[t]he Indic language which is the official language of Assam, related 
to Bengali and spoken by around 23 million people, roughly half in Assam and half 
in Bangladesh’ recently generated an online petition pointing out both its linguistic 
and territorial errors (https://www.change.org/p/oxford-university-press-wrong-
definition-of-assamese-in-oxford-dictionary-of-english?recruiter=38274722&utm_
source=share_petition&utm_medium=facebook&utm_campaign=fb_send_
dialog&utm_term=autopublish). My thanks go to Mark Turin for informing me 
about this petition.
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Bengal, given the increasing brand recognition of Assamese tea (Baruah 
1999: 27). With the association between the Assamese language and the 
regional territory solidifying, ‘[l]anguage politics became the channel 
for new demands’ for the Assamese (Saikia 2004: 60).
By the early twentieth century, Assamese intellectuals were wedding 
their anti-colonialist discourse to the nationalist cause. While some 
nationalists identified ancient Kamarupa in the lower Brahmaputra 
Valley as the source of pride in Assamese, others, such as the Assamese 
historian Surya Kumar Bhuyan, attempted to bond the (Indo-Aryan) 
Assamese with the (Tai-Kadai) Ahom kingdom in order to authenticate 
a distinctive ethnolinguistic consciousness, especially distinct from 
Bengali (Saikia 2008: 161; Purkayastha 2008: 196). The singularity of 
Assamese consciousness was crucial: ‘Bhuyan’s portrayal of a generic 
Assamese society evolving within the Ahom state trie[d] to assure 
homogeneity by playing down the legacy of a composite culture’ 
(Purkayastha 2008: 194). Bhuyan ‘argu[ed] for a language-based 
nationalism for Assam’, with language being ‘identified as a central 
feature defining Assamese culture’, for which he ‘used the buranji texts 
as a powerful weapon […] to assert an Assamese linguistic identity’ 
(Purkayastha 2008: 196). Furthermore, Bhuyan made the vital territorial 
linkage: ‘The name (Asam = Ahom) was a symbol of the territorial 
identity of modern Assam’ for him (Purkayastha 2008: 195).
The language-territory-people association, reified under the colonial 
regime, now resonated in the struggle for independence and beyond. 
Bhuyan had made the territorial linkage, but in Assam linguistic 
homogenization remained precarious despite Bhuyan’s and others’ 
attempts. Sylhet, which had been considered ‘as part of the mostly 
Bengali-speaking Surma Valley as opposed to the mostly Assamese-
speaking Brahmaputra Valley’ by colonial authorities was hived off 
from Assam at Partition, when its population voted by referendum 
to join (East) Pakistan rather than remain in India (Baruah 1999: 101). 
However, Cachar, also in the Surma Valley, remained part of Assam. 
Nagaland was formed in 1963 in a rather unsuccessful attempt to contain 
an insurgency. Further reorganization of Assam, which had linguistic 
implications, was postponed until the early 1970s, when Meghalaya, 
Mizoram and what became Arunachal Pradesh were detached. Even 
then, linguistic homogenization within Assam remained incomplete: 
according to the 1991 census, only about 58% of the population claimed 
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Assamese as their first language (Baruah 1999: 19). By the 2011 census, 
that figure had dropped to 48% (‘Assamese Language Under Threat’ 
2018). The Assam state government’s inability to carry out linguistic 
rationalization has been at the base of much of the conflict, often violent, 
in recent decades. 
Assam’s claims to legitimately constitute a linguistic state in modern 
India’s language regime has been further compromised by the emergence 
of a Tai-Ahom identity movement in recent decades. As Saikia (2004: 
11) puts it, ‘the assertion of Ahoms as separate from the Assamese is a 
problematic sign of the internal breakdown of the composite Assamese 
identity.’ Some self-identifying Ahoms are attempting language 
revitalization of Tai-Ahom, claiming Thai spoken in Thailand is a related 
language and seeking assistance from Thai scholars (Saikia 2004: 185–87, 
216–21). In this regard, they are downplaying language contact and the 
multilingualism it has entailed in Assam in their reconstruction of Ahom 
historical experience, opting for a philological basis to their new, distinct 
linguistic identity in Assam. The movement also identifies a territorial 
component to Tai-Ahom identity: the upper Brahmaputra Valley (Saikia 
2004: 232). Interestingly, however, one of the main organizations of the 
movement, the Ban Ok Publik Muang Tai (translated as the Tai-Ahom 
Sahitya Sabha in Assamese or Eastern Tai Literary Society), whose ‘main 
agenda [i]s to produce a memory of the Ahom as an ethnic group’ 
through a reinterpretation of the historical records (Saikia 2004: xv, 
180), retains in its name the mandala geocultural concept of muang. The 
likelihood of success of the movement is minimal, especially compared 
to the better-known Bodo movement in Assam. In 2003, Bodos attained 
territorial recognition through the establishment of a territorial council 
under their governance; the Bodo are now demanding a separate state 
in India’s federal union. The Bodo language also received recognition in 
2003, through its addition to the Eighth Schedule (Sarangi 2015), even 
though there are, unsurprisingly, many Bodo languages and many Bodo 
have assimilated linguistically to Assamese (Baruah 1999: 180–83). In 
contrast, Tai-Ahom activists’ ethnolinguistic demands have not gained 
the same amount of traction in India’s current language regime. As 
suggested throughout this chapter, this may be because by invoking the 
Ahom kingdom as the historical basis of their ethnolinguistic identity, the 
activists are also unintentionally invoking the legacy of a multilingual, 
multiscriptal language regime informed by mandala-state traditions.
74 The Politics of Language Contact in the Himalaya
Conclusion
Colonial and postcolonial language regimes are palimpsests, imposed 
not on blank slates but in complex political and cultural environments 
marked by historically dynamic language contact. While language 
contact has been recognized as a prominent and ongoing feature of the 
linguistic environment in South Asia (Emeneau 1956), and certainly 
characterized precolonial language regimes, it was not institutionalized 
in India’s colonial or postcolonial language regime. In contrast to these 
latter language regimes, conceptions of language and language use 
as language contact, without discrete associations with a particular 
territory or people, informed the language regime of the precolonial 
Ahom kingdom. 
The Ahom kingdom’s shift from the Tai-Kadai Ahom language to the 
Indo-Aryan Assamese language signaled the vernacularization of the 
Sanskrit cosmopolis in Assam, at a critical junction when the kingdom’s 
mandala-state traditions were being disrupted. Pollock (1998a: 31–32) 
references the argument that when the kingdoms in the Sanskrit 
cosmopolis started being spatially defined, then vernaculars took over 
from Sanskrit, suggesting a close, if not symbiotic, relationship between 
territorialization and vernacularization. At the height of the Ahom 
kingdom, the two processes of vernacularization and territorialization 
were intertwined. That vernacularization happened in Assamese, 
rather than in the Ahom language, is at least partially explained by the 
flattening of the elite hierarchy through an influx of Assamese speakers 
at the critical juncture.
While the legacy of the Ahom language regime can still be detected in 
the rich linguistic diversity in Assam today, as well as perceived in India’s 
‘multilingual ethos’ (Montaut 2005), language politics in Assam today 
resonate with the modern nation-state’s language regime of linguistic 
rationalization — albeit modulated by India’s linguistic federalism, in 
that linguistic rationalization is the political agenda of states within the 
Indian union, rather than the nation-state writ large. In Assam’s case, 
linguistic rationalization grates against its linguistic diversity. That 
diversity reflects the legacy of Assam’s multilingualism emanating 
from a historical constant of language contact. The historically and 
theoretically grounded case study of Assam that I have presented above 
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exposes the contingency of contemporary language politics informed 
by a language regime that is path-dependent on linguistic homogeneity. 
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3. Transforming Language to Script
Constructing Linguistic Authority through 
Language Contact in Schools in Nepal
Uma Pradhan
‘Earlier they used to speak phohor (unclean) and je pāyo tyehi 
(unsystematic) Tharu. Now they speak rāmro (good) Tharu, while also 
learning Nepali’, one of the parents told me as he described his child’s 
progress in Jana Kalyan Higher Secondary School (JKHSS).1 JKHSS had 
been implementing a Multi-Lingual Education (MLE) program since 
2010, with the financial and technical support of United Mission to Nepal 
(UMN) and the Government of Nepal. As a part of the MLE program, 
the school used Dangaura Tharu2 — the language spoken by ninety per 
cent of the student population — as the language of instruction for all 
subjects in Grades I–III. In line with this, JKHSS also developed a set of 
textbooks using three different languages — Tharu, Awadhi, and Nepali 
simultaneously. As I inquired further about this, the Vice Principal 
of the school, who is also the chief editor of textbooks, explained the 
process of MLE implementation and textbook preparation: ‘When we 
started mother-tongue education in our school, we refined our language 
1  The school requested the use of their actual name, rather than the pseudonym, 
so that their efforts in mainstreaming mother-tongue education could be publicly 
recognized. 
2  Tharu language is a contested category. Sonntag (1995: 115) notes that ‘Tharus are an 
ethnic group in search of a language’. Though Tharus have succeeded in coalescing 
pan-Tharu identity, they do not have a singular linguistic identity. Guneratne (1998) 
identifies at least nine different Tharu languages spoken across Nepal. The variant 
spoken at JKHSS, Kapilbastu, is commonly known as Dangaura Tharu. 
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[parimarjit garyaũ]; we removed ‘bad words’,3 systematized it and made 
it suitable for the textbooks.’ (Interview, 3 Jan 2014).
This apparent sanitization of the language is one of the ways in 
which JKHSS prepared the Tharu language for school education. 
The practice of removing what are seen to be profanities, jargon, bad 
grammar and mispronunciations — a process that also aims towards 
linguistic hygiene — is a result of an urge to improve and clean up 
language (Cameron 1995). In JKHSS, this process of cleansing the 
language was animated by three main challenges. First, while the MLE 
program opened up official space for minority language education 
in JKHSS, it also put a spotlight on its putative lack of appropriate 
vocabulary, standardization, and grammar. As in many other mother-
tongue education schools, the teachers and the school administration 
of JKHSS had become acutely aware of an “inadequate” level of 
literary development in their language, especially when developing 
new textbooks. Second, the MLE program brought minority languages 
such as Tharu in close contact with the national education system and 
the dominant language, Nepali. Third, this language contact created a 
process of negotiating linguistic authority, albeit within the confines of 
nationally-mandated guidelines. In order to use Dangaura Tharu for 
education, the school and textbook writers had to change this primarily 
oral language into a written language, and prepare it for the purpose 
of education. This chapter explores the ways in which local languages 
are being reshaped through the process of transforming a spoken 
language into a written language, and how this dynamic is revealing 
the understandings of the nation that are currently being reconfigured 
through language contact in schools.
Methodologically, this chapter is based on fieldwork conducted 
between August 2013 and March 2014 in Jana Kalyan Higher Secondary 
School (JKHSS). JKHSS is a government school in Kapilbastu district, 
in Nepal’s Tarai, the plains adjoining India. The school is located in the 
middle of a Tharu village.4 At the time the fieldwork was undertaken, 
there were a total of 1,048 students in JKHSS, of which 304 students in 
3  By bad words, he meant the rude words (gāli) and forms that denote a less respectful 
way of addressing people (tu instead of aap).
4  Tharus are classified as an indigenous nationality (ādivāsi janajāti) by the 
Government of Nepal. According to the Census of Nepal 2011, there are 1,737,470 
Tharus in Nepal, making up 6.6% of its total population.
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the primary grades were the direct beneficiaries of the MLE project, 90 
per cent of whom are Tharus according to school statistics. As part of the 
MLE program, JKHSS had published textbooks in Dangaura Tharu and 
Awadhi that were used in JKHSS and its five ‘feeder’ primary schools. 
During my fieldwork, I researched how ‘mother-tongue’ was understood 
and what was actually happening when the local language was officially 
introduced in the school. For this purpose, I spent time interacting with 
students, parents and teachers, observing classroom teaching and staff 
meetings, studying school textbooks, and participating in the everyday life 
of the schools. By drawing attention to the Tharu textbook development 
process, this chapter discusses the ways in which local textbook authors 
are transforming a primarily oral language such as Tharu into a written 
script and, through this, claiming linguistic authority. 
This chapter argues that by ‘performing’ a language in a particular 
way in a particular situation, people assert the legitimate authority of 
that language and seek to shift power relations between languages. I will 
elaborate on this by, first, discussing the ways in which local languages 
are being reconfigured by their supposed sanitization. Second, I will 
discuss how standardization and correction played a role in the writing 
of Dangaura Tharu, thus ensuring its claim as ‘language’ as opposed 
to ‘dialect’. Third, I will show how local languages were transformed 
in new ways via linguistic standardization. In doing so, I will discuss 
the ways in which local language authors sought authority through 
the process of publishing textbooks within the national education 
framework. This chapter aims to add to the existing scholarship on 
language contact by highlighting the implications language contact has 
for the negotiation of linguistic authority, and by drawing attention 
to the often overlooked dynamics of written language contact and the 
legitimization of specific regimes of authority. This analysis may help 
us to appreciate the inherently constructed nature of language.
Linguistic Authority Through Language Contact
In Nepal, the institutional space for the use of minority languages for 
the purpose of education opened up in a context in which language had 
become a highly politicized issue. During the 1990s, Nepal witnessed 
persistent ethno-linguistic activism that raised voices against the ‘one 
nation, one language’ policy of an earlier era. Gellner (2007) identifies the 
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post-1990 period as a time of ‘ethnicity-building’ (distinct from the period 
of nation-building before 1990) where different ethnic groups made 
demands for mother-tongue education and the use of local language in 
public offices, in addition to various other claims for territorial autonomy 
and recognition. In such a context, language has served as an important 
tool for promoting and challenging varying visions of Nepal. In response, 
the Constitution of Nepal (1990) declared Nepal a multi-ethnic (bahu jātiya) 
and multilingual (bahu bhāsik) country, with all the languages spoken as 
mother tongues duly recognized as ‘national languages’ (rāstriya bhāsā). 
The constitution also granted citizens the fundamental right to primary 
education in their own mother tongue, a provision that was carried over 
to the subsequent Constitution of 2015. This official adoption of minority 
languages for the purpose of education in Nepal is often portrayed as a 
radical departure from a historical context in which the use of languages 
other than the one former national language, Nepali, was considered 
divisive and therefore against the law.
One of the key features of the language movement in Nepal has 
been its effort to normalize minority languages in public arenas such 
as education, media, and state institutions. At the time of writing in 
2018, there is now a five-minute news broadcast on Radio Nepal, the 
state-run radio station, in a number of ‘languages of the nation’ and a 
weekly page in Gorakhapatra, the state-run newspaper, in a number of 
languages other than Nepali. The Royal Nepal Academy has included 
research on ethnic languages in its programs since the 1990s. Similarly, 
Nepal National Plan of Action (GoN 2003:47) has created space in the 
existing policies that focus on the inclusion of ethnic, minority, Dalit and 
women and girls on the development and use of local languages. This 
was further taken up by the School Sector Reform Plan 2009–2015, which 
set a target of 7,500 schools using the mother tongue as a medium of 
instruction in grades one to three. In line with this goal, the Government 
of Nepal piloted multilingual education in seven primary schools in 
2009 (mother tongues, Nepali and English as mediums of instruction).5 
5  In 2009, the government of Nepal piloted multilingual education in seven primary 
schools: Sharada Primary School, Sunsari (Tharu and Uraw), Rastriya Ekta Primary 
School, Jhapa (Rajbanshi, Santhal, and Nepali), Bhimsen School, Thulo Balkhu, 
Rasuwa District (Tamang), Rastriya Lower Secondary School, Saraswati Lower 
Secondary Schools, Thade, Rasuwa (Tamang), and Deurali Lower Secondary 
School, Dhankuta (Athppahariya Rai) (UNESCO 2011). This research was not 
conducted in any of these schools. 
 833. Transforming Language to Script
While such actions have not been enough to bring about significant 
changes, they have nonetheless opened up spaces for more minority 
language education, while at the same time demonstrating the Nepali 
state’s commitment to embrace the linguistic diversity of its population.
It is within this constitutional context that JKHSS started implementing 
multilingual education, and introduced Tharu and Awadhi as languages 
of instruction. Multi-Lingual Education in Nepal describes a model 
that involves starting education in the medium of the language that a 
student already speaks, i.e., the mother tongue. Inside a classroom this 
means learning school subjects like math, science and social studies in 
the student’s first language (usually the mother tongue, or L1), then 
introducing a second (Nepali, L2) and third (English, L3) language as 
‘subjects’, and gradually transitioning to L2 and L3 as media of instruction 
as needed. Multi-Lingual Education is based on the principle of ‘first-
language-first’ in order to help children make a better start, and they go 
on to perform better than those who begin their education in a language 
they don’t understand (UNESCO 2011). In addition, Multi-Lingual 
Education also operationalizes provisions in the Constitution of Nepal 
that recognize the multi-ethnic and multilingual nature of the country. 
The idea and practice of mother-tongue education thus played out in 
changing discourses of social inclusion and multi-ethnicity. 
In the socio-political context of Kapilbastu, where Nepali is 
the dominant language of education, multilingual schools such as 
JKHSS are also spaces where different minority languages come into 
close contact with dominant languages. Scholars such as Pratt (1991) 
describes these overlapping spaces as ‘zones of contact’ or the areas in 
which two or more cultures communicate and negotiate shared histories 
and power relations. These are also the spaces where ‘cultures meet, 
clash and grapple with each other’ (Pratt 1991: 34). Given that different 
groups in the contact zones enjoy different power positions, Bourdieu’s 
work on language and power is also instructive here. Bourdieu notes 
that language symbolizes relation to power, and therefore that no 
one acquires a language without acquiring a relation to that language 
(Bourdieu 1977). In this context, what counts as an authoritative 
performance of language and who is deemed to be a legitimate speaker 
reveal how social boundaries are constructed. 
Multilingual school spaces, therefore, provide an ideal site for 
exploring the dynamics of language contact in education. They not only 
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bring ethno-linguistic groups together but also provide a context to 
examine how various actors negotiate a ‘complex network of historical 
power relations between the speakers as well as between the respective 
groups to which they belong’ (Bourdieu 1991: 118). Further, Bourdieu 
argues that the production and reproduction of relations of power 
are legitimized through ideologies of language (Bourdieu 1977) and 
accomplished through social and discursive practices in a number 
of institutional sites, one of the most important being educational 
institutions (Bourdieu and Passeron 1970). Through the process of 
endorsing a particular language as an official language, using it for 
the purposes of schooling, and providing accreditation, education 
institutions legitimize the use of languages. Schools thus serve as 
important institutional spaces for conferring social authority and 
legitimacy on the use of a specific language in society. 
Precisely because of the power-laden dimensions of education, the 
issue of language in education can become important to the social and 
political struggles of a country. The choice of language in education 
can play a critical role in the construction of modes of participation 
in, and legitimation of, activities controlled by the state. Many studies 
on language education around the world have discussed how the 
introduction of a minority language in school education can allow for 
the possibility of revaluing languages within the same institutions (Gal 
1995; Heller 1996; Martin-Jones and Heller 1996). This growing body of 
research illustrates how particular social groups organize themselves to 
claim space in these educational institutions. These researchers argue 
that discursive negotiation in educational institutions can offer insights 
about the specific kinds of language practices that are legitimized, 
thereby illustrating the ways in which particular practices help to 
advance or marginalize the interests of different groups, and in the 
process alter the relations of power between these groups. 
In Nepal, even as mother tongues, in principle, are accepted as the 
language of education, the ‘under-developed’ nature of various languages 
is perceived to pose practical challenges for the successful implementation 
of mother-tongue education. More mainstream languages, such as Nepali, 
are regarded as well-developed in terms of their grammar, phonology, 
vocabulary, standardized form and written tradition, and therefore 
deemed to be more suitable for use in public domains. Many minority 
languages in Nepal do not have standard orthographies, grammar, or 
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written traditions. This perceived linguistic ‘under-development’ assigns 
minority languages low status, thereby rendering them undesirable for 
use in public spaces and for the purpose of education. Turin (2006) notes 
that Nepal’s National Language Policy Recommendations Commission 
presented a four-fold stratification of languages spoken in Nepal, ranked 
on the basis of having a written form. Written languages were accorded 
higher status than solely spoken ones. Accordingly, many ethnic and 
language activists seek to transform spoken languages into written 
languages as a way to seek linguistic authority. In this chapter, I discuss 
the ways in which the speakers of minority languages seek to enhance 
their sociolinguistic status through various mechanisms such as claims 
of ‘authenticity’ (Woolard 2016; Jaffe 2001), ‘correction’ (Bilanuik 2006), 
‘acceptability’ (Gal and Woolard 2001) and ‘legitimacy’ (Bourdieu 1977). 
By analyzing how language is performed in multilingual school spaces, 
we may be able to discern the process through which linguistic standards 
and linguistic ideologies are strengthened. Categories such as linguistic 
standards and authority are produced by expert knowledge as well as 
linguistic ideologies shared more widely among speakers. By ‘doing 
things with words’, as Austin (1962) explains, language performance 
constitutes social action. When people struggle to elevate and legitimize 
their identity through language, they reaffirm a system that links 
linguistic forms with social status. As Heller argues, it is most fruitful to 
analyze language performances as discursive spaces within which ‘social 
actors, whatever else they may be doing, also define (again and again, or 
anew) what counts as legitimate language’ (2010: 278). Since the minority 
languages often start out at a relatively less powerful position, these ways 
of negotiating linguistic authority by adhering to linguistic standards 
are important methods for minority languages to be legitimized in an 
educational context. In the following sections, this chapter outlines how 
language contact in educational institutions has implications for the 
production, legitimization and distribution of linguistic authority. 
Writing Language, Claiming “Authenticity”
When JKHSS joined the MLE program, local teachers in the school 
commenced an important project of publishing textbooks in Tharu. As 
Guneratne (1998, 2002) notes, the category ‘Tharu’ is used to denote 
86 The Politics of Language Contact in the Himalaya
several disparate groups of people living in the southern areas of 
Nepal, often referred to as the Tarai. Although they share the same 
name — Tharu — the members may belong to many communities with 
very different languages and cultural practices living across the Tarai.6 
Nonetheless, the Tharu encounter with Hill people has sharpened the 
sense of Tharu being a distinct group of people, even though different 
Tharu groups might speak different languages (Guneratne 2002). 
Several national and local social Tharu organizations such as the Tharu 
Welfare Society and the Backward Society Education (BASE) have been 
working on various development projects for the welfare of the Tharu 
population (Krauskopff 2008; Guneratne 2002). McDonaugh (1989: 200) 
records the establishment of ‘the association for the improvement of 
Tharu language and literature in the west of Nepal’ in the 1970s. Many 
of these organizations relied on cultural and language activities to 
organize the various Tharu communities. However, these are primarily 
oral languages, with very limited written literature, with the result that 
none of the Tharu languages have been used for education purposes, 
either in the school or for higher education. 
In this context, the textbook writers had the challenging task of not 
only transforming the oral language into a written one, but also ensuring 
that it represented “authentic” Tharuness that would be acceptable 
both at the local and national level. This was important, especially 
given that the set of mother-tongue textbooks developed by the Nepal 
Government’s Curriculum Development Centre (CDC) in nineteen 
different languages had not been accepted by the various schools 
across the country. Since most of the mother-tongue textbooks were 
centrally published by the CDC in Kathmandu, school administrators 
and teachers were dissatisfied that books were translations from Nepali 
textbooks and the contents were disconnected from local realities. In 
addition, the form of language used in the book did not match with the 
local variant of that language, and since the printing and distribution of 
6  At least five distinct groups are popularly known: Rana Tharu in the far western 
region, Kathariya Tharu to their east, Dangaura Thari near the Dang valley, 
Chitwaniya Tharu in the Central Tarai and Kochila Tharu in the eastern region of 
Nepal’s Tarai. Teachers in the school listed nine different varieties of Tharu language: 
Dangaura Tharu, Desauri Tharu, Rana Tharu, Saptaria Tharu, Chitwaniya Tharu, 
Deukhariya Tharu, Bhaurahia Tharu, Nawalpuria Tharu and Sunsariya Tharu.
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these books were coordinated centrally, schools always faced problems 
in their timely distribution, resulting in availability problems and 
shortages. Because of these ongoing issues, both the CDC and JKHSS 
felt that the local publication of the Tharu language curriculum was 
both relevant and practical.
The books were introduced as ‘local’ subjects as per the government 
of Nepal’s 2003 (2060 BS) provision for a ‘local subject’ in the primary 
school curriculum. In addition, the guidelines for primary education 
set aside twenty per cent of the curriculum for subjects like social 
studies and health and hygiene to be based on locally-relevant material 
(CDC 2007). The Curriculum Development Centre (CDC) outlines the 
minimum skills and competence to be delivered by textbooks in all 
languages in its Model Curriculum for Mother Tongue and Textbook 
Guidelines 2007 (2064 BS). According to the guidelines, the subject 
material should be prepared in coordination with the local resource 
center and district curriculum coordination committee. However, in 
order to be approved by the Curriculum Development Centre (CDC), 
the school materials needed to adhere to the age-grade objectives and 
competence level mentioned in the guidelines. 
Table 3.1.  List of mother-tongue textbooks used in the Jana Kalyan 
Higher Secondary School (JKHSS). 
Name of Textbook Subject Class Language
Apane Bhasa,  
Apane Sikhi
Tharu I, II, and III Tharu 
Aapan Bhasa,  
Apanen Shikhav
Awadhi I, II, and III Awadhi 
Bighyan Sikhi Science I, II, and III Tharu, Awadhi,  
and Nepali 
Sahajey Sikhi Hisab Math I, II, and III Tharu, Awadhi,  
and Nepali 
Hausille Sikhi,  
Samajik
Social Studies I, II, and III Tharu, Awadhi,  
and Nepali 
Source: Published jointly by JKHSS, the United Mission to Nepal (UMN)  
and the government of Nepal
88 The Politics of Language Contact in the Himalaya
Within this state-sanctioned space, JKHSS introduced a series of textbooks 
in 2010. This series included Tharu language textbooks called Apane 
Bhasa, Apane Sikhi and Awadhi language textbooks called Aapan Bhasa, 
Apanen Shikhau (‘let us learn our language’) for students in grades 1, 2 
and 3. These language textbooks were introduced with the objective of 
teaching these languages both as a subject and as a medium of instruction. 
The textbooks included a collection of poems, stories, essays, letters and 
plays. Each lesson was followed by a list of questions and exercises to 
ensure that the students had learned the appropriate language skills for 
that age grade. The textbook writers ensured that the various lessons in 
the textbook met reading, writing, and comprehension skills as per the 
guidelines of the Curriculum Development Centre (CDC).
Fig. 3.1.   Mother-tongue textbooks in Tharu and Awadi. Photograph supplied by 
the author with the consent of the textbook publishers, CC BY.
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Fig. 3.2.   Math textbook, lesson 5, page 5. Photograph supplied by the author with 
the consent of the textbook publishers, CC BY.
For subjects like science, mathematics and social studies, the 
books were prepared using three languages — Nepali, Tharu and 
Awadhi — simultaneously on every page. In the textbook extract above, 
presented on the right, the mathematics chapter on geometry is printed 
with Tharu on the top, followed by Awadhi and Nepali. Each line in 
the textbook is written in three different languages. The school teachers 
explained that although 90 per cent of JKHSS students speak Tharu as 
their first language, they also have students who speak Awadhi and 
Nepali as their first languages. All three languages — Tharu, Awadhi, 
and Nepali — belong to the Indo-Aryan language family, and are shown 
in Figure 3.1. The three languages are recognized as distinct, considered 
to be mother tongues by different linguistic communities, and have 
varied literary traditions (as will be outlined in the following sections). 
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Therefore, in order to facilitate the mother-tongue education of 
this multilingual student population, the textbook was written using 
different languages. Moreover, Devanagari script was used for all three 
languages to facilitate easy readability. The choice of script will be 
discussed further below.
These books were written and printed locally, and their chapters 
made reference to various objects and activities that were considered 
‘authentic’ representations of the locality. The textbook writers made a 
particular effort to include local stories, names, contexts, and pictures 
while designing the contents of each book. This space occupied by 
‘the local’ (sthaniya) in the textbooks enabled the textbook writers to 
reproduce more ‘authentic’ language and to establish mother-tongue 
education as legitimate pedagogy. This process of textbook publication 
was not without conflict and contestation. The national guidelines 
also required the school-level bodies such as the School Management 
Committee (SMC) and the Parent Teacher Association (PTA), as 
responsible bodies, to support and sign off on the textbook production. 
In case of any disagreement between the textbook writers and the 
committees, the final decision was reached on the basis of the most 
‘authentic’ and ‘local’ representation, in addition to an adherence to the 
guidelines provided by the government of Nepal.
These textbooks included local knowledge for educational purposes 
within the national curriculum framework, and often presented overtly 
essentialized notions of ethnicity as the ‘authentic’ identity of Tharu and 
Awadhi language speakers. Through this process, more ‘traditional’ 
representations of Tharu and Awadhi culture and artifacts influenced 
final decisions on the subject matter, pictures, and the presentation of 
the book. As other studies on minority languages around the world have 
also pointed out, the idea of ‘authenticity’ serves an important function 
in reconstructing the public form of a language and negotiating its 
authority. Stroud (2003) points out that using the notion of authenticity, 
local languages are articulated as the social identities of their speakers. 
Authenticity, Woolard (2016) explains, is more concerned with who one 
is rather than what one says, i.e., with social indexicality rather than 
referential function. 
Mother-tongue education was therefore not just about getting 
marginalized groups into and through schools successfully, but also 
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Fig. 3.3.   Class 2 Tharu textbook, lesson 10, page 33. Photograph supplied by the 
author with the consent of the textbook publishers, CC BY.
about changing the nature of education itself, in both its organization 
and in its curriculum. Comparing his efforts in contributing to textbooks 
with his early experience of publishing Tharu newspapers, the chief 
editor of the Tharu textbooks reasoned: ‘Writing a school textbook is 
more meaningful. Once approved, it is printed in thousands of copies 
and the younger generation read it and learn about it’ (Interview, 15 
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Fig. 3.4.   Class 2 Awadhi textbook, lesson 3, page 68. Photograph supplied by the 
author with the consent of the textbook publishers, CC BY.
Jan 2014). Teaching language to the younger generation in the schools 
was seen as an important way to keep a language alive, especially in 
the context of Nepal where studies have shown that younger people 
are increasingly ceasing to speak their mother tongues (Pettigrew 2000; 
Turin 2013). In order to combat this and to reformulate the grounds on 
which demands for the language could be made, the school actively 
engaged in publishing textbooks in local languages and seeking 
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recognition. This was also seen as an important way to overcome the 
designation of their language as a ‘dialect.’ 
Language, Dialect, and Making “Corrections”
According to the introductory section of the textbooks, one of their 
objectives was to strengthen students’ competence in speaking, reading, 
writing and understanding the language. The emphasis on various 
aspects of language competence, including reading and writing in 
addition to speaking and understanding, meant that these languages 
required a systematic written tradition. In a context where the languages 
did not have a well-developed written tradition, the process of writing 
books transformed the languages in ways that would impute ‘rationality 
to intelligible utterances’ (Burghart, 1993: 763). This meant developing 
an internal process to set phonological rules and grammatical structures, 
and to develop age-grade appropriate literary vocabulary. The teachers 
and the school administration in JKHSS thus sought to ‘refine’ their 
languages through textbooks. Weinberg (2015) also documents a similar 
process of publishing school textbooks in order to facilitate education in 
the Dhimal language — a language spoken by the Dhimal community, 
primarily located in the Jhapa and Morang districts of southern Nepal.
This emphasis on various aspects of language competence, including 
reading and writing in addition to speaking and understanding, meant 
that each language required the development of a writing system and 
an agreed orthography. Therefore, as Turin (2006: 66) points out ‘the 
lexicalization of a language and the development, or resurrection, of 
a suitable script or set of orthographical conventions have become 
prerequisites for introducing a language into education as the medium 
of instruction.’ Explaining the situation of different languages in Nepal, 
Noonan (2006: 179) argues that for languages such as Gurung, Magar, 
and Tamang, the differences between dialects will have to be resolved 
before a standard can emerge if these languages are ever to serve as 
vehicles of education or administration. A similar thought animated 
the Nepal National Language Policy Commission when they presented 
a four-fold stratification of language on the basis of having a written 
form. The written tradition has gradually become the basis for a ‘caste-
system of language’ (Turin 2006).
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Many studies on the Tharu language have shown that Tharu is a 
highly contested linguistic category (Sonntag 1995; Guneratne 1998). 
Scholars have also noted the difficulty in distinguishing it from its 
regional Indo-Aryan variants such as Awadhi, Maithili and Bhojpuri. 
However, since Tharu is often perceived as a language mainly spoken 
in Nepal, as opposed to Awadhi, Maithili and Bhojpuri which are also 
spoken in India, Tharu has often been prioritized in the Nepali state’s 
language policy (Sonntag 1995). This perception was echoed by the 
chief editor of the textbooks who stated, ‘Awadhi and Tharu are very 
different languages. In addition to the use of a distinct set of adjectives 
and a grammatical structure, one of the distinctive features is that 
Awadhi is closer to Hindi whereas Tharu is closer to Nepali’ (Interview, 
3 Jan 2014). In his MA thesis on Tharu and English adverbs, he had 
made this case when arguing for the position of Tharu as a distinct 
language. In his thesis, he also annexed a collection of Awadhi adverbs 
used in his locality. This list clearly listed that the Tharu and Awadhi 
had very different words used as adverbs; thus showing that Tharu and 
Awadhi are different languages. As Burghart (1984) points out ‘mutual 
unintelligibility with other languages’ is not necessarily the main criteria 
for determining a language. The difference between bhasa (language) 
and bhashika (dialect) is determined by its social and political status. 
Bhasika is by definition local and spoken (sthaniya boli). A bhasa exists 
in a formal sense (dignified by grammatical description) and possesses 
written literature, making schooling in that language possible.
The writing of textbooks in JKHSS also facilitated a larger project 
of developing grammatical descriptions for the purposes of written 
literature. However, this process also transformed these languages 
into new forms. The legitimacy of a language as an acceptable tool 
for education is often linked to ‘correct’ use of the linguistic code. The 
constant process of ‘correction’ of the Tharu and Awadhi languages 
served a dual function: first, to ensure distinctiveness and, second, to 
gain acceptance as a formal language. This also allowed these languages 
to find a space within state institutions, as languages with fully-
developed writing systems and codified grammar. For Tharu, which 
is primarily a spoken language with limited written traditions, this 
process was also seen as a way to demarcate the linguistic identity of 
one language from that of the other. For languages like Awadhi, which 
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has a written tradition, the process of textbook writing enabled it to be 
presented as a more formal language. 
‘Writing’ therefore became a way to prevent a language from being 
labelled as a dialect of another language. It also helped to standardize 
the language, thereby granting it the status of a developed language 
in which schooling would be possible. Though Dangaura Tharu had a 
written tradition, it had not been systematized earlier. Drawing mainly 
from the oral traditions and limited written material available, Tharu 
textbooks were prepared. In the case of the Awadhi language, though it 
had a fairly well-developed written grammar, there were disagreements 
regarding the use of some vowels. In spoken Awadhi, the vowel ‘ya’ is 
more commonly used, instead of ‘ai’ used in Nepali. The first set of text 
books printed in Awadhi therefore used the vowel ‘ya’ in the text, e.g., 
padhaya (to read), banakaya (in the forest). However, in the later versions, 
they decided to use the vowel ‘ai’ instead of ‘ya’ e.g., padhai (to read), 
banakai (in the forest). This rewriting of Awadhi, resembling the Nepali 
system, was considered more practical because was would facilitate 
easy reading in schools.
This process of correction works to maintain patterns linked with the 
language of power, which in turn become more visible in the form of 
judgements about the language. Scholars studying the development of 
the Nepali language have repeatedly illustrated similar dynamics in the 
language standardization that occurred in the 1900s. In the early 1900s, 
Nepali had a very limited literary role compared to many other languages 
used in India such as Hindi and Bengali. Nepali was characterized, as 
Chalmers (2003: 144) points out, by a lack of uniformity in spelling, 
grammar, and style. In addition, it was not the only language spoken 
by people of Nepali origin residing in India. Disappointed by the state 
of their language, the Nepali-educated middle class living in Banaras 
and Darjeeling spearheaded a language revival movement. The process 
to standardize Nepali also brought Nepali writers from different places 
to agree on the most acceptable form of literary Nepali (Hutt, 1988). 
Chalmers (2003) notes that the idea of the unnati (progress) of the Nepali 
population was the key driver of much of the work on developing 
the Nepali language in Benaras. These early Nepali literary scholars 
regularly published journals for the purpose of ‘bhasonnati’ (language 
progress) to mitigate a perceived sense of backwardness in relation to 
other communities in India.
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Fig. 3.5.   Class 2 Awadhi textbook, lesson 16, page 54. Photograph supplied by the 
author with the consent of the textbook publishers, CC BY.
The legitimacy of a language as an acceptable tool for education 
is often linked to ‘correct’ use of the linguistic code. This constant 
process of ‘correction’ of the language serves a dual function: firstly to 
ensure distinctiveness and secondly to gain acceptance. This practice 
of language ‘correction,’ as Bilaniuk (2005) points out in her study of 
Ukrainian language politics, is an important way to claim language 
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Fig. 3.6.   Class 2 Awadhi textbook, lesson 3 page 66. Photograph supplied by the 
author with the consent of the textbook publishers, CC BY.
authority. She argues that the legitimacy of a language as a discrete 
entity is often linked to linguistic correctness, and points out that a 
locally-spoken hybrid language, known as surzhik, was stigmatized as 
a substandard form of speech. This cleansing of language has also been 
defined by Deborah Cameron (1995) as linguistic ‘hygiene’, a normative 
practice that represents a symbolic attempt to impose a particular 
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order on linguistic practice. It is for this reason that Bourdieu (1991: 60) 
defines ‘legitimate language‘ as a semi-artificial language that has to be 
sustained by a permanent effort of correction. 
By striving to refine their language, the textbook writers were altering 
it from the multiplicity of oral forms to the singularity of a written 
form. In addition, this process helped to stabilize and standardize 
the language. Such corrections show that the professional linguist’s 
insistence on objectivity and scientific inquiry appears to arise partly 
from the neglect of the sociological use and importance of language. 
Historical studies of language show that standard languages have often 
been superimposed on dialects (Milroy and Milroy 1985). As Bourdieu 
reminds us, it is important to appreciate that ‘disagreements over merit 
or demerit of specific forms, whether particular pronunciation, lexical 
items, or syntactic forms, mask the fact that in their disagreement people 
are agreeing to the rules of the game by which the legitimacy is defined’ 
(1991: 58). By carefully constructing what speaking the ‘authentic’ 
language means, the textbook writers and teachers also reveal the value 
attached to certain linguistic rules and the ways these rules determine 
people’s choices towards correction and purification in anticipation of 
social acceptability.
Language, Script, and Social Acceptability
As the language activists and JKHSS school administration began 
to systematize the language for the purpose of schooling, they also 
engaged in the process of standardization. Transforming oral language 
to written form also meant that many variations of the same word or 
many words for the same objects had to be presented in a uniform 
manner. Sheshram Chaudhury, the chief editor of the Tharu textbooks, 
said ‘In cases where different names were used to denote the same 
thing, we chose the one that was closer to Nepali.’ Similar language 
dynamics have been documented by Hutt (1986) in his analysis of the 
Nepali language standardization process, where Nepali intellectuals 
deliberately chose Sanskrit words that were different from the Hindi 
words, in order to establish Nepali as a distinct language. This ensured 
that the local languages had wider readability, mediated potential 
conflicts, and enabled them to engage more meaningfully with the state. 
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Fig. 3.7.   Class II social studies textbook, lesson 2, page 40, written in Tharu, 
Awadhi and Nepali, using Devanagari script. Photograph supplied by 
the author with the consent of the textbook publishers, CC BY.
Moreover, all the books were in written in the Devanagari script, the 
same writing system used for the Nepali language. The teachers in 
JKHSS explained that the use of a common script makes it easier for 
all the various people involved: the writers and the teachers can follow 
it easily, and the students learn it faster as the same script is used in 
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most of their other school subjects. Since many languages either do not 
have a separate script or have more than one script associated with their 
language, it is easier for language workers to use Devanagari. Using 
a common script was seen as a way to make the language legible to 
the state and to other people who were literate in Nepali. According to 
the recommendations presented in a Report on Primary Education in 
Mother Tongue (GoN 1997): 
Devanagari script must be used when using mother tongue as a 
language of instruction, while protecting the authenticity of the language 
(niji visheshta). If different languages are used, the students will face 
difficulties when they graduate to higher grades. This might hinder 
the overall development of education in Nepal. In order to avoid this 
problem, a common script i.e., Devanagari, must be used. Historically, 
we have seen that languages such as Maithili and Newari have used 
Devanagari script. This will serve many purposes: it will strengthen the 
unity of the country, the students will not be overburdened with the 
additional script, and it will also facilitate easier learning of Nepali texts.7 
Various other book-writing instruction manuals recommended similar 
positions. The Support Material for Implementation of Multilingual 
Education Program (Kadel 2010: 83) cautions mother-tongue textbook 
writers against placing emphasis on the language rather than the script. 
It urges writers to follow the phonetic pronunciation of the word in the 
mother tongue and use Devanagari script to codify it in writing. If there 
are any popular ways of writing any words in the mother tongue, Nepali 
or English language, the book suggests a similar convention must be used 
in writing them in the mother tongue, e.g., the English word ‘computer’ 
should be written phonetically in Devanagari. Similarly, a Report on 
Primary Education in Mother Tongue (GoN 1997: 12) recommends 
that every language should collect at least 5,000 basic words so that it 
could be used for the purpose of primary education. In addition, every 
subject, such as science, social studies, mathematics, health, literature 
etc. should include an additional 1,000 subject-specific words to the 
textbook vocabulary. If some (technical) words are not available in local 
languages, these words can be taken from other languages. 
The emphasis on having a standard script for different languages 
serves multiple functions. First, different languages that do not have a 
7  Translation by the authors.
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standard script may seek to develop their language into written form. 
Second, it mediates potential internal tensions within the language group 
that may arise if there were more than one script that were commonly 
used. Third, the use of a standard script facilitates the wider recognition of 
the language. This particular way of constructing the social ‘acceptability’ 
of language highlights a deep-rooted social hierarchy, as well as its 
manifestation in language. This creation of an apparently naturalized 
link between language and its social value, often referred to as language 
ideology, is a judgement based on the existing social order (Gal and 
Irvine 1995). It is through an adherence to these widely accepted forms 
that people seek to either confer or deny social legitimacy.
While there are many minority languages in Nepal that have been 
advocating for their own distinct scripts (e.g., prachalit lipi for Nepal Bhasha, 
sirijunga script for the Limbu language), it has been difficult for language 
activists to garner wider social acceptance at the national level. Language 
activists often see a unique script as an embodiment of an ‘authentic’ 
language and as an important milestone in gaining higher status on the 
national stage, especially with the Language Commission (Shneiderman 
and Turin 2006). In JKHSS, however, the textbook writers paradoxically 
saw the unique script as posing a challenge in making the language more 
accessible to the students and more acceptable to the Nepali government. 
These overall frameworks that shape linguistic practices are invariably 
manifestations of linguistic ideologies, and indicate the practices in the 
making of political authority (Gal and Woolard 2001).
It is also important to note that the schools at no point sought to 
establish themselves as separate from the state. On the contrary, their 
efforts were geared towards engaging with the state more effectively. 
For the schools, strong engagement with the state was essential for 
gaining its recognition of mother-tongue education and strengthening 
their relationship with the state. This emphasis on working with the 
state is also prominent in the Diamond Jubilee souvenir book from 
2011, published by JKHSS, which begins with a letter of commendation 
from the then Prime Minister, Dr Baburam Bhattarai. In the souvenir 
book, written in Nepali, the Prime Minister commends the school for its 
‘exemplary’ work and hopes that this inspires other schools to follow 
the same path. The school magazine also includes letters of appreciation 
from the Minister for Education, Mr Dinanath Sharma, Minister for 
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Women, Children and Social Welfare, Mr Dan Bahadur Chaudhary, 
Secretary of Education, Mr Kishor Thapa, and the District Education 
Officer, Mr Shankar Bahadur Gautam. 
Language, Education and Frames of “Legitimacy”
Textbook writing was an important way to engage with the state effectively 
via its curriculum development framework. As I came to know later, the 
Curriculum Development Centre rejected the first set of books written at 
JKHSS when they were reviewed against the criteria for school textbooks 
and learning objectives specified for each school year. Sharing his 
experiences, Bikram Tripathy, a writer in Awadhi and one of the trainers 
for book-writing workshops, said, ‘The school had misunderstood the 
local textbook guidelines. If the schools publish their own textbooks, 
they need to abide by the criteria set out in the curriculum development 
guidelines and apply for approval from the Ministry of Education.’
The curriculum framework demarcated the boundaries of what is 
considered appropriate school knowledge. The curriculum evaluation 
proforma, used by the government of Nepal to evaluate the additional 
school textbooks, lists several criteria for the evaluation of the textbooks. 
One important criterion for approval is adherence to the guidelines on 
the subject matter of the textbook. This includes questions such as: Do the 
lessons comply with the topic mentioned in the curriculum guideline? 
Do the contents respect national values and integrity, respect janajati 
identity, and preserve the languages of the nation? Does it portray a 
balance of traditional and modern skills, technology, and employment? 
Do the books pay attention to localization and pay attention to the 
inclusiveness of various identities? The CDC also mandates that 
textbooks present a balanced collection of different genres, including 
local stories, essays and poems (CDC 2007). 
Through this process of selecting, classifying and distributing school 
knowledge, the Nepali state delineated the boundaries of the ways 
in which certain stories and representations could be expressed as 
public knowledge. The Mother Tongue Textbook Guidelines also notes 
that one of the important objectives of primary education is to build 
the moral character of the student by instilling the values of national 
unity and democratic culture (CDC 2007). This usually translates into 
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demonstrating that the contents of the school textbook respect ethnic 
identities and national identity. However, the possibility of pitting an 
ethnic identity against the national identity is completely ruled out. 
Vigilance on such issues of national sovereignty and integrity was 
evident from the guidelines published by the government, and in the 
school textbook that was finally published. 
This textbook creation process also transformed language in different 
ways. As listed in the evaluation criteria, local language was reshaped 
to include not only words and concepts that are appropriate for the 
purpose of school education, but the reorganization of the language 
through the rules of grammar and standardization. For example, 
the curriculum evaluation proforma also had a section on linguistic 
evaluation: the richness of vocabulary, appropriateness of grammar, 
clarity of language, age-grade appropriateness of the subject matter, and 
appeal of the presentation. This required the textbook’s writing team to 
transform the spoken language into written language, thereby limiting 
various forms of expression. This process also shaped an understanding 
of which form of a language is considered to be appropriate by its formal 
acceptance in school textbooks. 
After the first set of textbooks was rejected, the textbook team in the 
school revised them systematically. JKHSS also held several rounds of 
training and workshops for all the authors in order to communicate the 
process of writing school textbooks. The writers and editors of these 
books carefully followed the existing curriculum guidelines while 
designing the textbooks. In JKHSS, I was often told by the teachers that it 
was important to have Tharu textbooks if they wanted to teach the MLE 
program properly. Moreover, the official approval of the publication of 
these textbooks meant that the approach of the school was endorsed 
by the state, thus making it a form of legitimate knowledge. In JKHSS, 
the textbooks were approved on the second application. The result was 
three different seals on the textbook: those of the government of Nepal, 
the United Mission to Nepal (UMN), and the School itself. 
This wider acceptance from the state is important in Nepal, where 
programs like MLE face multiple challenges. Since it was supported 
by a Christian faith-based NGO in UMN, both JKHSS and UMN were 
careful in presenting MLE as a non-political initiative. At the time of this 
fieldwork, another faith-based organization — the Summer Institute 
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of Linguistics (SIL) — was under scrutiny due to alleged proselytizing 
while implementing mother-tongue education. In this context, UMN 
was cautious about this issue and presented MLE as a technical project 
to facilitate access and quality of education. There was a conscious 
effort not to stir up any potentially controversial issues such as religious 
conversion, ethnic politics, or political demands for a separate Tharuhat 
region. The schools negotiated this legitimacy by, firstly, holding the state 
accountable to the provisions made in the constitution, and secondly, by 
adhering to legitimate and widely-accepted frameworks for language 
education. The textbook authors also sought to mitigate deep-rooted 
tensions around issues of ethnicity and language in Nepal, emphasizing 
MLE as an education program rather than a politically charged issue.
State officials also readily accepted the discourse of legal and 
constitutional provisions. As one high-ranking official in the Ministry 
of Education stated,
These days in Nepal there is national-level political consensus around 
diverse languages […] there is an inclusive discourse. It has become the 
foundation of our constitution (sambidhān-ko ādhar). Even in the popular 
media, such as TV and radio, we can hear advertisements in different 
languages. So it is impossible to say no to mother-tongue education 
(Interview, November 2013). 
The constitution provides a widely endorsed framework that serves to 
bring various conflicting groups into alignment. In my interviews with 
various NGO personnel, language activists, government officials, and 
teachers, I was often told that the demand for mother-tongue education is 
a demand to make the state accountable to provisions guaranteed in the 
constitution, and implementing the rights guaranteed in international 
covenants such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 1948 
and the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous People 
2007. Based on these provisions, the Government of Nepal also oriented 
its education policies towards mother-tongue education in the National 
Education Committee 1992, the Higher Education Commission 2000, 
the Basic Primary Education Program 1991–2004, and School Sector 
Reform Program 2010–2015 (UNESCO 2011: 28).
The endorsement from the state was central to claiming legitimacy 
in national education. In one of the conversations in JKHSS, a teacher 
said, ‘We realized that we could impart education in the Tharu language 
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only after our school officially started MLE and we started using these 
new books.’ This was quite an odd realization because JKHSS had 
been using Tharu in the classroom as a medium of informal instruction 
before the program officially started in 2010. Nonetheless, it was only 
after the introduction of the state-supported initiative that teachers 
acknowledged it as acceptable pedagogy. The official introduction of 
mother-tongue education provided it with institutional visibility and 
much-needed legitimacy. 
Conclusion
This contribution illustrates the process by which linguistic authority is 
negotiated in the context of language contact in mother-tongue schools. 
As discussed in this chapter, this context created a productive space 
where a complex negotiation of linguistic legitimacy could take place, 
albeit in a limited way, sanctioned by the state. In JKHSS, students were 
fluent in Tharu and used it as the main language of communication. 
However, this competence and the local relevance did not legitimize 
these languages as the language of education. Though the language 
hierarchy has been increasingly questioned in contemporary Nepal, it 
still plays an important role in the context of education. In this context, 
the school used language standardization as a key strategy to negotiate 
the position of the mother tongue as the language of education within 
a state-sanctioned space of multilingual education. By analyzing the 
construction of apparently neutral grammatical and lexical forms, this 
chapter draws attention to the sociocultural process that shapes the 
socially charged life of language (Ahearn 2017). 
What emerges strongly from the practices in these schools is a process 
of claiming language authority that, paradoxically, conforms to the 
existing systems of education. In this process, different ethno-linguistic 
communities have sought to define and redefine their languages 
in order to claim linguistic authority and gain recognition from the 
state. The discussion presented in this chapter also points out that the 
negotiation of linguistic authority is inevitably framed, and constrained, 
by wider historical and social relations. The analysis of the process of 
linguistic authority construction serves as a lens to understand the ways 
in which such legitimizing ideologies and their authority are redefined 
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and reimagined. In such contexts, education offers a symbolic space 
where, as Levinson et al. describe, ‘new relations, new representations, 
and new knowledge can be formed, sometimes against, sometimes 
tangential to, sometimes coincident with the interests of those holding 
power’ (1996: 22). And while there might be no cohesion or consensus, 
dynamics in a mother-tongue school generated a process where the 
production of textbooks in a minority language was seen to be viable 
for school education.
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4. The Significance of Place in 
Ethnolinguistic Vitality
Spatial Variations Across  
the Kaike-Speaking Diaspora of Nepal
Maya Daurio
Group vitality has long been a framework for the inquiry into language 
maintenance and the sustainability of ethnolinguistic communities 
(Smith et al. 2017). Giles et al. (1977) conceptualized the vitality of 
an ethnolinguistic community ‘as that which makes a group likely 
to behave as a distinctive and active collective entity in intergroup 
situations’ (308). They outlined three objective ‘structural variables’ 
which together may ‘permit an ethnolinguistic community to survive as 
a viable group’ (308): demographics, institutional support, and status. 
Bourhis et al. (1981) introduced the concept of subjective vitality, the 
idea that a group’s own perception of its ethnolinguistic vitality and 
position relative to other ethnolinguistic groups also influences its 
viability. To better describe how vitality is used in language maintenance 
studies, Ehala (2015: 1) proposes a new definition, which posits that 
‘ethnolinguistic vitality is a group’s ability to maintain and protect its 
existence in time as a collective entity with a distinctive identity and 
language.’ Roche characterizes this idea of vitality as the ‘relationship 
between a language, its speakers, and its wider linguistic, social, and 
political context’ (2017: 193). Ehala’s conceptualization comprises four 
key indicators: ‘continuing intergenerational transmission of a group’s 
language and cultural practices, sustainable demography and active 
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social institutions, social cohesion, and emotional attachment to its 
collective identity’ (Ehala 2015: 1).
Following Ehala’s framework, I examine the ethnolinguistic vitality 
of an endangered language community in Nepal over a four-decade 
period: the Kaike speakers from Tichurong Valley in Dolpa. I engage 
with both existing scholarship around vitality, identity, and language 
maintenance, as well as with ethnographies of the Kaike-speaking 
diaspora, to assess the variability and uniformity of ethnolinguistic 
vitality across the diaspora. I suggest that ethnolinguistic vitality 
among Kaike speakers can be differentiated both geographically and 
generationally, and is affected by fluctuations in the status and power 
of the language and its speakers. Building upon existing scholarship 
on negative demographic shifts and power disparities among language 
communities, I also argue that another indicator of ethnolinguistic vitality 
is the ability of the group to maintain and protect its existence — not 
only in time, but also in place (Landweer (2000), and Hildebrandt and 
Hu (2017) explicitly address spatial factors in the context of vitality). 
Memory of, and language about, place is a form of cultural knowledge 
which is site-specific, processual (Pearce and Louis 2008: 110), and 
shapes a group’s understanding of itself and its collective history.
Kaike Speakers
Kaike is a Tibeto-Burman language spoken by a group of people 
originating in the Tichurong Valley in Dolpa, Nepal (see Fig. 4.1). Dolpa 
is one of Nepal’s largest, least populated, and most remote districts. 
It is bounded by the Tibet Autonomous Region and Nepal’s districts 
of Mugu, Jumla, Jajarkot, Rukum, Myagdi, and Mustang, located in 
Karnali Zone. As of the 2011 Census, Dolpa had a total population of 
36,700 people (Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS), 2014: 278) and actually 
saw a population increase of 2.17% between 2001 and 2011 (CBS 2014: 
24). Dolpa has among the fewest number of outmigrants, with less than 
10% of the population in that category (CBS 2014: 256). It is also not a 
high inmigration district.
Kaike speakers are often called Tarali, which in fact refers to 
any inhabitant of the Tichurong Valley, or Tichurongba in Tibetan. 
Throughout this chapter, I use the term ‘Tarali’ interchangeably with 
‘Kaike-speaking Tarali’. Kaike speakers predominantly occupy three 
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villages in the Tichurong Valley, referred to here as Tarang,1 Tupatara 
and Tarakot. Members of the Kaike-speaking Tarali community also 
reside elsewhere, with the largest populations outside the Tichurong 
Valley in Kathmandu and in Dunai, the headquarters of Dolpa district. I 
conducted research during the course of two separate stays over a span 
of nine years in Tarang, Dunai, and Kathmandu, as well as virtually. 
This research is based on informal interviews conducted in Nepali and 
correspondence over social media and via email in English.
Fig. 4.1.  Tichurong Valley. Map provided by the author, CC BY.
1  Tarang is the Kaike name for the village referred to as Sahartara in Nepali.
112 The Politics of Language Contact in the Himalaya
There are currently no roads connecting the Dolpa district with other 
districts, and Tarang is a 5–7 hour walk from Dunai, which is several 
hours walk from Juphal, the main airstrip for the district. There is a 
marginal road between Juphal and Dunai, with jeeps running regularly 
between the two locales carrying passengers. As of May 2017, villagers 
needed to walk several hours from Dunai to a point blocked by road 
construction except to foot traffic. From here, a single jeep takes 
passengers as far as a large rock slide, from which point they make 
their own way on foot to Tarang, crossing the Bheri River and ascending 
switchbacks to the village. 
Tarang is the largest of thirteen villages in the Tichurong Valley 
(see Fig. 4.2), with seventy to eighty houses (Daurio 2012) out of 780 
households (Central Bureau of Statistics 2014 [Dolpa]: 10) in the 
Kaike Gaunpalika (Rural Municipality), formerly the Sahartara Village 
Development Committee (VDC). Prior to March 2017, Tichurong was 
divided into two VDCs, Sahartara and Lawan, each respectively named 
after the largest village on either side of the Bheri River in the valley. Both 
former VDCs have been combined into the Kaike Rural Municipality as 
a result of local elections, a change which will be addressed in detail 
below. People largely practice subsistence agriculture in Tarang, growing 
several varieties of millet, sweet and sour buckwheat, amaranth, corn, 
potatoes, and a few other vegetables. Household incomes are heavily 
supplemented by harvesting yarsagumba (Ophiocordyceps sinensis), a 
highly prized fungus sold primarily to China that grows at around 4,000 
meters and is used medicinally and as an aphrodisiac.
Each village in Dolpa near these high-altitude areas has its own 
identified harvesting grounds for Ophiocordyceps sinensis, and 
people who come from outside the village are required to apply for 
access. Some harvesting grounds are more lucrative than others, but 
one Tarang villager estimated that an entire family can make between 
Rs. 100,000–300,000 (USD $960–2,800) during the approximately 
month-long harvesting season. Other people make money from selling 
goods to people at the harvesting grounds. The income generated by 
activities related to yarsagumba harvesting constitutes the main source 
of income for most Tarang villagers and has also led to a decline in 
agricultural production with greater reliance on purchased grains and 
goods (Budha 2015).
 1134. The Significance of Place in Ethnolinguistic Vitality
Of the thirteen villages in Tichurong, Tarang is the only village with 
a lower secondary school with classes up to the eighth grade, whereas 
all the other government schools only go up to the fifth grade. Of the 
eight or nine teachers, only one is from Tarang. All but two are male. In 
2017, a female teacher was hired from Gumbatara, a village an hour’s 
walk away but visible from Tarang. The other teachers are from outside 
the district.
Tarang exerts greater political and economic influence than other 
villages in the valley. For instance, the majority of forests in the vicinity 
belong to the village of Tarang. Tansa, the oldest and most important 
Buddhist monastery in Tichurong, is in the village of Gumbatara but 
half under Tarang jurisdiction and half under the shared jurisdiction 
of Gumbatara and Tupatara. A lama and his family from Tarang take 
up residence in Tansa Monastery every two years and assume all the 
religious responsibilities that go along with that position. In addition, 
his family cultivates and reaps the benefits from the land associated 
with the monastery during this time. A lama from Gumbatara, on 
the other hand, will alternate residency every other two years with a 
lama from Tupatara, a village, about an hour’s walk from Gumbatara 
through Tarang, which is halfway between the two. Tarang is a land-
rich village, as most of the lands in the former Sahartara VDC belong 
to the village of Tarang. There is also a larger number of shop-owners 
from Tarang in the district headquarters of Dunai compared to the 
other villages in Tichurong. Taralis from Tarang, in particular, as well as 
from other Tichurong villages, wield disproportionate political power 
in the district. There have been three MPs and four district chairmen 
representing the district of Dolpa who came from Tichurong, including 
the current MP, Dhan Bahadur Budha, who is originally from Tarang.
There are an estimated fifty adults from Tarang living in Kathmandu, 
and an estimated 100 children from Tichurong as a whole who have 
been sent to boarding schools in Kathmandu, fifty to sixty of whom 
hail from Tarang. Approximately ninety Taralis from the three Kaike-
speaking villages in Tichurong live in Dunai, and a number of children 
study in boarding schools in Dunai, although the exact number is 
unknown. Taralis are spread out across Nepal in several other locations 
besides Kathmandu and Dunai, with the next largest concentration of 
people living in Pokhara (around sixteen individuals), and up to several 
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Fig. 4.2.   Tarang in the upper right; Tarakot in the lower left; Tupatara is to the 
right of Tarang out of the picture. November 2008. Photo courtesy of  
the author, CC BY.
individuals in smaller locales such as Bhaktapur, Bhentara, and Maikot, 
in addition to at least four individuals in Tachen, another village in 
Tichurong. Additionally, there are a handful of Taralis spread out across 
the world in India, Australia, Belgium, and the United States, who 
emigrated in the pursuit of employment, education, or marriage. For 
the purposes of this chapter, I am concerned with the Kaike-speaking 
Tarali, predominantly from Tarang, who live in Tichurong, Dunai, and 
Kathmandu.
Kaike-speaking Taralis residing in Dunai are employed primarily 
as shopkeepers, and some also engage in yarsagumba trading. Kaike 
speakers are a sizable minority in Dunai, trailing Chhetris, Kamis, 
Thakuris, Brahmins, and Magars (see discussion below regarding 
Magars) in numbers, but more populous than various other ethnic and 
caste groups residing in Dunai (CBS 2014: 15).
Among the Kaike-speaking Taralis who live in Kathmandu, there 
are many who travel back and forth between Kathmandu and Tarang 
throughout the year. These Taralis primarily reside in Kathmandu 
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during the cold winter months and return to Tarang in the summer to 
engage in agricultural production and activities related to the harvesting 
of yarsagumba. The livelihoods of these Taralis remain primarily tied to 
Tichurong, but they have the financial capacity to travel to and live in 
Kathmandu for part of the year. The other Taralis who live in Kathmandu 
have businesses there, with a number of different families owning carpet-
manufacturing and export businesses (Fisher 2017: 32) supplemented by 
trading in yarsagumba, either from Kathmandu or Dunai. Nearly all of 
the Taralis who reside in Kathmandu at least part of the year raise their 
children in Kathmandu and send them to English-medium schools, 
including those Taralis who spend months at a time in Tichurong. The 
children of Kathmandu-based Taralis rarely travel to Tichurong and do 
not grow up speaking Kaike, although they hear their parents speaking 
it. There is a generational divide among Kathmandu Taralis in which 
those who were born and raised primarily in Tichurong maintain their 
language, cultural practices such as celebrating indigenous festivals, 
and an emotional attachment to the Tichurong Valley. Their children, 
however, do not learn Kaike, rarely visit Tichurong, and in the course 
of their urban lives, observe celebrations of deities residing in particular 
trees and glaciers in Tichurong they have likely never seen.
It is within the context of these divided and at once specific 
experiences of Kaike-speaking Taralis living in Tichurong, Dunai, 
and Kathmandu that I explore the uniformity and differentiation of 
ethnolinguistic vitality.
Language and Identity
In addition to speaking Kaike, Kaike-speaking Taralis identify as (Tarali) 
Magar, one of Nepal’s most prominent and numerous ethnic groups. 
According to James Fisher, this identification as Magar ‘is simply a 
convenient status summation which can be readily and incontestably 
claimed by anyone (except untouchables) who wants it’ (Fisher 1986: 3). 
Similarly, Michael Noonan attributes the appeal of this alignment with 
the Magar ethnic/caste group to the fact that Magars belong to a caste 
which cannot be enslaved to higher castes (Noonan 2005).
This self-affiliation with a particular ethnic group or caste is not 
exclusive to the Magars of Tichurong and has in fact been recorded as 
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a common practice throughout South Asia since medieval times (Turin 
2011; Whelpton 2005: 11). In the nineteenth century when the caste 
system was codified in Nepal, the Magars, Gurungs, and some of the 
other Tibeto-Burman groups were ‘allocated a position clearly below 
the high, twice-born castes but were not regarded as ritually unclean’ 
(Whelpton 2005: 31). Additionally, until the eighteenth century, there had 
also existed a flexible relationship sometimes resulting in intermarriage 
between Magars and Khasas, the Nepali-speaking ruling elite of the 
western middle hills (Whelpton 2005: 32). Later, after the establishment 
of Gorkhali rule in the eighteenth century, the western hills of Nepal 
served as a predominant source of slaves (Whelpton 2005: 28), and the 
Magars were able to remain unenslaved by paying an additional tax for 
this privilege (Whelpton 2005: 53).
It is not known when Kaike speakers or other inhabitants of 
Tichurong — who speak a dialect of Tibetan2 (Pöke) but also identify as 
Magar (Fisher 2017: 39) — chose to affiliate themselves with the larger 
Magar group. The Magars of Tichurong have no particular connection 
with other Magars in Dolpa outside of Tichurong other than identifying 
as Magar. Kaike, although recognized as one of three Magar languages, 
has no relation with the other two Magar languages, other than also 
belonging to the Tibeto-Burman language family. All of the languages 
within the Magar group are distinct from each other (Whelpton 2005: 
14). In contrast to the Taralis in Tichurong, there is an effort among 
some Kathmandu Taralis to situate themselves within the larger Magar 
ethnic community in Kathmandu through active participation in Magar 
associations. One Tarali businessman, for example, is the vice-president 
of the Nepal Magar Sangh (Magar Society of Nepal), which promotes the 
interests of the three different Magar groups in Nepal (Fisher 2017: 39).
Magars constitute the largest indigenous group in Nepal, with 
a population of 1,622,399, totaling 7.4 per cent of the country’s entire 
population (Rana 2005). As in other parts of the world, understanding of 
the word indigenous in Nepal is complicated and fractured. Generally 
speaking, and in common with most definitions of indigeneity, tenure 
2  Two different Tibetan dialects are spoken in Tichurong and in Upper Dolpa, 
respectively, but they can be understood by speakers of the other. One man 
from Gumbatara said that the Tibetan spoken in Tichurong is to the Tibetan in 
Upper Dolpa as Nepali is to Hindi. He also said that the Tibetan spoken in Tibet is 
unintelligible to him (personal correspondence, March 2018).
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on the land and a distinct written or oral history are important criteria in 
Nepal, along with, more uniquely, a group’s cultural traditions separate 
from that of ruling high castes, according to The National Foundation 
for Uplift of Adivasi/Janajati Act (Cultural Survival 2017). While 
addressing the extensive history and subsequent scholarship specific 
to Nepali ethnic politics (see Lawoti 2008; Shneiderman 2014; and 
Gellner 2017, among others) is beyond the purview of this chapter, it is 
necessary to frame Magar self-identification among Taralis within the 
context of the adivasi janajati (indigenous nationalities) rights movement 
in Nepal, which has been burgeoning since the People’s Movement 
of 1990 overthrew the Panchayat system and restored multi-party 
democracy (Rai 2008: 7). In 2006, the government officially recognized 
fifty-nine indigenous nationalities and formed the National Foundation 
for the Development of Indigenous Nationalities (NFDIN) to address 
and deal with indigenous issues (Muan 2007). The issue of indigenous 
rights was also pushed to the forefront during the Maoist insurgency 
and subsequent rule by the CPN(M) party, which in 2009 assembled a 
list of ethnic and indigenous groups for which quotas in government 
jobs should be reserved (Nepal News 2009). The practice of establishing 
quotas for ethnic and indigenous groups in government positions 
continues today, with varying levels of success.
Ethnic identity is an ongoing social and political process (Bucholz 
and Hall 2004; Gellner 2016), which helps people to locate themselves 
within a particular social, economic, and political context (Chettri 2017: 
22). Mona Chettri sums up ethnic politics in the Eastern Himalaya as 
follows: ‘the political nature of ethnic groups can be explained in terms 
of their aims to better facilitate access to or control over resources that 
are controlled by the state’ (2017: 29). Given the size of Nepal’s Magar 
population, it is clearly a socio-economic and political advantage for 
Taralis not only to continue to identify as Magar but to seek active and 
participatory membership of that group, particularly in Kathmandu, 
where there is greater competition for political and social capital. In 
Tichurong and Dunai, access to political and social capital associated 
with Magar ethnicity is more closely related to the position of Magars 
within the caste system, discussed above, which allows Taralis to situate 
themselves in positions of power relative to lower caste Dalits and 
casteless Tibetans or the ethnolinguistically related Bhotiyā, who are 
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of Tibetan descent. Interestingly, identifying as Magar simultaneously 
allows Kaike-speaking Tarali access to the political and social clout of 
the larger Magar ethnic group while also distinguishing them among 
Magars by their unique Kaike language.
Kaike is a language firmly rooted in the Tichurong Valley, 
encapsulated in the origin story of the language. This story tells 
of a lake of milk in Gumbatara — a village which can be seen from 
Tarang — where three goddesses3 who were sisters bathed every day. 
One day a boy, the only inhabitant of Tichurong along with his mother, 
kidnapped one of the sisters and eventually married her. She only 
spoke Kaike, which the boy and his mother also learned to speak. The 
descendants of the boy and the goddess are the Kaike-speaking Tarali 
people (Fisher 1986; Daurio 2012). The Kaike-speaking Taralis of Tarang 
are multilingual in Kaike, Nepali, and Pöke, but Kaike is the language 
in which they conduct their daily lives. 
Like other indigenous language communities, through the longevity 
of their relationship with a particular place, Taralis have developed 
detailed and adaptive knowledge about their environment, which 
is manifested in livelihood systems and expressed and encoded in 
language (Nettle and Romaine 2000). Similarly, the transmission of 
cultural knowledge across generations is facilitated largely through oral 
and performative traditions situated in a particular landscape, which 
lose their relevance when language speakers no longer reside in that 
landscape (Harrison 2007; Turin 2013).
The successful and highly adaptive system of agricultural 
production (see Fisher 1986 for a broader discussion) is contextualized 
through oral histories, as is the origin of the Kaike language itself. 
Taralis ‘situate themselves in their landscape in culturally specific and 
linguistically coded experiences. Their worlds are strongly delineated, 
and these boundaries are both named and imbued with spiritual 
significance’ (Daurio 2012: 17–18). There are, for example, more than 
twenty Kaike names for areas encompassing different fields, twenty-
four names for different areas of forest, and twenty names for different 
areas of the village of Tarang itself (Daurio 2012: 12). This kind of 
intimate, place-based knowledge of livelihood systems encoded in 
3  Fisher was told a version of the story in which there were seven goddesses. See 
Fisher (1986: 36).
 1194. The Significance of Place in Ethnolinguistic Vitality
the Kaike language is inaccessible to younger, Kathmandu-raised 
Tarali and is indicative of the centrality of place within the context of 
ethnolinguistic vitality.
The actual number of Kaike speakers is difficult to discern. As 
Ambika Regmi notes, the 2001 Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS) reports 
794 speakers (2013: 1), which was improbably reduced to fifty speakers 
in the 2011 Census (CBS 2012). Despite the lack of an accurate count 
of active speakers, it is considered a seriously endangered language 
(Yadava 2004). Kaike-speaking Taralis speak Kaike exclusively among 
themselves, although as previously mentioned, they are also fluent 
in Pöke and Nepali. Nepal is a country of multiple languages and 
identities, and multilingualism is the norm. As the other authors in 
this volume demonstrate, language contact produces multilingualism 
which is inherently mitigated by the power relations that exist between 
the language groups in contact. David Gellner (2016: 19) characterizes 
multilingualism in Nepal this way: 
There is a hierarchy, with different forms of language, or even different 
languages, being spoken at different niches and levels, both by different 
people and by the same person in different contexts.
The majority of Kaike speakers live in Tarang, Tupatara, and Tarakot, 
and of the ten other villages in Tichurong, Pöke is spoken in all but 
Riwa. In Riwa, which is less than a half hour’s walk from Tarang, Nepali 
is both the lingua franca and mother tongue of the Dalits who perform 
manual labor such as house building, grinding grain into flour, or 
tilling fields for the Taralis in Tarang and Tupatara. The Dalits in Riwa 
migrated to the Tichurong Valley over 165 years ago, and families in 
Riwa have inherited patron-client relationships with certain families in 
Tarang and other Tichurong villages (Fisher 1986: 181). A Tarali woman 
who is separated from her husband and who splits her time between 
Kathmandu — where her son attends an English-medium school — and 
Tarang recently gave all of her inherited fields to a family of Dalits 
from Riwa, in exchange for them providing her with a percentage of 
the grain they produce on those fields. The people of Riwa also speak 
Kaike fluently. There is some intermarriage between people from 
different villages (though not between the inhabitants of Riwa and other 
Tichurong villages), especially between people from the Kaike-speaking 
120 The Politics of Language Contact in the Himalaya
villages and nearby Gumbatara. Interestingly, although both the Taralis 
and the Dalits speak Nepali and Kaike fluently, Taralis choose to speak 
with Riwa villagers in Kaike rather than Nepali. Landweer (2000) writes 
about language choice as a function of group identity and cohesion, and 
conversely points out that a strong ethnic identity can also influence 
language choice. Although Taralis are mostly practicing Buddhists, 
they adhere to the Hindu caste system, and the Dalits of Riwa belong 
to the lowest caste, untouchables. This, combined with the patron-client 
relationship outlined above, is indicative that the decision to use Kaike 
instead of Nepali with the Dalits of Riwa appears to be an assertion of 
status and power. Given the longevity of the relationship between the 
Taralis and the people of Riwa, it would be interesting to know whether 
this has fluctuated over time.
In addition to the people of Riwa, some people from Upper Dolpa 
(Dolpo) also reportedly speak Kaike. The anthropologist James Fisher 
lived in Tarang from 1968–1970, and he recorded that many Tibetans 
and people from Dolpo stayed in Tarang during the cold months, 
escaping the harsher winter in Dolpo and bringing salt from Tibet to 
trade (1986: 92). The salt trade is largely no longer active, as salt is now 
conveyed from India via the road system in the Tarai, although Fisher 
reports that remnants of the salt-for-grain trading circuits persist to 
some extent (2017: 10). The number of people from Dolpo staying in 
Tarang in the winter has decreased, but there are a few who still come 
and occupy the houses of those who go to Kathmandu for the winter 
or stay with families with whom they have developed relationships 
over time. There is a long tradition of established business partnerships 
(netsang) between Dolpo pastoralists and people in each village where 
they conduct trade (Bauer 2004: 108). These netsang relationships have 
long existed between Dolpo people and Tichurongba (Budha 2015: 
6). Fisher described Taralis in the late 1960s conducting trade with 
people from Dolpo and Tibetans in Tibetan, and with people from 
lowland Nepal in Nepali. ‘The Tarangpur trader must endeavor to be 
all things to all men’ (Fisher 1986: 94).4 This portrayal implies that it 
4  Interestingly, a participant originally from Upper Dolpa at the Himalayan Studies 
Conference in Colorado in September 2017 informed me that he had once stayed in 
Tarang for three months, learned Kaike during that time, and that most interactions 
between Taralis and Dolpo-pa occurred in Kaike, not Pöke.
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was Taralis who were expected to accommodate the dominant language 
in a particular setting, whether it be Pöke or Nepali. In a more recent 
observation, Fisher describes listening to a discussion between two 
political leaders from Tarap, in Upper Dolpa, and the MP for Dolpa 
District from Tarang, about a dispute over the collection of yarsagumba 
(2017: 54). The discussion took place in Kathmandu and was conducted 
entirely in Nepali, instead of in Pöke, which all discussants also speak. 
Nepali is not the mother tongue for either of the parties. Contact among 
the various peoples from different geographic regions in Dolpa has 
resulted in multilingual relationships between individuals from these 
regions, and language choice appears to be moderated by power and 
status in addition to location.
It may be that spatiality is a factor in determining which language 
is used in interactions between Kaike speakers and people from Dolpo 
and Tibet. The higher status of Taralis in the caste system relative to 
the casteless people from Dolpo and Tibetans alike might also influence 
language choice, as may the fluctuating positions of power and prestige 
occupied by different groups of people at different times. These 
fluctuations occur both in terms of how Kaike speakers experience 
their own language and how Kaike speakers intersect with other 
speech communities (Pugh 1999). Such interactions and experiences 
serve to formulate Tarali identity within a ‘flexible system of identities’ 
(Chandrahasan 2015: 15) situated in changing group boundaries (Chettri 
2017; Turin 2014) and informed by power dynamics. As previously 
referenced, Kaike speakers and Tichurongba enjoy greater political 
representation at the national and district levels compared to the more 
remotely located people from Dolpo. Because Kaike-speaking Taralis are 
multilingual, their interactions with other speech communities that speak 
Kaike, Nepali, Pöke, or all three, involve a calculated choice about which 
language to use. This choice is informed by complex understandings of 
relative occupations of power and status (see Roche et al., this volume) 
which may confer upon the language the contemporaneous prestige 
of its speakers. Perceptions of power and its associated characteristics, 
such as prestige, status, and economic and political dominance, define 
the dynamics of language contact between groups speaking different 
languages, regardless of the size of the language group or some intrinsic 
quality of the language itself (Ehala 2010: 208). ‘Languages do not exist 
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as mere languages. Instead, they reveal affiliations to certain class 
and socio-ethnic groups that choose to include and exclude elements’ 
(Ibrahim 2015: 190) of a particular language. Annamalai (2002) refers 
to this pattern of language choice as the ‘multilingual networking’ of 
languages, which is based on the functional relationship between the 
languages in both public and private domains and reflects the social 
and political dynamics between them. A language’s vitality is higher if 
it is used in all domains (Hildebrandt and Hu 2017) and depends not 
only on the number of speakers and the exertion of external forces on 
the community but also on the attitudes and practices of the speech 
community itself (Ehala 2010: 204; Hildebrandt and Hu 2017: 154).
The attitudes of Taralis toward their language have changed over 
time. In the late 1960s, Taralis thought of Kaike as unsophisticated 
and primitive (Fisher 2017: 41). Now, Taralis in Tichurong, Dunai, and 
Kathmandu alike embrace the Kaike language as important and valued. 
Those Taralis who live in Tarang, who move through their daily lives 
speaking almost exclusively in Kaike, have no sense that Kaike is an 
endangered language. Fisher (2017) also observes that the perception 
of Kaike among Taralis is largely positive and that they possess a sense 
of pride regarding their language. A young man from Samtiling, a 
cluster of houses directly above Tarang, is studying to be a monk and 
also trying to write a Kaike dictionary, an act which would have been 
unimaginable four decades ago (Fisher 2017: 41).
For Taralis across the Nepal diaspora, speaking Kaike may hold 
important symbolic value in defining themselves as a distinctive 
‘collective entity in intergroup situations’ (Giles et al. 1977: 308). As 
Fisher aptly observes about Tichurong, it is not a ‘homogeneous area 
inhabited by ethnically identical people’ (1986: 25), and language choice 
among Kaike speakers may be an exertion of group solidarity.
For those Kaike speakers who live outside Tichurong, the continued 
use of Kaike is a cultural expression, a means of creating social cohesion 
beyond the geographic borders of Tichurong Valley. Mark Turin 
refers to the ‘emotive power of linguistic attachment’ (2014: 372) and 
to language heritage facilitating a sense of belonging. Compared to 
the late 1960s, when Fisher lived in Tarang, many Kaike speakers have 
migrated out of Tichurong. The Taralis who primarily live in Tarang 
have no sense of the impending loss of their language because they are 
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surrounded by it. In contrast, those who primarily live in Kathmandu 
are more invested in promoting Tarali culture, participating in Magar or 
Tarali social groups, and the continuation of the Kaike language, even 
while they send their children to English-medium schools and while 
the generation of those Taralis not born in Tichurong lack fluency in 
Kaike and certainly in the situated knowledge associated with that 
language. The preference among Taralis to educate their children in the 
dominant language of English is typical of marginalized (marginalized 
within the national and global context) speech communities. ‘They want 
their languages to appear to have power, but they in practice want to 
have their personal power enhanced through the dominant language(s)’ 
(Annamalai 2002: n.p.).
Kathmandu-based Taralis continue to celebrate important cultural 
rituals, such as Chaigo, the Tarali New Year, as well as Choputa puja, 
a two-month long celebration of a major deity (Fisher 2017: 36). There 
are also two cultural organizations founded by Kathmandu-based 
Kaike speakers to promote and preserve Tarali culture, part of which 
involves organizing the observance of Chaigo (Fisher 2017). The effort 
to preserve Tarali culture among Kathmandu-based Taralis precludes 
the maintenance of the Kaike language among the younger generations 
living in Kathmandu. Among the generation of Taralis raised outside 
of Tichurong, Kaike is passively understood but not actively used 
(Fisher 2017: 42). In contrast to the Kaike-speaking Taralis in Tichurong, 
whose language use intersects with both the public and private domain, 
language use among the Kaike-speaking Taralis in Kathmandu occurs 
solely in the private domain, such as at home and at social events, 
an expression of cultural identification and of belonging to a group 
(Annamalai 2002; Chandrahasan 2015; Landweer 2000; Turin 2014).
The Taralis in Dunai occupy a unique space. Only a day’s walk 
away from Tichurong and several hours walk (or an hour-long 
jeep ride) away from the airstrip in Juphal, they have relatively easy 
access to their childhood homes as well as to urban centers outside 
of Dolpa, cost notwithstanding. Kaike-speaking Taralis in Dunai, the 
majority of whom are shopkeepers, exist within a relatively tight-knit 
community of other Kaike speakers and Tichurongba, who share the 
town with a variety of other ethnic groups, a number of whom are 
more populous than the Kaike-speaking Taralis. While I was speaking 
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with a shopkeeper from the village of Tachen, which is in Tichurong, a 
man in his forties originally from Tarang joined our conversation. He 
was sent to Kathmandu as a boy to study and subsequently forgot the 
Kaike language. However, he moved back to Dunai to open a shop and 
eventually learned Kaike again. A Tarali woman born in Tichurong but 
raised in Dunai, now working as a teacher, likewise speaks Kaike with 
her fellow Kaike-speaking Taralis in Dunai. Turin, like Landweer (2000), 
posits that ‘speech communities maintain and manage their borders 
to create a sense of cohesion or group belonging’ (2014: 375), and the 
tendency of Kaike-speaking Taralis in Dunai to interact with one another 
in Kaike serves to differentiate them from others, and also to form a 
sort of solidarity among Kaike speakers within the town of Dunai. 
Language, in a sense, becomes a representation of identity (Samuelson 
and Freedman 2010: 197). In the process of emphasizing distinctions 
between social groups as expressed in the ascription of ethnic identity, 
language is one of the ‘most flexible and pervasive symbolic resources 
available for the cultural production’ of this identity (Bucholtz and Hall 
2004: 371).
Additionally, among the Taralis I have met living outside of Tarang, 
many have spoken of the sweet hāwā-pāni (an expression in Nepali 
literally meaning ‘air and water’) in Tarang and how much they prefer 
it to that of Dunai or Kathmandu. The man who returned to Dunai and 
learned Kaike after living there spoke fondly of the food in Tarang, 
which is grown, harvested, and processed locally. Among those in 
Tarang with whom I spoke who either live in Tarang full-time or spend 
part of the year there and part of the year in Kathmandu, there were a 
variety of opinions about whether they prefer Tarang or Kathmandu. An 
elderly couple who had been in Kathmandu for several years without 
returning to Tarang because of illness contrasted the traffic and dust in 
Kathmandu with the serenity and clean air of Tarang, while a middle-
aged woman who splits her time between Tarang and Kathmandu 
spoke of preferring her lifestyle in Kathmandu, perhaps because her life 
there requires less manual labor. Although not all among those Taralis 
who left Tarang continue to return there — often because the initial 
part of the journey involves expensive air travel, and the latter part of 
the journey on foot is long and strenuous — most retain a nostalgia for 
Tichurong. Fisher recently observed ‘those who have settled in urban 
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areas continue to feel as much at home in their ancestral villages as they 
do in the urban environments where they spend most of their time. 
Rather than flee their past or deny it, they seem to want to nourish and 
strengthen it’ (2017: 58).
In addition to a positive perception of the Kaike language, 
celebration of Tarali festivals, and active engagement in Tarali cultural 
organizations, there are other signs of an elevated regard for Tarali 
culture, the Kaike language, and an attachment to place compared to 
how Taralis perceived themselves and their language four decades 
ago, particularly among those who left Tarang as adults to pursue 
economic opportunities in Dunai or Kathmandu. Not least was a 
referendum in the May 2017 elections — the first local elections held in 
twenty years — to combine Sahartara and Lawan Village Development 
Committees (VDCs) into the Kaike Gaupalika (Rural Municipality), a 
symbol of both the clout of those from the largest village in Tichurong 
in Dolpa politics and an indication of the high regard in which Kaike 
is held. No other gaupalika in Dolpa was designated by the language 
spoken. This change was promulgated by the current MP from Dolpa, 
who is originally from Tarang and was recently nominated the Culture, 
Tourism and Civil Aviation State Minister. One community member 
from Gumbatara is personally dissatisfied with the name and has been 
lobbying to change it to ‘Tichurong Kaike Gaupalika.’ This man said 
that among those Tichurongba with whom he has spoken, there is 
general discontent about the name because the majority of Tichurongba 
do not speak Kaike but Pöke (personal correspondence, March 2018). In 
contrast, among the Kaike-speaking Tarali with whom I spoke, both in 
Kathmandu and in Tarang, the name is a source of pride. The ascription 
of the name of the Kaike language to a political entity is historically 
meaningful and culturally significant and memorializes the language in 
a particular geography (Pine and Turin 2017).
The use of Kaike by Taralis persists in the foundational social 
domain of the home (Landweer 2000), across geographic boundaries 
and, in Tichurong, across generations. The intergenerational 
transmission of the Kaike language does not occur among those Taralis 
born and raised in Kathmandu. However, the preference of Taralis in 
Tichurong, Dunai, and Kathmandu to use Kaike among themselves 
in spite of the availability of other language choices is an expression 
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of cultural identification with the language itself as well as with other 
users who have the same preference (Annamalai 2002). The decision to 
speak in Kaike or not in the public domain, the zone of power where 
speech communities compete, is more variable depending on whether 
one lives in Tichurong, Dunai, or Kathmandu, and on the nature of 
intergroup contact.
Intergenerational Transmission
As Fisher (1986) describes Tichurong in 1969, the Taralis of Tarang 
utilized mobility as an adaptive strategy for expanding economic 
capacity. At the time, Taralis were transporting salt from Tibet to the 
Tarai and needed supplies in the reverse direction. Multilingualism 
was important in navigating between the cultural zones in the Tarai 
and Tibet, both areas with which Taralis maintained interdependent 
economic relationships (Fisher 1986: 184). Mobility in its current form 
is multiple. There are, as mentioned before, around fifty adults from 
Tarang who live in Kathmandu, some of whom split their time residing 
in Kathmandu and Tarang, or Kathmandu and Dunai. Those that live 
entirely in Kathmandu do so because their business enterprises (e.g., 
carpet manufacturing and export) keep them there; some of them engage 
in trade with yarsagumba, which requires them to spend several weeks 
each summer in Dunai, where they buy recently harvested yarsagumba 
and then sell it in Kathmandu to another buyer. Those that return to 
Tarang for part of the year also do so primarily for economic reasons: 
to tend to their fields and to harvest yarsagumba or sell goods to those 
harvesting yarsagumba.
Another kind of mobility is recorded among more privileged Taralis 
who choose to send their children to school in Dunai, Kathmandu, and 
sometimes even farther afield. The reasons for this are clear: formal 
education is limited in Tarang and across all of the Tichurong Valley, 
and access to a good education — particularly in an English-medium 
curriculum — is highly valued and viewed as a pathway to greater 
opportunity (Fisher 2017). Therefore, those families who can afford 
to send their children to Dunai, Kathmandu, or, more rarely, to India, 
Europe, Australia, or the United States, may choose to do so. Many from 
Tichurong send their children to study at an English-medium school 
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run by a lama near Budhanilkhanta outside of Kathmandu. Parents are 
required to pay Rs. 80,000 (USD $820) up front, and then the rest of 
tuition is paid for by foreign donors who support the school.
Most of the children sent to Kathmandu, India, or further abroad do 
not grow up speaking Kaike, do not learn about traditional agricultural 
practices, and do not return to the village to live. There are a few 
exceptions. I met two men who returned after studying in Kathmandu: 
the aforementioned man in his forties who returned to Dunai to open a 
shop and a man in his twenties who couldn’t find a job in Kathmandu 
and returned to Tarang to start a family. Revealingly, when I asked 
people if they were worried about the loss of the Kaike language due 
to the outmigration of children from the village to study, the common 
response was that if they returned, they would likely relearn Kaike 
quickly. When I followed up with a question about whether children 
who are sent to Kathmandu to study generally return to the village, 
the usual answer is that they do not. Indeed, it would be difficult to 
imagine children raised in Kathmandu to adulthood returning to a 
village, a provincial way of life filled with backbreaking manual labor, 
and returning to speak a language in which they have not conversed for 
most of their lives. For example, I traveled to Tarang from Kathmandu 
with a twenty-two-year-old nursing student whose elderly parents had 
recently returned to Tarang for the warmer months. She hadn’t been 
to Tarang in ten years and had moved away when she was seven. She 
lived with her brother and his family in Kathmandu and was sent for 
a short visit to Tarang. She was in most ways a typical young, middle 
class, Kathmandu urbanite and was wholly out of place, uncomfortable, 
and unfamiliar with Tarang, its rusticity, and its customs. She could 
understand a little Kaike but largely spoke and was spoken to in Nepali. 
She left Tichurong to return to Kathmandu as soon as she was allowed. 
Her much older brother, by contrast, who was raised in Tarang, is one 
of the most active Kathmandu-based Taralis in terms of promoting 
Tarali culture and pride through his leadership in Tarali cultural 
organizations. He also visits Tarang once every one or two years, speaks 
Kaike exclusively with his wife and other Taralis in Kathmandu, and 
maintains an emotional attachment to Tichurong. This fondness for and 
continued familiarity with Tichurong, with the Kaike language, and 
with Tarali cultural traditions is exclusive to those Taralis who were born 
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and raised in Tichurong and left as adults, and does not characterize the 
experience of their children or siblings born outside of Tichurong.
As previously noted, knowledge about the environment among 
Taralis in Tarang is extensive and expressed in language. This kind 
of knowledge is often referred to as traditional ecological knowledge 
(TEK). Formal education has been associated with the erosion of TEK 
(Benz et al. 2000; Cruz Garcia 2006; Kuyakanon et al. 2017; McCarter 
and Gavin 2011; McKinley and Castagno 2009; Ruiz-Mallen et al. 
2009; Saynes-Vásquez et al. 2013) and the decline of language vitality 
(Landweer 2000; Turin 2008 and 2014; Botha 2010; McCarter and Gavin 
2011; Reyes-Garcia et al. 2005; Zent 1999). There are many reasons for 
this. Most environmental knowledge is acquired at an early age and 
is based on direct experience and interaction with cultural traditions, 
beliefs, and rituals. Formal education systems often remove children 
from these place-based and linguistically coded traditional knowledge 
systems (McCarter and Gavin 2011) or do not account for nor value 
local knowledge and traditions (La Belle 1982; Ruiz-Mallen et al. 2009). 
In Nepal, in spite of multiple laws and acts in recent years that adopt 
policies to provide primary level education in mother tongues (i.e., with 
mother tongues as the medium of instruction) (Phyak 2015; Singh et 
al. 2012), these have yet to be implemented on a country-wide scale or 
for all of the mother-tongue languages that exist. Challenges to mother-
tongue-based multilingual education (MTB-MLE) are multifold, 
including, among others, lack of a writing practice in most mother 
tongues, lack of involvement of affected stakeholders at the policy level, 
and lack of community management of mother-tongue teachers (Phyak 
2015; see also Pradhan, this volume). Furthermore, although children 
taught in their mother tongue from an early age tend to perform better 
and exhibit higher cognitive, linguistic, and social skills compared to 
their peers educated in the dominant language (Coleman 2015; Pinnock 
2015; UNESCO 2003), English-language education in Nepal is still highly 
valued and heavily invested in (Phyak 2015; Singh et al. 2012) because of 
its association with greater cultural and economic dominance.
Ironically, those who seem to hold Tarali customs and traditions, 
including the Kaike language, in the highest regard — those Taralis who 
were raised in but who now live outside the Tichurong Valley — are 
also those who are most invested in educating their children in 
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English-medium schools. They are also more likely to have the financial 
means to do so. Speakers of marginalized languages around the 
world often do not prefer the use of their language as the medium of 
formal education (Annamalai 2002; Coleman 2015; Turin 2014). The 
English language is associated with economic opportunity as well as 
the possibility of mobility outside the borders of Nepal. As much as 
Kathmandu-based Taralis strive to preserve their culture, the prospect 
of providing better opportunities to their children through an English-
medium education trumps the perceived benefits of attempting to 
preserve their own language from generation to generation by pursuing 
a mother-tongue-based education, which is currently unavailable in 
Kaike.
Those Teralis who reside in Tarang, even without necessarily 
believing their language to be under threat, are presented with poor 
choices regarding the educational opportunities they are able to provide 
to their children, a common experience of smaller language communities 
(UNESCO 2003: 15). Formal education consists of subdomains where 
language choices are made, including the language of instruction, of 
study, the language allowed in recreation, and the language used by 
teachers to communicate to parents (Landweer 2000). The momentum 
toward linguistic and cultural erosion in Tarang is not so much a result 
of the Nepali-medium language instruction and a culturally irrelevant 
curriculum at the local school as it is the outright removal of children 
from the social-ecological landscape into which they are born. In the 
case of Tarang, providing children with a good education and with a 
strong foundation of traditional knowledge are mutually exclusive 
endeavors. The fact that only an eighth-grade education is achievable 
without leaving the valley means that either children are denied access 
to a full education or they are forced to seek higher education away from 
family and are denied access to their language, and to the culturally 
and linguistically transmitted knowledge associated with landscape, 
livelihood systems, and sacred spaces and practices.
The Kaike language situates the Taralis of Tarang in a particular 
landscape and facilitates the transmission of knowledge about that 
landscape. The pursuit of better education and opportunities for 
children outside the socio-ecological landscape associated with the 
Kaike language serves to lower the practical transmission and retention 
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of that language among younger generations, even while the regard 
for Kaike and the knowledge with which it is imbued continue to rise 
among older generations, particularly those residing in Kathmandu.
Conclusion
Language can serve as a marker of ethnic identity (Landweer 2000). In 
Nepal, among most indigenous speech communities, mother-tongue 
language competence is a key indicator of ethnic identity (Turin 2014). 
Across the Kaike-speaking diaspora, the choice to speak in Kaike among 
Taralis solidifies group cohesion and a sense of belonging. The decision 
about when to speak in Kaike is dependent upon relative positions 
of status and power among speech communities. Kaike speakers in 
Tarang occupy a politically dominant position both within Dolpa and 
Tichurong, which confers greater status on the Kaike language itself.
Taralis everywhere ascribe a higher value to their language now as 
compared to the late 1960s, when Fisher described a perception among 
Taralis that the Kaike language was unsophisticated (see Bendi Tso and 
Turin, this volume, for a comparable discussion about Chone Tibetan). 
Positive perceptions of the Kaike language signify greater emotional 
attachment to both the language and the collective identity it affords its 
speakers, and is an important indicator of ethnolinguistic vitality (Ehala 
2015). Greater emotional attachment to Kaike does not equate with 
successful intergenerational transmission of the language itself across 
all Tarali communities, specifically among those who reside outside of 
Tichurong. The perpetuation of the Kaike language across generations 
requires situatedness in the landscape in which the language continues 
to be relevant. Within Tarang itself, Kaike continues to serve as the 
primary language, and its transmission across generations is facilitated by 
linguistically encoded and place-based cultural and ecological knowledge.
Kaike-speaking Taralis persist as a socially cohesive group across 
multiple locations and operate within a variable and dynamic system 
of identities, articulated through language and negotiated through 
economic and political positioning.
Active participation in social institutions, demonstrable connection 
to a shared identity, and a capacity to protect one’s existence are 
indicators of ethnolinguistic vitality (Ehala 2015). In addition, I argue 
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that spatiality is another important factor in the vitality framework, 
particularly with regard to intergenerational transmission of language 
and cultural knowledge.
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5. Speaking Chone, Speaking ‘Shallow’
Dual Linguistic Hegemonies in China’s 
Tibetan Frontier
Bendi Tso and Mark Turin
The People’s Republic of China (henceforth, PRC) is firmly committed 
to a language policy of promoting the Chinese language among ethnic 
minority groups and encouraging ethnic minorities to construct a 
Chinese national identity through linguistic and cultural assimilation. 
Running parallel to such assimilationist policies are standardization 
projects that recognize China’s heterogeneity, and preserve and promote 
ethnic minority languages that are sponsored by the PRC government 
and maintained by ethnic minorities. The state has succeeded in both 
of these ideological and strategic endeavors. The Chinese language 
and associated cultural norms have been widely adopted and ethnic 
minority languages have effectively been standardized. However, as a 
collateral byproduct of these processes, non-standard dialects of ethnic 
minority languages have been marginalized and begun to disappear. 
This chapter examines official language policy as it is played out in 
Chone County, located in the Kanlho Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture 
(TAP) of Gansu Province, and explores how state policy interacts 
with locally-held language ideologies among Chone Tibetans. Using 
the concept of hegemony, we argue that China’s language policy 
and Chone Tibetans’ willingness to adopt new languages serve to 
generate both coercion and consent. These two forces work together to 
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contribute to a three-tiered linguistic hierarchy that has emerged from 
an intensification of language contact since the 1900s, if not earlier. 
This three-tier linguistic hierarchy, with Chinese and Amdo Tibetan as 
the dominant languages — albeit with Chinese firmly situated above 
Amdo Tibetan — and Chone Tibetan as the subordinate language, has 
accelerated the loss of Chone Tibetan through the dual oppression from 
two linguistic hegemonies that have exerted complex pressures on the 
speech community of Chone. 
In this chapter, we first present the theoretical framework of our 
study and discuss how forces of coercion and consent work together to 
secure and maintain the dual linguistic hegemonies. We then proceed 
to sketch out the context of our research and our methodology. Next, 
we illustrate how literacy campaigns and educational policies in Chone 
function to coercively establish the linguistic hierarchy. We then discuss 
the apparent willingness of Chone Tibetans to internalize this linguistic 
hierarchy and to adopt new languages, and how this helps to generate 
a sense of consent that in turn legitimizes the hierarchically superior 
positions enjoyed by Chinese and Amdo Tibetan. Our goal, throughout 
this chapter, is to contribute to an emerging and critical conversation 
about linguistic diversity within cultural Tibet. 
The Shape of Linguistic Hegemony:  
Coercion and Consent 
Building on Woolard’s (1985) and Wiley’s (1996) notions of hegemony, 
for the purpose of this study we define linguistic hegemony as the 
position and power that the dominant language enjoys in legitimating 
and reproducing prevailing ideologies and practices. The hegemony 
to which we refer here is linguistic and cultural rather than political. 
The adoption of a particular language by a group of speakers is never 
random nor is it accidental (Carlucci 2013; Ives 2004; Suarez 2002; 
Wiley 1996). Instead, it is assisted, shaped and promoted by coercive 
forces. And the consent displayed by speakers in turn justifies and 
secures the existence and practice of coercion. Consent and coercion 
work together in powerful and socially effective ways to establish and 
secure the superior position enjoyed by the dominant language or 
languages. 
 1395. Speaking Chone, Speaking ‘Shallow’
To better understand how linguistic hegemony is created and 
reproduced in the context of Chone, we examine two interactive 
aspects of hegemony: coercion and consent. The first point of analysis 
is located within the powerful nature of hegemony itself and explores 
how state institutions and policies enable and maintain linguistic 
domination. Social institutions, including but not limited to law and 
language policy, shed light on the politics of language by producing 
expectations of ‘standard’ language and by taming diverse language 
ideologies held by the people so that only a standard language appears 
to be natural and proper (Eriksen 1992; Wiley 1996). Through powerful 
social institutions, the linguistic hierarchy is established. Language 
norms are shaped and then take hold. Furthermore, linguistic hierarchy 
is produced and reinforced by social institutions that lead to speakers 
of minority languages and varieties eventually accepting an ideology 
that defines their heritage language as inferior, ultimately leading to its 
abandonment (Eriksen 1992). 
Yet, at the same time, we acknowledge that ‘authority and hegemony 
cannot be mechanically read out from institutional dominance’ (Woolard 
1985: 743) since the successful normalization of a linguistic hegemony 
relies on the extent to which ‘linguistic minorities will believe in and 
participate in the subjugation of the minority language to the dominant, 
to the point where just the dominant language remains’ (Suarez 2002: 
514). In other words, institutions alone cannot fully sustain the power of a 
dominant language. The consent of speakers of minority languages, and 
their willingness to adopt a dominant language, is another key aspect of 
hegemony, and one that grants the coercive force important legitimacy. 
In contrast to coercion, consent is achieved through the apparently 
willing participation of minority language speakers in promoting, 
accepting and appreciating the dominant language (Ives 2004; Suarez 
2002; Wiley 1996). In the context of consent, minority language speakers’ 
adoption of a dominant language is not an ‘accommodative behavior’ 
(Woolard 1985: 741) that conceals their true and deep feelings of value 
towards their heritage language and thus accommodates to the coercive 
force. Rather, their internalized language ideology becomes part of the 
‘collaborative consciousness’ (Woolard 1985: 741) and is naturalized, 
thus working to shape their daily language practice and reproduce the 
linguistic and cultural hegemony. It is, then, through their language 
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ideologies that minority language speakers participate in the social 
reproduction of consent, and the cultural and linguistic domination 
over them is justified, secured and sustained. 
To summarize, the superior position enjoyed by a dominant 
language cannot be established without a combination of institutional 
coercion and the consent of minority language speakers. With the 
support of institutional powers, a dominant language becomes the 
yardstick for establishing a linguistic hierarchy, which in turn makes 
minority language speakers accord it high value (Turin 2018). Through 
the participation of minority language speakers, language ideologies 
that offer the dominant language prestige, pride of place and authority 
are given legitimacy. This iterative process secures and reinforces the 
position of the dominant language. 
Situating Chone County in Time and Place
Chone County is located on the Sino-Tibetan border. It was incorporated 
into Kanlho Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture (henceforth, Kanlho 
TAP) of Gansu Province, China, in 1953. Ethnolinguistically speaking, 
Chone is located in Amdo, one of three cultural-linguistic regions of 
cultural Tibet. 
According to Choephel (1978), Chone was an ancient border outpost 
of the Tibetan empire. The earliest definitive evidence showing the 
settlement of Tibetans in this area dates to the seventh century, when 
Songtsen Gampo — the famed King of Tibet — sent his troops to Chone. 
Chone is also home to several other ethnic groups, including but not 
limited to Chinese, Hui Muslims, Mongols and Monguors. Chone 
County is closely interlocked with Batse County of Kanlho TAP, the 
majority of whose residents are Hui Muslims and Chinese. In broad 
strokes, Chone shares its northern, western, and southern borders with 
Tibetan communities and its eastern border with Chinese communities. 
As a multi-ethnic border zone, the political and linguistic history of 
Chone is rich and complex. Chone is marked by 600 years of governance 
by a Tibetan chieftain family who maintained religious connections with 
Lhasa in Central Tibet while winning political recognition from Chinese 
courts (Rock 1933; Yang 1990). Also noteworthy is the massive Chinese 
immigration into Chone that began in the early twentieth century due to 
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Fig. 5.1.   Map of Chone County as situated within Amdo, within China. Adapted 
from Kolås and Thowsen (2005: 2), CC BY-NC-ND. 
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the Hui Muslim revolt in 1928 in He Zhou — which came to be referred 
to as the He-Huang Incident — located in what is today the Linxia Hui 
Autonomous Prefecture,1 adjacent to Kanlho TAP (Chone Gazetteer 
Compilation Committee 1994: 166). Since the 1950s, the PRC’s national 
language policy has promoted Chinese in Chone. Also, since the late 
1980s, the Amdo Tibetan standardization movement — encouraged by 
the Chinese state to preserve and develop the Tibetan language, and later 
instigated by Tibetan political and cultural elites to safeguard the survival 
of the Tibetan language and assert Tibetans’ Tibetanness — has further 
complicated the already complex ethnolinguistic landscape of Chone. 
Broadly speaking, there are three identifiable Tibetan linguistic 
groups within Chone County, according to their geographical location 
and complex histories of migration: 1) the group of nomads who live 
in the western and northern pastoral regions of Chone and whose 
spoken language is close to Amdo Tibetan; 2) the group of farmers 
who live in the eastern enclave of Chone and whose spoken language 
shares linguistic feature with both Kham and Lhasa Tibetan; and 3) 
riverside Tibetans who live along the Luchu River and its tributaries, 
and whose spoken language is closer to Lhasa Tibetan (Chone Gazetteer 
Compilation Committee 1994: 164, 699). Our research site is located in 
the riverside Tibetan community. Within the official PRC discourse, 
‘riverside Tibetans’ are recognized to be Chone Tibetans and the 
ethnonym has been accepted by locals. For the purpose of this study, 
then, we refer to the riverside Tibetan community as ‘Chone Tibetans’ 
and to their spoken tongue as the Chone Tibetan language. The Chone 
Tibetan language is only intelligible to speakers living alongside the 
Luchu River and its tributaries, making its linguistic ecology somewhat 
unfavorable. By this we mean that Chone Tibetans live in a traditional 
Amdo Tibetan-speaking area, but speak a form of Tibetan that is, if 
anything, closer to Lhasa Tibetan.2 Due to their frequent, intensive and 
1  The ‘He-Huang Incident’ was a Hui Muslim revolt against the Feng Yuxiang’s 
administration and Kuominjun Army of Hezhou that occurred in May 1928. This 
conflict quickly swung against the Chinese and lasted for six years, causing over 
half a million casualties in Gansu and Qinghai (see also Jonathan N. Lipman 1997; 
Woser, Interview, 21 July 2013; Bendi Gyal, Interview, 19 June 2017). Due to the 
He-Huang Incident, many Chinese fled to Chone and settled there. 
2  We are aware that linguists critically challenge the notion that Amdo, Lhasa and 
Kham are three dialects of the ‘same’ Tibetan language, and that they highlight the 
linguistic diversity and complexity that exists within these three dialects (Suzuki 
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prolonged contact with the Chinese language over time, Chone Tibetans 
have increasingly been exposed to strong assimilationist forces from 
mainstream Chinese culture, and have adopted many Chinese loan 
words into their language.
Our principle research site was Yarru village, a settlement located 
along the northern side of the Luchu River. According to oral histories 
passed down through the generations and augmented by interviews 
with Chone Tibetans in Yarru village, Tibetans from Central Tibet 
settled in the area thanks to its hospitable and fertile environment. 
There are currently sixty-four households in Yarru village, of which 
at least twelve are Chinese. The Chinese settlement can be accounted 
for in two ways: some Chinese were hired by Chone Tibetans as farm 
laborers in the early twentieth century,3 while others were refugees 
who suffered during the Hui Muslim revolt in the 1920s and fled to 
Chone. The cumulative result of this Chinese immigration is that, 
since the early twentieth century at least, Chone Tibetans have been 
gradually exposed to both written and spoken Chinese language 
and culture. According to the interviews with Chone Tibetans in this 
village, during the earlier period of Chinese settlement, language shift 
did not occur because Chone Tibetans significantly outnumbered 
ethnic Chinese. Later, when a series of political and cultural events 
provided strong incentives for Chone Tibetans to incorporate Chinese 
loanwords into their language and to learn to speak, read and write 
Chinese, this triggered widespread language shift which further 
promoted the belief that the Chone language was a ‘low-status’ 
Tibetan language. As a result of these interconnected factors, many 
Chone Tibetans are now experiencing a growing sense of what may be 
described as linguistic and cultural anxiety and alienation. 
2016; Tournadre 2014). However, we use these terms in order to emphasize the 
cultural hegemony associated with these languages instead of their linguistic 
distinctiveness per se. Meanwhile, there is a disparity between speakers’ locally 
conceptualized linguistic categorization and those defined by linguists. Based on 
the data collected from interviews, local Chone Tibetans tend to believe that their 
language is similar to Lhasa Tibetan. 
3  This labor force later developed into the Small Households, which refers to the 
shelters that some long-term laborers and refugees built at the outskirts of Tibetan 
villages along the Luchu River (Chone Historical Accounts Compilation Committee 
1984: 10; Lhamo, Interview, 23 May, 2017). 
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Research Methods and Subject Position
This research is based on interviews and observations conducted with 
community members between May and August in Yarru village in 2013, 
a series of follow-up interviews with Chone Tibetans in Yarru village 
between October and December 2016, and ethnographic fieldwork 
conducted between mid-May and late June 2017 in Yarru village and 
the neighboring villages. Our research questions focused on language 
practice, shift and ideology among Chone Tibetans in the context of 
China’s wider language policy. 
In the field, the lead author’s identity as an ethnic Chone Tibetan 
with distant relatives living in Yarru village facilitated her acceptance 
within the community. Participant observation served as her primary 
research method, which — when combined with familiar contact and 
continual encounters with community members — opened up many 
spaces for designing and honing complex research questions. Semi-
structured interviews with county, township and village officials 
helped her to explore the role played by institutions and bureaucrats 
in shaping Chone Tibetan language ideologies. We also used semi-
structured interviews to explore Chone Tibetans’ language proficiency 
and attitudes towards their heritage language, as well as towards the 
more dominant Amdo Tibetan and Chinese languages. Semi-structured 
interviews with parents, children and village school teachers helped 
us understand their experiences of language acquisition, while life 
story interviews with elder Chone Tibetans were particularly useful in 
documenting shifting experiences of and changing attitudes towards 
language acquisition. All of these methodological techniques were used 
to assess the processes of consent and coercion that are integral to the 
formation and normalization of dual linguistic hegemonies. 
Interviews were conducted in the local Chinese dialect, which is 
known as the Taozhou Chinese dialect. It belongs to the Northwest 
subdialect of the Northern dialect of Chinese (Wang 2013), and it 
has now become the lingua franca of Chone and Batse Counties. It 
was necessary to use the local Chinese dialect to conduct interviews 
because the majority of Chone Tibetans under the age of forty are now 
monolingual in Chinese, and generally speak the local Chinese dialect 
amongst themselves. Second, the lead author’s imperfect proficiency 
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in Tibetan limited her ability to conduct interviews in her ancestral 
language. In this chapter, we use pseudonyms for research partners and 
locations to mitigate any unwanted and unwelcome repercussions.
Coercion as an Aspect of Linguistic Hegemony 
The adoption of a dominant language by minority language speakers 
and the establishment of a linguistic hierarchy are not processes that 
occur in a vacuum. Instead, these actions are supported by the policy 
contexts in which they occur. The national language policy of China 
plays a central role in constructing and maintaining the linguistic 
hierarchy and triggering language shift from ethnic minority languages 
to Chinese. To date, there have been two dominant discourses within 
the PRC’s language policy. First has been the promotion of Chinese 
in almost all domains, including education, the workplace, and the 
media, at both national and community levels (Spolsky 2014; Rohsenow 
2004; Wang and Yuan 2013). Second, the state has offered incentives 
and some resources to encourage the preservation, standardization 
and development of minority languages (Harrell 1993; Zhou 2004; Li 
and Huang 2004; Li and He 2014). Laws and regulations have been 
implemented by both central and local governments that enshrine and 
guarantee minorities’ rights to use and develop their own heritage 
languages. Within the Kanlho TAP, the rights to use, learn, preserve, 
standardize, and develop Tibetan are enshrined in the Autonomy Statute 
of Kanlho Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture of Gansu Province, which was 
passed in 1989 and amended in 2010 (Articles 24, 28, 60, 63, 64, and 74). 
Even though these two distinct discourses are emphasized within the 
PRC’s language policy, they do not guarantee that minority languages 
have a linguistic position equal to Chinese or that minority languages 
can access the same range of discursive and financial resources that 
Chinese does (Zhou 2012). The government — through the state’s 
language policies and associated ideology — decides which language 
can be used in which context, with the result that languages are accessed 
to differing degrees, forming a language order or hierarchy (Zhou 2012). 
As Arienne Dwyer (1998) observes, a five-tiered linguistic hierarchy has 
been established in the PRC. This hierarchy positions Mandarin Chinese 
at the top and situates standardized minority languages over ‘primary 
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minority languages, secondary minority languages and unrecognized 
languages’ (Dwyer 1998: 71–72). The niche that a language occupies 
within this five-tiered linguistic hierarchy is highly dependent upon 
the prestige and political influence of the language, and the number 
of speakers (Dwyer 1998). The state, in turn, offers various levels of 
support to different languages depending on their position along and 
within this hierarchy (Dwyer 2005). In the case of Tibetan, the three main 
vernaculars (Lhasa, Kham and Amdo Tibetan) have become the most 
prestigious Tibetan language varieties in their respective regions. Amdo 
Tibetan — the dominant language in Amdo region (Roche 2017) — has 
been promoted over local Tibetan varieties because its pronunciation 
is closer to literary Tibetan (Prins 2002). In addition, the nomadic 
pronunciation of Amdo Tibetan adds extra prestige to the language 
since nomadic life is often imagined as the key aspect of Tibetan identity 
(Prins 2002). 
In this section, by examining literacy campaigns and educational 
policies implemented in Yarru village from the 1950s onwards, we 
argue that the PRC’s coercive language policies are powerful forces for 
the establishment and maintenance of hegemonies. These influences 
have prompted language shift from Chone Tibetan to Chinese, and 
have helped to establish Amdo Tibetan as the effective standard Tibetan 
language for this region.
The Role of Literacy Campaigns
Following the foundation of the PRC, on account of the powerful 
symbolic connection between literacy and the imagining of the nation-
state, the government set out to address illiteracy in Chinese as well as in 
other regionally-dominant ethnic minority languages through national 
and local policies (Spolsky 2014; Zhou 2005). At the national level, 
ethnic communities were encouraged to improve their literacy in ethnic 
minority languages in the early period of the PRC, especially during 
the 1950s (Zhou 2005). Article 6 of the Regulations on the Eradication of 
Illiteracy, which was passed in 1988 and which was later amended in 
1993, states that the medium of instruction for literacy campaigns should 
ideally be Mandarin Chinese, but that in ethnic minority areas, either 
the ethnic minority language or the language most commonly used by 
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all of the ethnic minorities in a community could be the medium for 
literacy education. At the Prefectural level, Article 9 of the Regulations 
on Tibetan Language Use in Kanlho TAP (1996) stated that the campaign 
to improve Tibetan literacy among Tibetans should be systematically 
implemented. At the County level in Chone, Tibetan learning materials 
were distributed in 2005 in certain villages where the Tibetan language 
has been used as the medium of education to combat Tibetan illiteracy 
(Chone Education Bureau 2011: 82). In Yarru village and other villages 
where Chone Tibetans reside, however, the seven-decade-long literacy 
campaign was focused on increasing Chone Tibetans’ literacy in Chinese 
rather than Tibetan. This has resulted not only in Chone Tibetans 
learning to read and write in Chinese, but has also accorded high value 
to Chinese since ‘literacy is a primary vehicle for maintaining and 
transmitting cultural values and beliefs’ (Zhou 2005: 117–18).
In Yarru village, the shape taken by literacy campaigns has changed 
over time, but their purpose — namely exposing Chone Tibetans to the 
Chinese language — has remained the same for seven decades. In the 
early years, from 1953 to the mid 1960s, literacy classes were the major 
expressions of literacy campaigns (Chone Education Bureau 2011: 20; 
Chone Gazetteer Compilation Committee 1994: 550). These literacy 
classes were not only classroom-based, but were also held in informal 
locations throughout the village. Teachers, students and cadres who 
were literate in Chinese participated in teaching Chinese characters 
to illiterate Chone Tibetans. Lhamo, a grandmother now in her mid-
eighties, recalled that in the 1960s, after a day of hard work on the farm, 
Chone Tibetans would gather together to learn Chinese. Lhamo spoke 
of how local Chinese cadres and Tibetan students who had received 
education in the Chinese language taught basic vocabulary such as 
numbers and commodities, introducing her to new terms. Even though 
the classes were held only intermittently, Lhamo reported that after 
several years of learning, she could write her name in Chinese and had 
learned basic vocabulary. Along with acquiring rudimentary Chinese, 
Lhamo was also taught that old Tibetan kinship terms should be 
replaced with Chinese ones: ‘Ama (mother in Chone Tibetan) should 
be muqin (mother in Chinese); Ape (father in Chone Tibetan) should 
be fuqin (father in Chinese)’. Through the erosion and belittling of 
traditional Tibetan terminology — even in the domain of kinship — the 
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supremacy of the Chinese language and cultural hegemony with which 
it was associated began to be established.
During the Cultural Revolution (1966–1976), literacy campaigns 
were escalated. Alongside literacy classes, villagers were expected to 
memorize Quotations from Chairman Mao as a foundational Chinese 
language-learning resource. Chinese language learning was evaluated 
by reading quotes out loud from blackboards, which were even 
mounted outside the communal dining hall of Yarru village and the 
ferry pier along the Luchu River. Bendi Gyal, a grandfather now in his 
mid-seventies, recalled that two students from a local school usually 
stood beside the blackboard and would ask villagers to read the quotes 
aloud. If they were unable to read the quotes correctly, they would 
not be permitted to eat or take the ferry, and students would offer 
instruction in the quotes until villagers could read them. When the policy 
was tightened further, blackboards were mounted at the entrance of 
villages. Every time villagers passed by the gateway, they were required 
to read the quotes on the blackboards. Although we cannot say to what 
extent this literacy campaign helped Chone Tibetans acquire Chinese, 
such practices certainly changed Chone Tibetans’ attitudes towards the 
Chinese language in which Chinese was positioned as a resource that 
could bolster status and garner prestige. As Lhamo said, ‘when we were 
young, those who could speak and write Chinese were [thought to be] 
the talented ones.’ 
After 1976, each household received a radio from the government. 
News from China National Radio and Chone County Radio were 
broadcast in Mandarin Chinese at 7pm every day, introducing Mandarin 
Chinese to the community in a more systematic way. Since the 1990s, 
literacy campaigns in Yarru village have become increasingly diverse 
and multimodal, including — but not limited to — meetings, songs, TV, 
blackboards, posters, and job trainings. In 2005, the literacy campaign 
strategy gradually shifted its focus from teaching Chinese characters 
to receiving skills training in the Chinese medium (Chone Education 
Bureau 2011: 83). Literate Chone Tibetans were told that they would 
become more competitive in the labor market through reinforcing the 
Chinese characters that they had learned. Courses introducing skills in 
vegetable cultivation, animal husbandry, construction, noodle making 
and using sewing machines have been offered to people in Yarru village 
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through the medium of Chinese, all on the understanding that this will 
make them more competitive in the labor force. 
Even though specific statistics on changes in Chone Tibetan literacy 
rates as a result of this seven-decades-long campaign are still lacking,4 
overall literacy rate changes in Chone County are available. While the 
illiteracy rate was above 90% before the foundation of the PRC in Chone 
(Chone Gazetteer Compilation Committee 1994: 165), by the end of 2010, 
the illiteracy rate in Chone had dropped to 3.14% (Chone Education 
Bureau 2011: 84). Through the waves of successive literacy campaigns, 
Chone Tibetans now not only know how to speak and write Chinese, 
but have also internalized the prevailing linguistic order. The strong 
and sustained position taken by the government has helped to establish 
the linguistic domination of Chinese. 
Changing Educational Policies
While the national literacy campaign outlined above introduced the 
Chinese language to Chone Tibetans and helped to establish a linguistic 
hierarchy with Chinese as the superior language, educational policies 
worked to further complicate the linguistic hierarchy by having Chone 
Tibetans learn both Chinese and Amdo Tibetan in a structured and formal 
way, speeding up the loss of the Chone Tibetan language. As widely 
documented (cf. Aronowitz 2002; Macedo, Dendrinos and Gounari 2003; 
Wiley 1996), schools are important sites for a dominant language and 
its associated culture to be asserted, justified and reinforced. Schools 
are also important locations where people’s consent is acquired and 
linguistic hegemony is reproduced. In China, the stated aim of bilingual 
education is to introduce the Chinese language to ethnic minorities and 
have ethnic minorities develop Chinese language proficiency in order 
to better assimilate them into Chinese society (Dwyer 2005). At the same 
time, as an intended or unintended byproduct, bilingual education helps 
to establish the superior and authoritative position of standardized 
minority languages over local varieties, as the standardized local 
language is chosen as the medium of instruction in school settings. In 
the case of Yarru village, educational policy has legitimized Chinese 
4  Chone Tibetans (riverside Tibetans) are also recognized as Tibetans. Therefore, the 
statistics about their literacy are not separated from other Tibetan groups in Chone. 
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and elevated Amdo Tibetan as the regional standard, which in turn has 
encouraged Chone Tibetans to view their heritage language as inferior 
and less formal. The dual hegemonies engendered by this bilingual 
education policy have contributed to the rapid loss of Chone Tibetan 
and to a growing sense of linguistic anxiety among its former speakers.
The primary school in Yarru village was founded in the 1950s at the 
same time as the establishment of the People’s Commune; because of 
political campaigns, classes were not regularly offered until the mid-
1970s. Chone Tibetans recall that since the founding of the school, the 
medium of instruction has always been Chinese, and that Tibetan classes 
were not offered until 1987. The only opportunity for Chone Tibetans in 
Yarru village to learn a Tibetan language in school before 1987 was to 
enroll in the Town Center Middle School where both Tibetan and English 
were taught as school subjects. Pema, aged forty-seven, was educated 
in the Town Center Middle school, and confirmed that standardized 
Amdo Tibetan was taught there twice a week. When asked about his 
experience of learning Amdo Tibetan in a school setting, he answered, 
‘our [Chone Tibetan] language is different from the spoken language 
taught in school, which is taught by teachers from regular school.’ From 
Pema’s point of view, the major difference between Amdo Tibetan 
and Chone Tibetan was formality. He further added, ‘Ironically, the 
Tibetan language class was later cancelled in the second year while the 
English class was never cancelled in all of my three years. Just as in 
English, we are dabblers in Tibetan.’ Pema is an ethnic Tibetan whose 
native language is Chone Tibetan. However, the standard form of the 
language taught in school has changed his understanding of the Tibetan 
language. Having described himself as a dabbler in Tibetan, he further 
perceives Chone Tibetan to be linguistically deficient, inauthentic, and 
subordinate when compared to Amdo Tibetan. 
In 1987, when the Tibetan language was finally offered for instruction 
in Yarru village twice a week under Model Two of China’s bilingual 
education policy,5 it was the standardized Amdo Tibetan language 
5  Currently, two bilingual models have been implemented in the Tibetan areas of 
China. The first, known as ‘Model One’, refers to an approach where the medium 
of instruction is Tibetan and all textbooks are written in Tibetan, except for those 
used in Chinese and English classes. The second, known as ‘Model Two’, refers 
to an approach where the medium of instruction is Chinese and all textbooks 
are written in Chinese, except for those used in Tibetan and English classes 
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that was selected to be taught. The first Tibetan language teacher, 
Dorje Men, is an ethnic Chone Tibetan born in Yarru village. She was 
stationed in Yarru village immediately after graduating from Kanlho 
Minorities’ School in 1987 where she first learned to write Tibetan using 
standardized Amdo Tibetan over the course of three years. She recalled 
that back then, most of her students could speak Chone Tibetan but 
they did not know how to read or write in any Tibetan language. She 
therefore corrected their pronunciation and taught the Tibetan script in 
standardized Amdo Tibetan form, so that both standardized vocabulary 
and pronunciation would be imparted to the students. Through such 
approaches, a linguistic hierarchy was established within schools with 
the Chinese language as dominant and Amdo Tibetan as secondary and 
subordinate, and this hierarchy was maintained through the medium of 
instruction. However, two years later, Dorje Men was transferred to a 
primary school in the Chone County seat to teach math and music. When 
villagers were unhappy with her departure and asked the principal of 
the Town Center School to assign a new Tibetan teacher to the village 
school, their request was not honored due to a shortage of recognized 
Tibetan language teachers. Later, several Tibetan language teachers 
were stationed in Yarru village school but none of them stayed long. 
As a result, the educational model of Yarru village school was finally 
switched from Model Two to Model Three, and Tibetan classes were 
permanently canceled (see n.5 for more information on the different 
educational ‘Models’). This situation lasted until the Yarru village 
primary school was permanently shuttered in 2013.
(Yang 2017). In addition to these two bilingual models, ‘Model Three’ refers 
to an approach where the medium of instruction is Chinese, and all textbooks 
are written in Chinese except for the ones used in English class. ‘Model Three’ 
does not include the provision of a Tibetan class. These three models were 
implemented based on both geographical location and the modes of production 
on which people have relied (Personal communication with cadres). ‘Model One’ 
was implemented in the pastoral region of Chone. ‘Model Two’ was implemented 
in farming-pastoral regions, where most Chone Tibetans, including Tibetans 
in Yarru village and some Chinese, reside. Nowadays, apart from one primary 
school in a village where Chone Tibetans reside that still follows ‘Model Two’, the 
rest of the schools that Chone Tibetans attend, including the primary school in 
Yarru village, have gradually shifted to ‘Model Three’ due to the lack of Tibetan 
language teachers and at the insistence of parents. Such a policy has its own 
limitations since Tibetan classes were offered based on the modes of production 
of the community rather than students’ ethnicities, thereby arguably not meeting 
the real needs of Tibetans who wish to learn their Tibetan language.
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From 2013 to the present, children in Yarru village either attend the 
Town Center Boarding School or Chinese schools in the Chone County 
seat. No matter which school they choose, the medium of instruction 
and all of their textbooks are in Chinese, and Tibetan has increasingly 
become a foreign and distant language for them. At the same time, 
Mandarin Chinese is being robustly promoted in school. Teenagers 
have described a Language Commission Office that was set up in the 
Chinese high school in the Chone County seat, with two teachers in 
the office taking charge of promoting Mandarin Chinese. Also, because 
most teachers working in the Chone High School were not local and 
spoke only Mandarin Chinese, the local Chinese dialect was not widely 
tolerated in school and teachers strongly encouraged teenagers to use 
Mandarin Chinese for all communication. The same process occurred 
in the Town Center Boarding School. Slogans such as ‘please speak 
Mandarin Chinese, please write standardized Chinese characters’ 
were displayed and conveyed the prevailing belief that only Mandarin 
Chinese in standardized Chinese characters was a legitimate language 
within the school setting. Children’s extensive exposure to Chinese in 
school made parents believe that it was the children’s Chinese learning 
that triggered language shift within the family. During fieldwork, the 
principal author noted that the sentiment that ‘ever since the children 
were sent to school, the transmission of the (Chone) Tibetan language is 
over’ was heard time and again. 
This review of seven decades of educational policy changes in Yarru 
village illustrates how policies have shifted back and forth between 
promoting Chinese, on the one hand, and supporting Chone Tibetans 
to learn Amdo Tibetan on the other. This oscillation can be explained 
by understanding how China’s language policy is tightly connected to 
its policy relating to ethnic minorities and nation-state building, both 
of which have been subjected to changes in response to state-ethnic 
minority relations over the years (Zhou 2003). Dwyer categorizes such 
dramatic policy pivots as ‘ideologically and pragmatically chaotic’ 
(2005: 22). A consequence of such frequent changes is the creation not 
only of ‘generation gaps’ in terms of language learning and literacy 
development, but also ‘gaps in historical knowledge’ (Beckett and 
Postiglione 2012:14). In the case of the Chone Tibetans of Yarru village, 
frequent educational policy changes not only deprived them of their 
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right to learn the Tibetan language, but also resulted in most generations 
being fully exposed to Chinese language and culture, thereby speeding 
up the production and reproduction of Chinese linguistic and cultural 
hegemony and the assimilation of Tibetans.
In today’s Chone, following the cancelation of Tibetan classes, 
Chinese has become the single most prioritized language in the school 
setting. However, this has not resulted in Amdo Tibetan losing its 
considerable influence in Chone County. Chone Tibetans are still under 
the linguistic and cultural influence of the Amdo Tibetan language, an 
influence which at times can feel oppressive. Recently, guided by the 
Regulations on Tibetan Language Use in Kanlho TAP of Gansu Province 
(1996), the Article 24 of the Autonomy Statute of Kanlho TAP of Gansu 
Province (2010), and the Implementation Rules for the Regulations on 
Tibetan Language Use in Kanlho TAP of Gansu Province (2006), Tibetan 
language and its use, development and promotion within Kanlho TAP 
has been strongly encouraged in both letter and spirit. In Chone, the 
Tibetan Language Committee was formed in 2010, and consists of five 
staff of whom four majored in Tibetan Language and Literature. The 
Committee is tasked with implementing six goals, one of which is to 
promote Tibetan language standardization and the use of Tibetan in 
Chone. Even though it is nowhere explicitly stipulated which form 
or variety of Tibetan should be regarded as the standard language in 
Chone, the lead author of this chapter was informed that the unwritten 
rule is that it be Amdo Tibetan. Consequently, Amdo Tibetan is widely 
used in formal linguistic contexts in Chone when Tibetan is called for. 
For example, shop signs and road signs are written in Amdo Tibetan; the 
Chone Television Station broadcasts in Amdo Tibetan; and the medium 
of instruction in Tibetan class at the Tibetan High School of Chone 
County is Amdo Tibetan, with accommodations made for different 
teachers’ accents. Supported by the state, then, Amdo Tibetan is now 
encroaching into every domain in which Chone Tibetan was once used, 
and is even expanding into new domains. 
As is clear from the above description, educational language policies 
implemented by the central and local governments are also hegemonic 
projects. These policies not only inscribe and reinforce a linguistic 
hierarchy — which gives priority to Chinese and Amdo Tibetan 
through the medium of instruction, textbooks and public signage and 
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media — but also serve to create a sense of language deficit and linguistic 
alienation, whereby Tibetans in Yarru village lose the opportunity to 
learn their own heritage language. 
The Role of Consent in Shaping Linguistic Hegemony
As noted by Peter Ives, ‘language is spread predominantly not 
by government or state coercion, military or police action, but by 
speakers accepting the prestige and utility of new languages, phrases 
or terms’ (2004: 7). By this we understand that the willingness of 
minority language speakers to adopt a dominant language leads to the 
reproduction of a linguistic hegemony, thereby offering the dominant 
language further legitimacy. The rationale behind people’s attitudes 
and choices about the languages they adopt is socio-political, economic 
and cultural (Kroskrity 2000). In the context of Chone, we argue that 
Chone Tibetans have internalized the dominant belief that Chinese 
is a more modern and useful language than their variety of Tibetan, 
leading to pronounced language shift. At the same time, Chone Tibetans 
have also internalized a related if different language ideology: that 
Amdo Tibetan should be thought of and promoted as the standardized 
Tibetan language in formal and public contexts. The internalization of 
a three-tiered language hierarchy with Chone Tibetan at the bottom of 
the stack has resulted in Chone Tibetans voluntarily participating in the 
legitimization and reproduction of dual linguistic hegemonies. 
Tracking Language Shift from Chone Tibetan to Chinese 
Supported by China’s language policy and nation-state building, 
Chinese is the language associated with notions of science and modernity 
(Dwyer 2005; Prins 2002). Minority languages, including Tibetan 
languages, have borrowed new words from Chinese in order to engage 
in new technologies and domains of use. Such linguistic processes have 
made Chone Tibetans feel that Tibetan languages, and in particular their 
own form of Chone Tibetan, are not as useful, modern or advanced as 
Chinese. Tashi, a grandfather in his late sixties, said: ‘I always think that 
Tibetan is shallow. For example, in Chinese we can say the government 
constructs this or that thing, that it makes an airplane or cannon. Can 
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we say these things in Tibetan?’ When compared with Chinese, then, 
Tibetan languages — especially Chone Tibetan — do not have an 
indigenous vocabulary for post-1949 innovations. This lack of a modern 
lexicon has worked to make local Tibetans undervalue their heritage 
language and imagine Chone Tibetan to be ‘shallow,’ accelerating the 
language shift from Chone Tibetan to Chinese. 
Language shift and the sense of linguistic inferiority are further 
reinforced by the linguistic market. In China, Chinese is the lingua 
franca and is used in almost every domain with the support of both the 
state and the market. Chinese is also a language that people believe can 
provide them with economic security and upward mobility (Bulag 2003; 
de Varennes 2012; Harrell 1993; Prins 2002). Tibetan is not used in the 
same kinds of social interactions as Chinese is, leading Chone Tibetans 
to perceive it as having less value. Discussing which language was more 
useful, Dorje Men, the former Tibetan language teacher, said, ‘Tibetan 
is of little use. If you go to Lanzhou (the provincial capital of Ganzu 
province), you have to speak Chinese, and Tibetan becomes useless. 
Without knowing Chinese, you cannot even find a bathroom or ask 
people where a bathroom is.’ From Dorje Men’s perspective, it is almost 
impossible to engage in any activities in today’s China without resorting 
to the use of Chinese. At the same time, Chinese is also valued more 
highly in the labor market. For most Chone Tibetans, the labor market 
has become a major source of income due to their gradual abandonment 
of livestock farming since the 2000s. Currently, only two households in 
Yarru village still herd sheep. The remaining Chone Tibetans either grow 
cash crops and medicinal herbs or choose to work as migrant workers. 
However, as the forty-seven-year-old Pema, who took standard Tibetan 
classes in the Town Center Middle school, argued, the precondition of 
being a migrant worker in the labor force is that ‘you have to be literate 
in Chinese.’ Increasingly, Chone Tibetans are realizing that gaining 
proficiency in Chinese is a prerequisite for them to lead a better — or at 
least modern — life and have the chance of social mobility in the context 
of the nation that the PRC is building. In a tangible indication of the 
shift, in 2002, parents in a village near Yarru even demanded that the 
Chone Education Bureau cancel their children’s weekly Tibetan class 
in order that their children learn Chinese intensively and have a better 
chance of being admitted to a good university.
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Such parental requests reflect the success of a powerful linguistic 
hegemony among Chone Tibetans. As Suarez has noted, ‘the results 
of successful linguistic hegemony are often language shift from 
the minority language to the majority language and, ultimately, 
language loss’ (2002: 514). A strongly held language ideology, as the 
consent component of linguistic hegemony, can result in speakers of 
a minority language holding a negative view towards their heritage 
language and giving up opportunities to learn the heritage language. 
For example, an eighteen-year-old high school student, Khacho Men, 
stated firmly that Tibetan languages, especially Chone Tibetan, should 
not be used in formal contexts, such as meetings and conferences, 
because ‘Tibetan is not a presentable language.’ This growing sense 
of inferiority has bred a sense of linguistic fatalism in which local 
Tibetans believe that Tibetan languages will eventually cease to be 
used. Tashi, the grandfather in his late sixties, stated: ‘not many years 
from now, Tibetan languages will be extinct. The influence of Chinese 
is so strong that it will leave no space for the development of Tibetan. 
Other than the monks learning Tibetan to study Buddhist scriptures, 
there is no use for farmers or herdsmen to learn Tibetan. [Famers and 
herdsmen] are incapable of strengthening the Tibetan language.’ For 
Chone Tibetans, then, whereas Chinese is considered to be a useful 
language, Tibetan is perceived to be of little use on account of its low 
social status and slow response to new domains of use.
Establishing the Superiority of Amdo Tibetan  
over Chone Tibetan 
Alongside perceiving Chinese to be the most useful language, 
Chone Tibetans also believe that standard Tibetan can necessarily 
only be Amdo Tibetan on account of a successful standardization 
movement and the use of Amdo Tibetan in formal contexts. Chone 
Tibetan is considered less prestigious, less useful, and less authentic 
than Amdo Tibetan due to its heavy reliance on loanwords from 
Chinese. The notion that the Chone Tibetan language has been more 
contaminated by Chinese at the lexical level is deeply rooted in Chone 
Tibetans’ understandings, further contributing to Chone Tibetans’ 
disparagement of their heritage language. 
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Even though in some contexts, linguistic purism can be seen as 
minority language speakers’ resistance to a dominant language (Brunstad 
2003, Turin 2014), linguistic purism can also jeopardize the maintenance 
of local linguistic varieties. This is because in the construction of an 
imagined linguistic purity, there is always a conception of what a good 
or standard language is. This in turn encourages people to accept and 
value the standard language given its support of institutional power. 
As a result, linguistic purism affects speakers’ language ideologies 
and contributes to the linguistic and cultural hegemony of a standard 
language (Brunstad 2003). Compared to Amdo Tibetan — which is 
represented by institutional forces as the pure and standard Tibetan 
language — Chone Tibetan, with its heavy reliance on loan words from 
Chinese, has been belittled by its speakers as an impure and inauthentic 
local patois. As Woser, a man in his mid fifties, argued, ‘the authentic 
Tibetan language should be the language spoken by Tibetans in Luchu, 
Machu, Labrang.6 Their language is different from us in that we keep lots 
of Chinese words in our language, such as vinegar, pepper, matchstick, 
etc.’ Loanwords from Chinese have made Chone Tibetans feel that their 
language is contaminated and therefore inauthentic, and they have 
further internalized this ideology to believe that even phonetically, 
Chone Tibetan is less culturally Tibetan than Amdo Tibetan. Dorje Men, 
the former Tibetan language teacher said, ‘Amdo Tibetan is so delicate 
and sophisticated, while our language (Chone Tibetan) is a little bit 
coarse and crude.’ 
Chone Tibetan’s heavy reliance on loanwords from Chinese, plus 
its low social prestige due to the lack of state support, has made its 
speakers, such as Pema Tso, look down on their heritage language and 
believe that: ‘Chone Tibetan is just a local dialect, while Amdo Tibetan 
is a [more] standardized language.’ Two teenagers who had equal 
proficiency in Chinese and Chone Tibetan also expressed their desire to 
learn Amdo Tibetan, indicating that the linguistic hierarchy has taken 
hold in the minds of young Chone Tibetans. This hierarchy reflects 
not only the limited material, educational and symbolic resources 
6  Luchu, Machu, and Labrang (Sangchu) are three counties of Kanlho TAP that form 
the nomadic center of Kanlho TAP. Since Amdo Tibetan is based on the speech of 
nomads, Chone Tibetans attributed a high value to the Tibetan language spoken 
by Tibetans from the above-mentioned three counties and view it as the authentic 
Tibetan language. 
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to which the Chone Tibetan language and its speakers have access, 
but also indicates how local villagers unconsciously and voluntarily 
participate in and reinforce the reproduction of a linguistic hegemony 
by putting a favored regional language (Amdo Tibetan) ahead of their 
own heritage language. 
When asked about the future of the Chone Tibetan language — from 
cadres to villagers, and from seniors in their eighties to teenagers — few 
people have an optimistic view. Woser, who received all of his education 
in Chinese, believes that the sidelining of Tibetan is unavoidable: ‘the 
nature of Chinese society is Han Chauvinism. If you do not voluntarily 
assimilate yourself to Chinese society, you cannot go further.’ Pema 
Tso said, ‘preservation and promotion of Chone Tibetan is impossible. 
In the future, Chone Tibetan will only be spoken in the deep and 
remote valleys.’ However, the majority of Chone Tibetans, including 
Pema Tso, are confident in the resilience and value of Amdo Tibetan. 
They believe that Amdo Tibetan, with the support of the state and its 
large number of speakers, will continue to be promoted widely. When 
asked if Tibetan classes would be offered in the future at the request 
of parents for the sake of preserving their ethnic and cultural identity 
in Yarru village, a government official replied, ‘virtually impossible, 
since Chone Tibetans’ linguistic environment has already become 
unfavorable. Nothing can be changed and Chone Tibetans are greatly 
Sinicized.’ 
What remains appears to be an almost hopeless situation for the 
historic language of Chone. Last year, with the equivalent of USD $8,000 
of funding from the office of Cultural Affairs of Gansu Province, Chone 
Tibetans in Yarru village started to preserve their linguistic and cultural 
identity through the learning and preservation of Shépa, an important 
local oral tradition. However, because it was a voluntary activity, only 
those who understood Chone Tibetan participated in the cultural 
activities. Also, since almost all of the participants were illiterate in 
written Tibetan, they learned and documented the songs by writing the 
Tibetan lyrics in Chinese characters based only and incorrectly on their 
phonetic resemblance to Tibetan words. Therefore, to what extent and 
how effectively Chone Tibetans can revitalize their heritage language 
through the learning, preservation, and revitalization of Shépa remains 
an open question.
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Conclusion
To conclude, the language policy of the People’s Republic of China has 
shaped the Chone Tibetan language and ideologies around its use and 
future. Through examining the state’s language policies as they have 
played out in Chone post-1953 and delineating Chone Tibetans’ language 
practices and language ideologies, it is evident that the state’s coercive 
language policies and the understandable willingness shown by Chone 
Tibetans to adopt new languages work together to contribute to a three-
tiered linguistic hierarchy. This linguistic hierarchy positions Chinese 
and Amdo Tibetan above Chone Tibetan — albeit with Chinese firmly 
situated above Amdo Tibetan — with the result that Chone Tibetan 
faces a dual linguistic hegemony. This hierarchy has also shaped the 
language practices and beliefs of Chone Tibetans, and has led them to 
internalize a sense of linguistic fatalism towards their heritage language 
and reconcile themselves to its inevitable demise. 
We hope that our research contributes to an emerging and necessary 
conversation about linguistic diversity within cultural Tibet, and helps 
to improve the visibility and viability of the varieties and dialects of 
Tibetan, each of which are distinct markers of identity and cultural 
expression. We also call for an approach to dialect documentation and 
preservation that is situated within the broader goal of minority language 
preservation in cultural Tibet. In the meantime, we hope that our work 
contributes methodological approaches and analytical advancements to 
research on minority language standardization processes, through our 
examination of the inherent tensions within such processes and through 
our discussion of how communities interact with minority language 
standardization projects.
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6. Concluding Thoughts  
on Language Shift and Linguistic 
Diversity in the Himalaya
The Case of Nepal
Mark Turin
Location: The Greater Himalayan Region.
Topic: Language.
Status: It’s complicated.
The process of building nations has involved the reimagining, recreating 
and repositioning of the language or languages that are spoken within, 
and sometimes across, national borders. Across the Himalaya, speech 
communities hailing from genetically unrelated languages have been in 
contact with one another across large periods of modern history — for 
reasons of trade, political alliance and interethnic ritual practice. 
However, prolonged language contact and even cohabitation did not 
historically result in large-scale language shift. Rather, the move from 
plurilingual spoken realities to more homogenous and increasingly 
monolingual linguistic identities is a central and even coercive feature of 
modern nation-building, and not an accidental byproduct of its success. 
Moreover, as the contributions in this volume show, the container of the 
‘nation-state’ is not always the sole category to consider.
Nation-building projects can not only objectify languages through 
documentation, but may also inhibit the spread of some speech forms 
in the name of elevating a favored vernacular to the status of national 
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or official language. We should recall that all projects involving ethnic 
categorization and linguistic classification are fraught with taxonomic, 
political and ideological problems, often compressing complex and 
highly local ethnolinguistic identities into standardized checkboxes. 
The tensions between competing frameworks of recognition are well-
documented across the states that make up the Greater Himalayan 
Region (cf. Shneiderman 2015), and these intersect with ongoing 
national enumerative instruments such as decadal censuses and modern 
linguistic surveys in curious, and often complex, ways.
The Greater Himalayan Region extends for 3,500 km from 
Afghanistan in the west to Myanmar in the east, sustaining over 150 
million people and is home to great linguistic diversity, including many 
of Asia’s most endangered languages. Often described as one of the ten 
biodiversity ‘mega centers’ of the world, the area could also be thought 
of as a linguistic and cultural ‘mega center’, being home to one-sixth of 
all human languages (Turin 2007). Yet, despite this variety, many of the 
region’s speech communities — variously understood as communities 
of subjects, citizens or even stateless individuals — are rapidly shifting 
from speaking traditionally unwritten and increasingly endangered 
vernaculars to regional, national and even international languages 
of prestige that carry with them the promise of economic benefit 
and political access. Communities that were once multilingual are 
becoming functionally bilingual and, in some cases, even monolingual, 
with the move from oral speech forms to written languages often that 
of replacement rather than of addition. At the same time, we must 
recognize that in hierarchically organized polities — whether these are 
stratified by caste, class or ethnicity — elites often have the privilege 
of remaining functionally and comfortably monolingual in the official, 
national language, while non-elite communities are more commonly 
and necessarily multilingual, switching register or shifting language 
entirely in order to access state services.
As we learn from the five contributions that together form this 
collection, language shift across the Himalaya is complex, uneven 
and highly specific, as attentive to grand historical processes as it is to 
granular local conditions. Language shift has been variously understood, 
but is commonly characterized as a process in which both langue and 
parole are systematically simplified. Individuals move from functioning 
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as full speakers of a given language with complete grammatical and 
pragmatic command to being ‘semi-speakers’ with reduced verbal 
dexterity. Eventually, all competence drains away, leaving only a 
residual smattering of specialized vocabulary (often, but not always, 
food words, kinship terminology, or elements of ritual vocabulary), 
combined with a strong sense of attachment to a heritage identity as a 
former speaker.
For example, in the case of the Ahom in what is now Northeastern 
India, so insightfully outlined by Selma K. Sonntag in the second 
chapter, language shift from the Tai-Kadai language to Assamese, an 
Indo-Aryan language, occurred in the precolonial seventeenth century, 
creating a ‘rupture in the language regime.’ This move was both ‘reified 
under the colonial language regime’ and even helped to set ‘the stage for 
post-colonial linguistic nationalism in Assam.’ For contemporary self-
identified Ahom who are now working to revitalize (and in the process, 
inevitably reimagine) their ancestral language, language shift is located 
in the past, and understood to be a historical rather than modern-day 
process. Similarly, language shift in Northern Pakistan is no recent 
phenomenon. Since the Pashtun invasion of Swat and Bajaur in the 
fifteenth century, Pashto has spread at the expense of more traditional 
languages, such as Domaakí and Gawri (Weinreich 2010).
By contrast, in the Tibetan cultural zone that extends across and 
beyond the borders of the People’s Republic of China, Tibetan-speaking 
communities are responding to multiple and overlapping linguistic 
pressures that threaten the viability of the many regional Tibetan variants. 
Such processes include state-sponsored Sinification (within China at least) 
that positions Mandarin as the expected language of upward mobility 
and access; national language policies of India and Nepal that prioritize 
English, Hindi and Nepali respectively, where many Tibetan communities 
are resident and within which they have to operate; and current language 
standardization campaigns that position central, Lhasa Tibetan or other 
dominant regional variants as the optimal (and in some cases the only) 
acceptable form of the Tibetan language. As Tunzhi (Sonam Lhundrop), 
Hiroyuki Suzuki and Gerald Roche detail in their contribution, and as 
Bendi Tso and I document in the case of Chone, there is a pervading sense 
across the Tibetan-speaking realm that while all variants of Tibetan are 
putatively equal, some are more equal than others.
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While the contributors all focus on communities who are visible 
to the state — sometimes, arguably, too legible — as co-editors of the 
volume, we have asked ourselves whether stateless peoples engage 
in or are swept up by language shift in the same way as state citizens 
are. We may spare a thought for the Rohingya in particular, 700,000 of 
whom have been forced to escape violence in Myanmar by fleeing to 
Bangladesh while thousands have been massacred in villages before 
they could flee. The Rohingya language, although part of the Indo-
Aryan sub-branch of the greater Indo-European language family and 
related to the Chittagonian language spoken in the southern-most 
corner of Bangladesh, is not mutually intelligible with Bengali, and most 
Rohingya do not speak Burmese fluently, the lingua franca of Myanmar. 
Excluded from full participation in the Burmese state on the basis of 
ancestry, religion and culture, and not officially recognized as one of 
Burma’s ‘major national ethnic races’, the plight of the Rohingya has 
given Myanmar the dubious honor of being the nation with the world’s 
highest percentage of non-citizens in its population (cf. Bialystok 2011).
Other nations in the Himalayan region have also used culture and 
language as tools for social exclusion and political disenfranchisement. 
We need look no further than the case of the Lhotshampa of Bhutan — a 
nation missing from this edited collection and therefore worth noting 
in these concluding remarks — for a compelling illustration for how 
language became instrumentalized as a way to dispossess a people. In his 
powerfully titled Unbecoming Citizens, Michael Hutt documents Bhutan’s 
demotion of the Nepali language that started in 1989. Until 1964, Hindi 
was the medium of instruction in schools across Bhutan, in part due to 
the absence of suitable curriculum in any other language, but also on 
account of a shortage of Bhutanese teachers. As a consequence, a large 
number of Hindi-speaking (and writing) Indian teachers were employed 
in Bhutan’s government schools (Hutt 2003: 138). In 1964, English took 
the place of Hindi as the medium of instruction, and Bhutanese teachers 
were to trained to replace Indians as the pedagogical staff in the nation’s 
schools. While Hutt is careful to describe Bhutan’s language policy of the 
1960s as ‘pragmatic’ (2003: 179), he draws attention to a growing sense of 
unease in Bhutan about the government’s avowed, public and deepening 
commitment to Dzongkha on the one hand, and its chance of ‘ever 
becoming a fully-fledged national language on the other’ (2003: 180).
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Over time, Hutt presents Bhutan’s otherwise ‘easy-going attitude 
to language matters’ as becoming distinctly ‘less compromising’ (2003: 
183), particularly as the prevalence of Nepali continued to rise. Even 
though the Bhutan Broadcasting Service (BBS) continues to this day 
to broadcast in Nepali, and Kuensel, the national newspaper, is still 
committed to printing a Nepali-language edition, the teaching of Nepali 
was discontinued at the beginning of the school year in 1989, and ‘all 
curricular materials were removed from Bhutanese schools’ at the 
same time (Hutt 2003: 183).1 While linguist George van Driem does not 
dispute the fact that the Nepali language was eliminated from Bhutan’s 
schools by 1990, he offers a very different interpretation of the intent 
and reasoning behind this change in national language policy, offering 
three reasons why the new measure was ‘not directly connected with 
the southern problem’ (1994: 101).2 First, he argues, the use of Nepali 
in the south of Bhutan was ‘counter-productive to the advancement of 
the national language’; second, Nepali was being unfairly privileged 
over other ‘originally allochthonous’ languages, a position not enjoyed 
by any other tongue and thus a situation which required balancing; 
and finally, given Bhutan’s limited resources, the strategic priority 
for the nation had to be the development of modern curricula content 
in Dzongkha and English over Nepali, a process in which he himself 
participated (van Driem 1994: 101–2).
This period of modern Bhutanese history remains complex and 
contested, and the issue of whether Nepali was ever truly a medium 
of instruction or simply a subject in schools in Bhutan’s southern belt 
remains unresolved. More germane to the current discussion, however, 
is that speaking Nepali, and a specific variant of Nepali in particular, 
became a diagnostic marker of identity and group membership for 
Lhotshampa. The vocabulary differences between modern Nepali as 
spoken in Nepal and the variant spoken in Bhutan were deemed to 
be significant enough that they served as the basis for a linguistic test 
1  Hutt reports allegations of some schools disposing of their books by burning them 
in bonfires (2003: 185).
2  Euphemistically referred to as the ‘southern problem’, van Driem is referring 
the forced exodus and expulsion of tens of thousands of ethnic Nepalis from the 
primarily southern districts of Bhutan by the state in response to growing concerns 
about preserving the country’s unique national, cultural, linguistic and religious 
identity.
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to ascertain whether individuals claiming political asylum in Europe 
were indeed credible Lhotshampa from Bhutan (people of Nepalese 
ancestry who grew up in Bhutan) or citizens of Nepal dissembling as 
Bhutanese refugees in order to game the system and find safe passage to 
the European Union. Linguistic assessments — albeit of aptitude rather 
than critical examinations of dialect variation — are used by nations as 
part of their ‘naturalization’ test for aspiring citizens. In such instances, 
nation-states require that candidates demonstrate a communicative 
competence in the national language, with the ability to speak a certain 
language serving as a gatekeeping device to determine and grant 
membership of a nation.
Documenting, analyzing and historicizing patterns of language 
shift — alongside the changing linguistic identities that can result — are 
familiar territory for social scientists. Michael Noonan, writing about 
Chantyal-speaking villages in western Nepal, suggested that their 
‘relative isolation and poverty’ might contribute to ‘the retention of the 
language’ (1996: 130). While outmigration may even prolong isolation for 
those left behind, inmigration brings individuals together in unexpected 
ways, sometimes creating new speech forms and often elevating regional 
tongues to the status of lingua franca or Verkehrsprache. As documented 
in Daurio’s contribution to this volume, the entire Himalayan region 
is undergoing a period of profound social, economic and political 
upheaval — including but not limited to rapid urbanization, massive 
transformations in traditional livelihood practices and responses to 
ecological pressures and natural disasters. Languages and linguistic 
identities are also in flux, as ‘language shifts are inextricably tied to 
shifts in the political economy in which speech situations are located’ 
Urciuoli (1995: 530).
In a post-conflict era that has intersected with a national reconstruction 
project following the catastrophic earthquakes that rocked the country 
in April and May 2015, the newly minted Federal Democratic Republic 
of Nepal is grappling with the political complexity of contemporary 
language policy. Constitutions are powerful and aspirational framing 
documents, helping to ‘constitute’ the basis of the polity in which 
people live. The 2015 Constitution of Nepal recognizes all languages 
autochthonous to the nation as ‘mother tongues’ but elevates Nepali to 
the level of official language of the nation:
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All languages spoken as the mother tongues in Nepal are the languages 
of the nation, and the Nepali language in the Devanagari script shall 
be the official language of Nepal. In addition to the Nepali Language, 
a province shall select one or more additional languages that is spoken 
by the majority of people in that province as the language of official 
business, as provided for by provincial law.
We may ask what this really means. Is the framing of this foundational 
article of Nepal’s constitution an example of fast footwork and 
intellectual agility on the part of the drafters of the document — an 
intentional and deliberately scripted ambiguity — or is it rather just a 
sign of muddled thinking, setting Nepal’s citizens up for a prolonged 
period of confusion, contestation and legal wrangling about language? 
One inference is beyond doubt: in Nepal, Nepali remains firmly 
entrenched as the first among equals, paradoxically the same as — and 
yet substantively different to — the more than a hundred other languages 
spoken within Nepal’s borders. This is a compelling demonstration of 
the ‘tension’ between language shift and language documentation and 
enumeration in this fast-changing nation, a tension that lies at the heart 
of all of the contributions to this volume.
Nepal needs a language to talk about language. Enumerating and 
then classifying people’s mother tongues on a scale from boli to bhasa, 
spoken to written, or endangered to safe won’t be enough. At both 
practical and theoretical levels, whether Nepal has 90 or 150 languages 
is at once beside the point and illustrative of the rigidity of officializing 
and recognizing frameworks. All Nepalis know that one language is 
dominant in politics, culture and media. Nepali — that supra-national 
language — functions as the lingua franca for much of the nation, and 
boasts millions of fluent speakers across northern India, most of Bhutan 
and even Cultural Tibet. Nepali is now a language with global reach: 
heard on the streets of London and the restaurants of New York, as well 
as in Lhasa and Manipur.
Over time, as language and belonging become reinscribed by each 
generation, communities may start thinking of their language as a bhasa 
rather than as a boli. An interesting example provided by the 2011 Census 
of Nepal is the ‘emergence’ of languages such as Doteli (at around 3.2% 
of the total population), Baitadeli (around 1%), Achhami and Bajhangi 
(around 0.1%), which were likely grouped together with Nepali in 
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earlier decadal enumerations in response to the question of ‘What is your 
primary language’. Indeed, these speech forms were entirely absent from 
prior censuses despite accounting for over 5% of the total population. 
A growing ethnolinguistic awareness of the political utility of distinct 
linguistic identities, combined with an emergent set of benefits that 
accord to diverse communities, are likely a major part of the explanation 
for the sharp increase in the number of languages reported as ‘mother 
tongue’ in more recent population censuses in Nepal. This newfound 
strategic visibility is yet another persuasive validation of how, over time, 
the relationship between language enumeration and language shift is 
changing. At present, languages such as Doteli, Baitadeli, Achhami and 
Bajhangi — to mention but a few — are not new additions to Nepal’s 
already densely packed linguistic environment. Rather, these languages 
have long ‘existed’ but have only recently been visible to enumerators 
and strategically valuable to communities of speakers.
Interesting historical trends become apparent from a cursory look 
at the last three decadal population censuses, from 1991, 2001 and 
2011. While the share of the population that report Nepali as their 
first language has dropped sharply from 51% to 44% between 2001 
and 2011 (possibly because languages like Doteli have undergone an 
internal as well as external transformation from boli to bhasa and are 
now ‘legible’ to the state in ways that they were not before), the other 
major language-shares have remained largely stable. Despite the social 
anxiety and political panic about Hindi and English encroaching upon 
Nepali, the shares for both are stable or in decline: Hindi has decreased 
as a ‘mother tongue’ from 0.92% in 1991 to 0.29% in 2011, while English 
has remained stable at around 0.01%. The moral panic articulated by 
some over the perceived decline in the use of Nepali may not actually 
reflect less Nepali ‘use’ but rather a newfound visibility for historically 
underrepresented languages. National identity politics, then, is as 
vulnerable to existential and perceived threats as it is to tangible and 
real ones.
Globalization is regularly, and often uncritically, pilloried as a 
major threat to linguistic diversity. But in fact, globalization is as 
much process as it is ideology, certainly when it comes to language. 
The real forces behind cultural homogenization are unbending beliefs, 
exchanged through a globalized delivery system, reinforced by the 
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historical monolingualism prevalent in much of the West and rolled out 
through imperial adventure and colonization. As a force, globalization 
is causing realignments in the relationship between language shift and 
language enumeration through documentary and classificatory projects. 
Just as there is a campaign to officialize and strengthen English in the 
United States, led by shrill and reactionary voices who perceive this 
most globalizing of languages to be under threat, so too the Nepali 
language has powerful advocates who declare the need to support it with 
additional protective legislation. And herein lies the irony: the worries of 
Nepali being eroded or diminished through the encroachment of English 
or Hindi echo the genuine alarm expressed by speakers of Nepal’s 
Indigenous (and increasingly endangered) languages, who themselves 
fear being overwhelmed by Nepali. A language that appears to be 
vulnerable from one perspective is perceived as hegemonic from another, 
as is clear from the chapters in this volume that address the complexity of 
the Tibetan cultural area and its associated linguistic landscape.
As this volume was heading to the press, Nepal was at a pivotal 
political moment with regard to language. First, in whatever federal 
reconfiguration lies ahead following the decade-long civil war that 
raged from 1996–2006 and the catastrophic earthquakes that shattered 
large swathes of central Nepal in 2015, the polity will have to consider 
whether languages other than Nepali will be resourced and supported 
so that communities can live, work and represent themselves in their 
mother tongues. This question goes beyond the right of accessing legal 
representation in, for example, Maithili or Nepal Bhasa (Ojha 2017), and 
lies at the core of Nepal’s understanding of itself as a nation. Will Tamang 
serve as the medium of instruction in schools in Province No. 3 or only 
a subject? Will airlines flying to Lukla make safety announcements in 
Sherpa alongside Nepali and English? Will government websites be 
translated into and made accessible in some of Nepal’s most widely 
used native languages that have written traditions? Will ATMs offer 
users cash in Nepal Bhasa in Bhaktapur, in the same way that cash 
dispenser in Hawai’i offer an Ōlelo Hawai’i language option?
Second, as Nepal’s Language Commission gains momentum in 
accordance with Article 287 of the Constitution, and exercises its 
mandate to recommend measures to be adopted for the protection, 
promotion and development of languages, it would be well advised 
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to explore how similar processes have played out in New Zealand, 
Canada, Myanmar and India. Language Commissions and Language 
Authorities have a unique opportunity to reset language planning in 
a nation, but need to determine whether their mandate is proscriptive 
(citizens must…) or descriptive (citizens already do…). Is a one, two or 
three language formula appropriate and deliverable in Nepal, or are 
there other options as yet unexplored? Technology is an increasingly 
important element to consider, certainly for those Nepalis whose use of 
and interest in mobile and digital tools provides a huge opportunity for 
nurturing language diversity and supporting language mobilization.
Third, educational policy needs to embrace this digital turn, and 
focus not only on traditional textbook creation in Nepal’s many mother 
tongues (as outlined in Pradhan’s contribution) but on multimedia 
content that can be delivered through e-learning systems to schools 
in remote districts as so compellingly illustrated by the success of 
OLE Nepal.3 Given that the penetration of mobile telephony has been 
a singular success story for Nepal over the last decade, now is an 
opportune time to create content to back it up. Nepal’s infrastructure 
backbone is increasingly digital, and can be used to reflect the nation’s 
diverse and vibrant multilingualism. Tools of globalization like the 
internet, so often blamed for homogenizing the world, are also enabling 
diverse and geographically dislocated language communities to connect 
across time and place.
Overall, Nepal — like many of regions and nations discussed in 
earlier chapters of this collection — needs to come to terms with its 
own multilingualism, both historic and contemporary, and find ways to 
recognize creative innovation even when these actions are not sanctioned 
by the state or explicitly contradict national policy. In her recent work on 
the Kumaun region of North India, Cynthia Groff explores the ways in 
which the lived multilingual reality quietly subverts national language 
3  Open Learning Exchange Nepal (OLE Nepal) is a social benefit organization 
dedicated to enhancing education quality and access through the integration of 
technology in classrooms. Since its inception in 2007, OLE Nepal has pioneered the 
use of technology in schools and provided open and free access to quality education 
and innovative learning environments to children. Its education-focused free and 
open digital library, E-Pustakalaya, provides access to a collection of thousands 
of books and educational resources, course content and reference materials and 
has been installed in low power servers and deployed in schools and community 
libraries across the nation. See http://www.olenepal.org
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policies, noting that the ‘Kumauni example demonstrates how local 
ideologies and perspectives can preserve spaces for minoritized linguistic 
varieties regardless of official policy: spaces for unofficial mother tongue, 
unofficial media of instruction, and additive notions of multilingualism’ 
(2018: 17). Language practice and mobilization in Nepal has long been 
similarly subversive, whether in the home, the community or the school, 
and Nepal has never been and likely will never be a monolingual nation 
in which one language is used exclusively for all interactions — whether 
in person, in print, online or on air. 
Nepal’s celebrated non-colonization by outside forces has helped lay 
the foundation for the extraordinary diversity of cultural and linguistic 
expressions to endure, although 100 years of Rana rule and more 
recent nation-building ideologies have done much to erode this very 
diversity and uniqueness. Nepal’s multilingualism can help its citizens 
prepare to live in an ever more connected and interdependent world, 
particularly in the face of the inevitability of language change and ever-
increasing language contact. Across the global north, parents anxiously 
encourage their children to learn another language in school because 
their daily lives are so deafeningly monolingual and they see tactical and 
intellectual benefit in speaking more than one language (Bialystok 2011). 
Multilingual and culturally diverse Nepal is already ahead of the curve 
on this, and well positioned to lead a global discussion on language, 
identity and belonging in education, administration and governance.
Although Nepal (a diverse nation state home to many ethnolinguistic 
communities) and Sikkim (India’s least populous and second smallest 
state) differ massively in scale and in their historical trajectories, there is 
a certain utility in comparing the two because their populations continue 
to draw on similar narratives of belonging and linguistic association, in 
large part because of the common geographies and cultural histories 
that they share. One notable difference between Nepal and Sikkim, 
however, is in their experience of migration: Nepal has a tradition of 
‘sending’ migrants, whereas Sikkim is a state that has accepted and 
‘received’ them, even building itself on their labor. In Sikkim, the 
process of language shift is popularly presented as an unavoidable 
byproduct of the juggernaut of global progress and development, while 
in Nepal, the continued vibrancy of minority mother tongues has been 
associated with their remote and sequestered status. This opposition, at 
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least in the popular imagination, is fleshed out to the extent that Sikkim 
is often imagined to be modern, literate, educated, and connected, 
whereas the ethnolinguistic homeland areas of Nepal — from which 
many contemporary Sikkimese residents derive their ancestry — are 
described as remote, backward, and traditional. My point here is not 
to endorse such descriptions, but to reflect on them for what they tell 
us about the different and changing language regimes that individuals 
and communities have been subjected to and participate in, and what 
these ideological formulations tell us about the different nation-building 
exercise in Nepal and India. As competence in Sikkim’s traditional 
mother tongues has declined, their status has begun to shift from spoken 
vernaculars forming part of a lived ethnic identity to symbolic markers 
of an ancestral linguistic heritage. I would argue that in the language 
shift I observed in Sikkim, a growing attachment to the ‘idea’ of a mother 
tongue is directly related to its decline in use as a speech form.
Monolingualism — the condition of being able to speak only one 
language — is regularly accompanied by a deep-seated conviction 
in the value of that language over all others. Across the largest 
economies of the world, being monolingual is still often the norm, with 
multilingualism appearing unusual and even somewhat exotic (Turin 
2013). This monolingual mindset stands in sharp contrast to the lived 
reality of most of the Greater Himalayan Region, which throughout 
its modern history and into the present has been more resolutely 
multilingual than unilingual. Through this collection of five essays, 
and Selma Sonntag’s rich introduction, we learn that communities 
across the Greater Himalayan Region have complex and contingent 
linguistic identities that are rarely if ever predicated on a sole speech 
form, even if the states in which they live assume that ideal linguistic 
identities are homogenous and monolingual. The linguistic future of the 
Himalayan region is yet to be written, and only time tell whether its 
historic multilingualism will endure and outlive the narrow ruptures 
of nationalism.
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